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ABSTRACT 
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By 
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Dissertation Supervised by Dr. Calvin Troup 
 
No. of Pages in Text: 218 
 
The field of interpersonal communication conducts many descriptive studies. 
However, guidance for healthy communication within intimate relationships is more 
difficult to come by—a condition stemming in part from an emotivist ethical paradigm.  
MacIntyre (1984) describes “emotivism” as the current state of society where individual 
preference serves as the ethical decision making compass. Emerging from Enlightenment 
scholarship (e.g., Hobbes, Rousseau, sociobiology), individual preferences have become 
main tenets in intimate interpersonal research. In the interpersonal theories of social 
exchange and goal-orientation, emotivism is encouraged in the emphasis placed on self-
interest and technique. This exposes itself metaphorically through descriptions of 
communication as a tool, an economic bartering system, and a means of gaining 
emotional satisfaction. As a result, communication phenomena such as love and trust in 
intimate romantic relationships are difficult to express due to the difficulties self-
interested language has in moving beyond the dichotomy of egoism and altruism.  
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This interpretive study hopes to reinvigorate the philosophical ground for other-
focused action in today’s historical moment in regard to the study of interpersonal 
intimate romantic relationships. To do this, communication must first be interpreted in an 
active paradigm. Communicative praxis (Schrag, 1986) provides the texture for this shift, 
describing the subject as decentered, and thus interpreted as multiple, temporal, and 
embodied. In the embodied connection of word to deed (the act of being to, for, and with 
the other), ethical conduct can be determined, thus providing ground to pose an 
interpretive framework for healthy romantic relationships—a narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment as defined in the work of Hyde, Schrag, and Augustine. The connection 
between charity and acknowledgment focuses on rhetorical competence, the emphasis on 
connecting word to deed, and the importance of will and habit. Acknowledgment serves 
as a hermeneutic to open up charity to a postmodern society on an axiological level, 
explored through transversal interpretations of faith, hope, and charity. Charitable 
acknowledgment, then, is the enactment (within a nexus of will, habit, and ethic) of 
unconditionality, sacrifice, and forgiveness. This approach to romantic relationships 
opens the door for new research and future discussion on the ethical implications of the 
narrative shift. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction to the Problem 
As a Master’s student interested in communication in intimate relationships (i.e., 
family, friends, and romances), I was frustrated with intimate interpersonal 
communication research because I struggled to find its relevance to laypeople, namely 
the students I was teaching. Because of my inexperience, I thought I was missing 
something that may have made situational application of the material easier, but after 
another four years reflecting on the subject I am still struck by how much of the literature 
is rather unhelpful for guiding everyday life. Take these findings on divorce for example: 
“Relational dissolution can be seen as a chronic strain” (Amato, 2000). “Partners who 
have supportive social networks tend to experience less difficulty [in divorce] than do 
those without such networks” (Gerstel, 1988). “An individual who suffers socioeconomic 
decline after a divorce is more likely to have difficulty adjusting to the separation 
(McLanahan & Booth, 1989). These are just a few of the numerous studies cited by 
Vangelisti (2002) in her chapter on “Processes in Romantic Relationships” in the 
Handbook of Interpersonal Communication that left me dissatisfied with my subject of 
study. How was this supposed to help someone struggling with a divorce? If I had 
students in such a situation, it certainly would not be very helpful to tell them their 
relational dissolutions likely will be a chronic strain in their life—divorce being difficult 
is hardly earth-shattering news. Furthermore, there seems to be little good that could 
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come of noting to students going through a divorce that financial difficulties would 
compound their difficulties in separating from their spouse or that having friends would 
make the situation easier. Such descriptive studies and their general observations do not 
provide suggestions on what to do if you do not have friends to lean on or have less 
money after a divorce. Since descriptive studies are the norm rather than the exception in 
interpersonal communication, professors are confronted with a rather daunting question: 
in light of a largely descriptive research base, what can professors in interpersonal 
communication intellectually offer to students searching for answers to their relational 
struggles? One answer is provided in the thesis of this dissertation: A narrative of 
charitable acknowledgment provides rich philosophical ground from which to 
interpret healthy relational behaviors.   
While descriptive studies may be frustrating for someone searching for answers to 
relational problems, they do have an important purpose. The value of descriptive studies 
in interpersonal communication is in their ability to confirm or disconfirm “common 
sense.” It is conceivable that divorce may not really be the strain it is made out to be in 
common conceptions of the phenomenon. Thus studies are required (e.g., Amato, 2000; 
Wallerstein, Lewis, & Blakeslee, 2000; Cherlin, Chase-Landsdale, & McRae, 1998) to 
describe that a strain does exist and is in fact a serious problem within relationships. 
Descriptive studies provide a way to establish with a level of confidence that a given 
notion, common-sensical or not, is indeed reflective of reality. But such studies are not 
sufficient in and of themselves for relational guidance. Knowing a support system 
decreases divorce anxiety does not help a student find a support system and that 
ultimately is what is most important to a person with that specific struggle. Knowing 
 2 
   
what is the case is only helpful to the extent it is conjoined with discussions of how it can 
be changed (or brought about if the condition is a positive one).  
It is for this reason that descriptive studies are usually conjoined with discussions 
of technique. The field usually addresses this through “communication skills.” Scholars 
typically take various contexts and explore effective means of navigating outcomes in 
that given context. Examples span from broad areas of technical skill such as comforting 
(e.g., Burleson, 1990; Burleson, Albrecht, Goldsmith, & Sarason, 1994) and conflict 
(e.g., Sternberg & Beier, 1977) to the skills for navigating specific genres such as bad 
news delivery in health care (e.g., Ray 1996) and parenting techniques (e.g., Stafford & 
Bayer, 1993). What makes a given skill the “right” or more commonly the “competent” 
solution depends upon the criteria that are used to assess the given action.  
Spitzberg and Cupach (2002) note six areas of criteria used to evaluate the 
helpfulness of a given skill. Fidelity refers to the idea that clear, concise, and accurate 
communication leads to competent communication. This is probably the most common 
conception of “good” communication in the vernacular. However, as Spitzberg and 
Cupach (2002) note, “Savage, mean-spirited, and even evil communication can be 
frighteningly clear and well understood, even though intuitively most interactants would 
be hesitant to consider such behavior competent” (p. 578). The second criteria base deals 
with satisfaction. Success depends upon whether or not a person is happy with the 
outcome. Relational satisfaction is a very common standard in intimate communication 
studies. This too however is flawed in that “a person who enjoys being mean-spirited, 
evil, and savage in his or her communication can be defined as competent under a 
satisfaction criterion…Such a solipsist criterion therefore relegates interpersonal skills to 
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the whim and subjectivity of the individual” (p. 579).  Efficiency indicates criteria that 
value minimal time, effort, complexity, and investment of resources in gaining the 
desired outcome. The shorter or more parsimonious route is seen as better. However this 
can also allow objectionable behavior in that telling someone “screw you” would be 
efficient at rejecting an idea but would hardly be considered competent. Effectiveness is 
defined by Spitzberg and Cupach (2002) as the “extent to which an interactant 
accomplishes preferred outcomes through communication…Effectiveness is inclusive of 
satisfaction and superordinate to efficiency” (p. 580). The compliance-gaining literature 
today reflects this standard. Again however, those goals can be manipulative and 
deceptive. “It seems there is less concern over a theory of competence based on 
effectiveness than there is a philosophy of communication implicit in such a theory. What 
does it say about the human condition if a theory of competence predicated exclusively 
on effectiveness envisions the darker side of communication as competent?” (Spitzberg 
& Cupach, 2001, p. 581). Appropriateness, the perceived legitimacy of an act in a given 
context, is considered by Spitzberg and Cupach (2001) to be the most common criterion. 
Strongly dependent on politeness and the status quo, this model depends upon a 
communicatively competent individual negotiating the social norms of a given 
community. Problems, however, exist in that, “The rule of the mob, the distortions of 
peer influence, and the sometimes coercive nature of group pressures all warn against the 
automatic evaluation of competence in strict terms of the other” (p. 582). Evaluating the 
appropriateness of action between two divergent communities may not be possible 
without other criteria. The final criteria are based on ethical considerations. These are 
means-oriented rather than ends-oriented, and they commonly reflect a core of principles 
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that include equality, otherness, and freedom. Spitzberg and Cupach (2002) note, 
however, that these are “unabashedly ideological” which may explain their relative lack 
of attention in the interpersonal literature. In explanation of this, the authors suggest that 
the “ideological objective of moral behavior may clash with the postmodern objective of 
celebrating self-determination” (p. 583).  
The importance of taking time to demonstrate the various criteria with which the 
field denotes “competent” communication is to show the overwhelmingly ethical 
underpinnings of the field’s understanding of skills. Regardless of which criterion is used, 
there is always a consideration of whether or not it is the “right” way to treat another 
human being. Note the common usage throughout Spitzberg and Cupach’s article of the 
perception of an individual or even a community as “evil” or the intuitive disdain of 
using “manipulation.” In each of the ends-based criteria, one of the stated objections 
made by the authors always concerns the inherent ethical implications of the means used. 
Thus, undergirding competent communication skills is ethics. However, vast swaths of 
interpersonal communication do not discuss the distinction between good and bad, or to 
use a less polarizing terminology, healthy and unhealthy relationships, instead describing 
intimate relationships in interpersonal communication (Vangelisti, 2002) as primarily 
comprised of categorizations (e.g., stages of relationships), descriptive approaches to 
observed phenomenon (e.g., relational dialectics), and utilitarian explanations for 
achieving goals (e.g., exchange models, reciprocal liking, complementary needs). Why 
has the field shied away from discussing how a person should act in a given relationship?  
I argue the primary reason the field has shied away from ethical criteria is what 
Spitzberg and Cupach describe as the “postmodern objective of celebrating self-
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determination,” which I contend is not a postmodern objective at all but rather an 
objective of modernity. Individualism is the central focus of a modern ethic, and is not 
easily generalized as a result.  It is only with the move in recent times into a 
“postmodern” mode that an argument against self-determinism takes shape. Simply put, 
modernity is an ideological time period where science, progress, and rationality 
composed a metanarrative that dictated the bounds of truth. Ethics, notoriously difficult 
to control and predict yet imminently relevant, took an individualist bent, emphasizing 
self and individualism as an epistemological way to ethical truth. In response, the time 
period of postmodernity questions all metanarrative as rhetorically constructed, thus 
calling into question absolute dictates about society or self. Views of self in the modern 
period are optimistic as rationality and science provide means for “advancement” that 
unseat the faith-based structures modern scientists would consider unfounded. 
Postmodernity calls into question this optimism and lays out the rhetorical nature of 
modern presuppositions. Chapter Two will lay out the modern/postmodern shift in more 
detail especially in regard to its impact on our view of relational ethics and the subject. 
What is important to recognize here is that the “celebration of self” is a modern 
invention. As this dissertation intends to show, there is a profound shift around the time 
of Hobbes that prioritizes rationality and its ability to remedy the ailments of human 
relationships, namely “vainglory” (vanity) and our unquenchable desire to have our own 
needs met. An a priori centralization of self-interest is at the heart of this theory. Since 
this point in history, the fields of philosophy and social sciences have largely maintained 
a distinction between altruism and self-interest whereby self-interest has been conceived 
as the all-encompassing drive in the human being and altruism is viewed as a dutifully 
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administered yet oft-neglected chore that may or may not exist depending upon the 
theorist. It is this emphasis on self-interest that has shifted discussion of ethics in 
relationships from an emphasis on communal/relational values to an emphasis on 
individual preference, an ethical framework described by MacIntyre (1984) as 
“emotivism.” 
The issue of emotivism begins Chapter Three where the prioritization of self-
interest is analyzed in current interpersonal research. MacIntyre (1984) describes 
“emotivism” as the current state of society where individual preference reigns supreme as 
the ethical decision making compass. The prioritization of self-interest has led to a body 
of interpersonal research that is dependent on the modern philosophy of individualism for 
its foundation (Arnett, Fritz, & Holba, 2007). Here the broad critique of MacIntyre 
(1984) and Arnett, Fritz, & Holba (2007) is translated into a narrative of individualism 
specific to interpersonal communication. In the interpersonal communication theories of 
social exchange and goal-orientation, emotivism is encouraged to varying degrees in the 
over-emphasis these theories place on individualism. Social exchange theory (Homans, 
1958; Blau, 1964; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959; Foa and Foa, 1974; Walster, Berscheid, & 
Walster, 1978) depicts human relationships as a bartering system for attaining one’s 
needs and desires. Social exchange explicitly frames communication in terms of self-
interest, which, it is argued here, fosters emotivism in people who would frame their 
relationships within this theoretical framework (i.e., narrative). Goal orientation (Dillard, 
1990; Berger, 1997;  Pervin, 1989) and its correlate cognitive representations (e.g., 
Schank & Abelson, 1977; Green, 1984) does not necessitate an explicitly self-interested 
approach. Nonetheless, the literature in interpersonal communication often assumes a 
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self-interested model where an individual starts with self-motivated intentions and uses 
the “tool” of language to meet his or her goals, implying a self-interested, preference-
laden ethic. One final body of literature is the skills literature. For the purpose of this 
dissertation, those skills explored will be those pertaining to successful communication in 
romantic relationships (Vangelisti, 2002). Both social exchange and goal-oriented 
theories are foundational for the skills literature in intimate communication, which 
focuses primarily on relational satisfaction (i.e., personal preference) as the criterion for 
what is considered competent. The technique-driven approaches that emerge make it 
difficult to assess features of intimacy such as trust and love, which are functions of 
embodiment, not technique. 
  Thus, I argue that this focus on self-interest misses something fundamental about 
the human condition, denoted by John Herman Randall (1926), one of the foremost 
articulators of what comprises the modern mind:  
Aristotle and Thomas…read into the cause and goal of the universe that which 
alone justifies it for man, its service of the good…To the modern scientist, who 
prefers to enumerate the successive steps in this process, the goal is uncertain and 
the force of love smacks of magic. But this faith that the world can not only be 
made to serve man’s purposes, but actually does so, that things can not only be 
perfected, but that the whole course of nature draws toward perfection, was 
precisely what the Middle Ages meant by faith in God. They studied the universe 
to discern how God moves the world by the love of his perfection; the modern 
physicist tries to give man God’s knowledge of how to do it, but he has 
overlooked the knowledge of what is best to do…With ethics alone, man may 
love the good, but never find it; with physics alone he may gain the whole world 
and lose his own soul…The physicist elaborating a new poison gas, or the 
economist tracing the inevitable working of the law of supply and demand, may 
well ponder these words. (pp. 100-101).   
 
When it comes to looking at theory, especially theory dealing with relationships, there is 
a question of ethics that must be conjoined with questions of physics (i.e., process) to 
explore the fundamentals of human-ness. Intimacy has too frequently been only a 
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question of process in interpersonal communication. This dissertation attempts to depict 
ethics vis-à-vis the metaphor of charitable acknowledgment in order to frame love as 
more than “magic”—it is an ethic to guide relationships. 
Thus, the need to examine the initial research question has been established: How 
should a person act in a relationship? For this dissertation an even more narrow focus has 
been adopted concerning how we should conduct a healthy romance. This focus, 
however, is not an endeavor to provide “self-help” by describing ways to achieve goals 
(e.g., “how to get that perfect date,” “finding an object to love”). This would merely 
reiterate interpersonal models leading to an emotivist ethic. Such an approach would 
enter into what Lasch (1991) calls a therapeutic sensibility (p. 7) which propagates a 
narcissicistic viewpoint—exactly the viewpoint critiqued by MacIntyre (1984) under the 
heading of emotivism. This focus also differs from the typical interpersonal approach to 
romantic relationships exemplified by Vangelisti (2002) in the Handbook of 
Interpersonal Communication where studies use “satisfaction” as the appropriate way to 
measure the success (health) of relationships. What is satisfying to one may not be 
satisfying to another (a reiteration of MacIntyre’s (1984) emotivist critique) which 
explains the field’s focus on descriptive issues. When individual satisfaction is the 
benchmark for relational success, the philosophical ground upon which to discuss the 
health of such actions is greatly diminished if not nonexistent. 
Instead of a descriptive study, the focus here is interpretive in nature and centers 
on the primary question of this dissertation: How do we reinvigorate the philosophical 
ground for other-focused action in today’s historical moment in regard to the study 
of interpersonal intimate romantic relationships? The focus on healthy romances for 
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this dissertation is a quest to reestablish ground from which healthy romances can be 
discussed in the scholarly literature and in the classroom. To do this I hope to refocus the 
way we understand love, a potential answer to the above question of healthy romantic 
relationships. In short, I hope to provide a philosophically-grounded “why” and “how” to 
a field dominated by discussions of "what" by demonstrating 1) an alternative way to 
understand love (vis-à-vis charitable acknowledgment) so that 2) we as professors 
can help others in their quest for healthy romantic relationships. 
Understandably, professors may hesitate at this point wondering whether the task 
of depicting an ethic to others begins to breach sacred boundaries by either invading 
someone’s privacy or taking a tone of persuasion when one should be taking a more 
informative stance—in short, preaching when one should be teaching. By suggesting how 
someone should act in their personal life, is it taking our role in interpersonal 
communication too far? While it is important to provide students the freedom to choose 
between varying viewpoints, ultimately there is a rhetorical message with ethical 
undertones no matter how we present the information. As Richard Weaver (1970) notes, 
language is sermonic. Because rhetoric is an “art of emphasis embodying an order of 
desire” and has a function as “advisory,” then “the honest rhetorician has two things in 
mind: a vision of how matters should go ideally and ethically and a consideration of the 
special circumstances of his auditors” (p. 211). In other words, people must consider the 
consequences of their words as they pertain to their actions and the actions they intend to 
foster on the part of the audience. This is not an uncommon dynamic. Colleges, in fact, 
encourage ethics in the classrooms as is evident in their mission statements. Among my 
alma maters, Purdue University “expects our actions to be consistent with our words, and 
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our words to be consistent with our intentions” (Mukerjea, 2006); Duquesne University’s 
mission is to serve students through “excellence in liberal and professional education” 
while maintaining a “profound concern for moral and spiritual values” (Duquesne, 2006); 
Lipscomb University strives “to integrate Christian faith and practice with academic 
excellence” (Mission, 2006). In each school, beliefs about truth and goodness are paired 
with actions in the classroom. This implies some standard of goodness and justice that 
goes beyond the mere “dispensing” of knowledge and enters a realm where beliefs are 
paired with teaching. This does not mean sacrificing choice in the classroom. It does 
mean acknowledging there are viewpoints being presented. The importance then is to 
discuss ethical perspectives while simultaneously developing critical apparatus in 
students for evaluating varying viewpoints, not to stifle such discussions under the 
pretense of neutrality.  
All relational theory has a moral consequence. The moral consequence of several 
dominant interpersonal communication theories on intimate relationships is emotivism, 
which I argue (along with MacIntyre [1984]) is an unhealthy moral compass for 
relationships. How then do we reinvigorate the philosophical ground for other-focused 
action in today’s historical moment in regard to the study of interpersonal intimate 
romantic relationships? My answer to this and the thesis of this dissertation is: A 
narrative of charitable acknowledgment provides rich philosophical ground from 
which to interpret healthy relational behaviors.  To defend this I will argue the 
following: 1) We must reframe the current understanding of other-centeredness and self-
interest as dichotomous motives in interpersonal relationships. This requires 
understanding relationships from a dynamic rather than a static perspective and 
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reinterpreting the altruism/egoism dichotomy to an ethic-centered motive. 2) A narrative 
of charitable acknowledgment and its focus on action deemphasizes motive to help 
navigate between self-love (amore de soi) and charity (pitie). The works of Augustine, 
Hyde, and Schrag, provide foundation for this perspective. 
Important to establishing this dynamic is an understanding of narrative. What 
seems to speak to all narrative is an ontological emphasis that characterizes our human 
capacity for rationality, ethics, community, and relationship. It is a “symbolic 
interpretation of aspects of the world occurring in time and shaped by history, culture, 
and character (Fisher, 1989, pp. xiii) that provides “a way of relating truth about the 
human condition” (p. 63). There is a spectrum of definition within which “narrative” can 
be understood in this regard. At the broadest level of acceptance is the metanarrative 
defined as “an implicitly and uniformly agreed-upon public virtue structure that functions 
as a universal standard” (Arnett & Arneson, 1999). The current postmodern condition is 
one of an incredulity toward metanarrative discussed by Lyotard (1985). On the other end 
of the spectrum, Bochner’s work on (2002) narrative inquiry suggests a link to theories as 
stories with a focus on individual narratives and “how meaning is performed and 
negotiated” (p. 76). As a method, this narrative inquiry involves the individual “reader 
who wants to enter into dialogue with the writer and the story” (p. 77). The goals of 
Bochner (2002) resonate with this project, in particular his take on ethics: “Most narrative 
research functions ontologically, practically, and existentially. As Jackson (1995) 
suggests, the question becomes not so much how we know as how we should live” (p. 
77). However, rather than viewing narrative primarily as an method within dyads, the 
understanding used here is broader, in line with the philosophical narrative 
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understandings of Fisher (1989) and Arnett and Arneson (1999). Homo narrans for 
Fisher (1989) is the condition of humanity.  Probability and fidelity are two criteria for 
assessing these narratives, but the broad philosophical claim is that narrative is a “root 
metaphor” at the heart of human being. In this same philosophical ballpark, Arnett and 
Arneson (1999) are expressing a specific narrative of dialogic civility—a “public 
interpersonal model in an era of diversity” (p. 74). They call for “a public narrative of 
dialogic civility” that “does not emphasize the inner workings of the psyche or attitudes 
of the communicators” but rather searches for “basic guidelines that can assist our 
interaction in the public arena” (p. 287). A narrative of charitable acknowledgment is 
philosophically in line with this approach, looking instead for basic guidelines to assist 
interaction in the private ethos or dwelling place. In other words a narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment is an attempt to open moral discussion on healthy intimate relationships 
as enacted within specific relationships. It is broader than the personal narrative but 
understands the need for a humility in a postmodern age.  
Chapter Four will demonstrate the importance of shifting from a static to a 
dynamic view of relationships in order to create ground for an ethical metaphor. Through 
this dynamic view, the “therapeutic model” critiqued by Arnett and Arneson (1999) is 
avoided, replaced by a focus the act of being to, for, and with the other. Augustine’s view 
of humanity as fractured and Schrag’s (1986) self after postmodernity found this 
approach. This “decentered” self viewed as multiple, temporal, and embodied, provides 
the ground for suggesting narrative structure and ethical interpretation. When 
communication is active in contrast to the understanding of communication as a tool, a 
technique is embodied in a person and embedded in a culture. Words are interpreted in a 
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context and are stable only because of this context. In the act of being to, for, and with 
the other, ethical conduct is determined. Someone is acknowledged in a good way. How 
this goodness is interpreted is the subject of the next chapter. 
Chapter Five describes a narrative of charitable acknowledgment as a lens 
through which we can understand intimate human relationships. Intimate relationships 
when understood in terms of charity and acknowledgment, necessitate faith, hope and 
love in order to maintain relational healthiness. By using Hyde’s (2003; 2004; 2006) 
work on acknowledgment, Augustine’s view of charity, and combining this with a view 
of communicative praxis as described by Schrag (1986), we can shape an understanding 
of love that provides a balanced expression of both other-focused and self-focused 
motivation as it takes place within an ethic. In short, it provides an effective navigation of 
self and other. When we think of a healthy romantic relationship, we commonly use the 
term “love,” which is an indication of some level of commitment, intimacy, and passion 
towards each other (Sternberg, 1986). In a shift from the interpersonal communication 
field’s focus on satisfaction, a major assumption made here is that love (when viewed as 
an ethic, i.e. charity) is a primary indicator of a healthy romance. This is based on a 
transversal rather than universal or horizontal approach to knowledge. When understood 
as an ethic, love’s definitional boundaries include unconditionality, forgiveness, sacrifice 
for one’s partner, and rhetorical competence, which leads to passion (i.e., in the 
emotional sense). This “love-as-ethic” (a.k.a. charity) often serves as a short-hand for 
positive characteristics looked for in a romantic relationship. A more common contrasting 
view for love takes a narrower approach, viewing love primarily as a passionate emotion 
(love-as-emotion). Rather than get caught up in a definitional or methodological debate 
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over the bounds of “love” itself, I will instead demonstrate two philosophical frameworks 
within which love can be understood—a framework of static personality where there is a 
possibility for a dichotomous a priori characterization of human motivation between 
egoism and altruism, and a framework of active personality where motivations are so 
mobile and fractured it is impossible to identify any a priori motive at any given time 
outside of a given narrative structure.  
The final chapter deals with implications and conclusions drawn from this new 
interpretive approach. Pedagogy and research ideas are suggested. Thus we begin the 
critique of the fragmentation of interpersonal communication and end with a suggestion 
for an ethical perspective on the field using the metaphor of charitable acknowledgment. 
It is hoped that this reinterpretation of intimate interpersonal communication will provide 
new ground to explore ethics in today’s communication field. 
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Chapter 2 
A History of Understanding  
the Fractured Individual 
 
 On the opening page of their interpersonal communication textbook, Galvin and 
Cooper (2006) profess what many have witnessed firsthand: “Relationships are messy, 
unpredictable, joyful, frustrating, comforting, painful, and necessary!” (p. 1). Indeed, this 
menagerie of messiness that is the human relationship makes life both invigorating and 
vexing. Those who study the individual as “impartial observers” are often frustrated 
along with those in the relationship as they try to make sense of something frequently 
non-sensical. Researchers cannot, after all, experience with their subjects’ the emotions, 
motivations, ideologies, and many other factors that go into their given actions in a 
relationship. Given that oftentimes individuals are astounded by their own behavior, is it 
any wonder observers, too, have difficulties in interpreting these same behaviors? 
Nonetheless we still are striving in our quest to formulate new understandings to unlock 
the mysteries of human relationships.  
 Our understanding of human relationships has been framed in different ways 
depending upon the assumptions laid forth in a given historical moment. As we continue 
the journey towards better relational understanding, it is important to gain perspective 
from historical experience rather than ignoring it as somehow less “enlightened.”  Just as 
researchers today appreciate the difficulties in approaching the concept of the self and 
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other, so have thinkers throughout history; it has simply occurred with a different set of 
presuppositions catering to a given historical moment. Essentially, what follows is a 
historical overview of some of the overarching conceptions that have framed 
understandings of self and other.  
The authors were chosen based on their ability to represent the intellectual spirit 
of their given time period in regard to their perspective on relationships navigating self-
interest and other-regard. I argue there are at least three pathways, broadly placed in 
premodern, modern, and postmodern categories, that frame the navigation of self and 
other. In short, this categorization depicts a move from tradition to individualism and 
then back to tradition. In the premodern period, Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine represent 
respectively a transcendental, virtue-based, and holistic (albeit distinctively Christian) 
idea of the individual. Each of these ideas shows deference to non-subjective sources in 
establishing ideas of self. In the modern period, Hobbes, Rousseau, and sociobiologists 
Dawkins and Wilson, represent the subjective approaches of a time period devoted to 
individual rights and scientific method. The postmodern authors Derrida and Foucault 
have deconstructed the idea of the non-biased subjectivity through emphasis respectively 
on the fragility of words and the pervasiveness of power. This has undermined much of 
the modern idea of how to navigate understandings of self and other, yet leaves the 
question of reconstruction looming.  
 By analyzing these differing perspectives, one can appreciate the prejudices we 
may bring to our analysis of relationships as a result of our embeddedness in a given 
historical moment. To appreciate the diversity with which one can understand human 
interaction, it is necessary to draw forth those alternative interpretations through the 
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works of major thinkers of their time. Thus, a conversation is started concerning 
interpersonal relationships that pits Derrida and Foucault against Hobbes and 
sociobiologists in order to depict Augustinian ideas on relationships. In other words, it is 
only after a deconstruction of Enlightenment presuppositions that one is able to 
appreciate some of the premodern understandings of self and other which have for so 
long been regarded in modernist terms. Indeed, holistic ethical approaches to intimate 
relationships are constructed only after a deconstruction of the dichotomous 
understanding of self that comes with an emphasis on egoism versus altruism. While 
recognizing there might be alternative ways to interpret similar views, this history 
attempts to trace a rough line from ancient Greece to today’s emphasis on self-interest in 
relationships.  
 
Premodern Approaches to the Fractured Individual 
 The term “premodernity” here refers to a time period before the emergence of 
humanism around the era of the Renaissance. These approaches reflect subjectivity tied 
to historical, philosophically-grounded narratives. In the pre-Enlightenment West, 
understandings of the navigation of self and other were often tied to the works of 
Augustine and Aquinas. The works of these two “Doctors of the Church” (Randall, 1926) 
are instrumental in understanding how ethics framed the pre-modern understanding of 
self-interest. However, an explication of their work is by nature an explication of Greek 
philosophy as well. Thus, to give foundation to the “founding fathers,” it is necessary to 
address Plato’s conception of the self through the lens of Eros and also address 
Aristotle’s virtue-centered notion of self as understood through the golden mean.  
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Plato and Eros 
 To understand Plato’s view of relationships, it is important to understand his view 
of Eros or Love of Beauty. Eros establishes an aesthetic ethic for relationships founded 
by the Forms. While self-interest is an inherent part of this aesthetic view of 
relationships, there is an expectation that the wise man will be led by transcendent 
moderating factors to avoid a hedonist philosophy.  
What holds greatest importance for Plato lies in the transcendent realm rather than 
the physical. The search for answers is a vertical endeavor that strives towards “Truth” 
rather than a “truth.” With this philosophical orientation, a delineation between 
appropriate and inappropriate desires, the foundation of love, is drawn according to its 
focus on “higher” i.e. transcendent things. Love, as with all transcendent ideas, is a quest 
for excellence, not mere pleasure. Knowledge is the key to achieving this excellence, 
particularly as it pertains to Beauty. As Diotima instructs Socrates (Plato, 1984), “Love is 
a love for the beautiful” (p. 99) and in particular “it is a desire for good things and 
happiness.” The goal is “to approach the things of love” (p. 101) by “beginning from 
these beautiful things [lovers], to mount for that beauty’s sake ever upwards, as by a 
flight of steps, from one to two,” then to “all beautiful bodies,” then “beautiful pursuits 
and practices,” then “beautiful learnings” and finally “the learning solely of that beauty 
itself” (1984, p. 105). Thus, love is an aesthetic ideal one is trained to recognize through 
romantic relationships. To learn what Beauty is is to engage in a process of personal 
enlightenment whereby one builds from bodies, to lovers, to actions, to knowledge, to the 
Form of Beauty.   
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Plato’s concern when it comes to romantic relationships is with “a breeding in the 
beautiful, both of body and soul.” (p.101). Beauty is not a base passion to be lusted after 
but must be held in awe. To do this, one should focus on the proper way to conduct 
relationships by recognizing the transcendent Beauty of the soul:  
Now the man who is not fresh from his initiation or who has been corrupted does 
not quickly make the transition from beauty on earth to absolute beauty; so when  
he sees its namesake here he feels no reverence for it, but surrenders himself to 
sensuality and is eager like a four-footed beast to mate and to beget children, or in 
his addiction to wantonness feels no fear or shame in pursuing a pleasure which is 
unnatural. But the newly initiated, who has had a full sight of the celestial vision, 
when he beholds a god-like face…gazes upon it and worships it as if it is were a 
god… (Phaedrus, p. 57) 
 
Plato’s understanding of relationships acknowledges the need to look beyond personal 
desires and the object of love in order to recognize True Beauty as a transcendent feature 
of humanity. Relationships are thus less about the embodied person and more about the 
characteristics of his/her transcendent soul. Vlastos (1973) summarizes this idea by 
noting Plato’s theory of love is not “about personal love for persons” but rather “love for 
place-holders of the predicates ‘useful’ and ‘beautiful’—of the former when it is only 
philia and the latter, when it is eros” (pp. 107-108). Individuals search for Beauty in the 
individual rather than loving the individual himself/herself. The Love of Beauty, an 
aesthetic ethic founded on the Forms, thus encourages a journey of self-discovery, where 
the individual is trained to “gaze” and “worship” appropriately that object of Beauty 
before him.  
Philosophers are the ones to lead this journey. In Symposium, philosophers are 
described as “those between Wise and ignorant” (p. 99), falling somewhere between 
Gods and regular men because they seek wisdom. A God is Wise and as such does not 
need to pursue further wisdom. An ignorant individual is “neither beautiful and good 
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[i.e., a cultured gentleman] nor intelligent” (p. 99) and thus “does not think he is lacking 
in what he does not think he needs.” Philosophers however seek wisdom and thus hold 
spiritual capacities, namely of insight. In this case, the insight on love is that love is 
“having the good for oneself always” (p. 101). This provides happiness which is the 
universal desire of mankind. Thus, philosophers through proper knowledge and wisdom 
are able to recognize Eros and find true happiness as they gaze at the Beauty of the soul 
in their lover.  
But is this too solipsistic to create healthy relationships? Does looking inward and 
espousing the information discovered there delve into an insular bubble of subjectivism? 
Such questions have led to many modern expositions on and critiques of Eros as a 
relational ethic (see Grube, 1935; Nygren, 1953; Vlastos, 1973). However, Plato 
recognizes this danger and thus attempts to define the soul in such a way to avoid this 
solipsism. As Plato (1984) states in Phaedrus: 
We must realize that in each one of us there are two ruling and impelling 
principles whose guidance we follow, a desire for pleasure, which is innate, and 
an acquired conviction which causes us to aim at excellence…The conviction 
which impels us towards excellence is rational and the power by which it masters 
us we call self-control; the desire which drags us towards pleasure is irrational, 
and when it gets the upper hand in us its dominion is called excess. (§ 237-238, p. 
37). 
 
Based on this dichotomy, Plato develops his famous analogy of the charioteer 
(Phaedrus). It is here we see Plato’s definition of the soul as a charioteer leading two 
horses, the white horse being noble and obedient and the black horse defiant and 
impulsive. The charioteer is rationality. Reason tries to reign in the black horse of self-
interests, which is primarily struggling to pursue pleasures. Meanwhile the white horse 
represents the noble ethical system of the Forms which ultimately should be leading, not 
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personal pleasure. Rationality should be whipping self-interest into shape, forcing this 
willful horse to allow the other noble steed to lead. The ethics of wisdom will lead to 
civic and personal happiness in the soul. 
This demonstrates an important difference between Plato’s management of 
inherent self-interest and the way it is perceived in modernity—a difference important for 
understanding self-interest in interpersonal communication. An Enlightenment 
perspective notes self-interest as inherent to humanity and unabashedly adopts it as a 
central tenet of relational ethics (a point defended later in the work of Hobbes, Rousseau, 
sociobiologists, and social exchange theorists). Plato’s perspective also notes humanity’s 
(a.k.a., the soul’s) inherent nature as self-interested; however, he attempts to counter such 
self-interest by having it submit to a transcendent ethical system. Whereas in modernity, 
self-interest is foundational to relational ethics, thus giving priority to Spitzberg and 
Cupach’s (2002) criteria of satisfaction, Plato uses a criteria of ethics established in the 
Forms to manage self interest. Because the Forms are inherent within human souls along 
with self-interest, the struggle is to be led by one’s relational ethics, in this case a proper 
understanding of Beauty, and not self-interests, which would be defined as mere pleasure. 
What will become apparent throughout the premodern period is that while self-interest is 
recognized as a dynamic in humans, it is superceded by an ethical system that guides 
relationships. One can take issue with Plato’s idea of Beauty as being the “healthiest” 
relational ethic, but this is inseparable from the issue of self-interest.  
Aristotle and Reason 
Aristotle takes a different approach than Plato, noting that the golden mean 
dictates relational ethics as determined by the polis. In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
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navigates relationships and “goodness in truth” by touting the virtue of the intermediate 
or the “golden mean.” When one strays too far from this mean the given action becomes 
a vice. The virtue of bravery, for example, could be a vice of excess when reckless 
(imprudent) or a vice of deficiency in the form of cowardice when underdeveloped. It is 
in regard to bravery and similar virtues regarding one’s place in the polis that one begins 
to understand the Aristotelian balance concerning the role of the individual. Virtue for 
any given individual is defined through that individual’s role as a citizen (MacIntyre, 
1988).  This citizen status frames the notion of self. As Aristotle (1999) states: 
It is true of the virtuous man that he does many actions for the sake of his 
friends—and country—and if necessary dies for them. He will sacrifice money, 
honor, and all the goods men strive for, gaining for himself an honorable good 
(1169a18-22). 
 
Honor and glory in sacrifice for country and kin drives an Aristotelian understanding of 
one’s relational obligations. 
In addition to this public obligation, the author of the golden mean also sees the 
benefits of philautoi (self-love), which is presented as a condition of friendship (philos) 
in a more private realm. Love of self is balanced with a love of friends whom a person 
can benefit: 
It is reasonable for the virtuous man to love himself, because in doing good he 
will help both himself and others. But the vicious person must not love himself, 
since he will harm both himself and his neighbors by following his base feelings. 
(1169a11-13).  
 
Aristotle seems to indicate that a good deed by a good person helps both the self and the 
other. However, if a person is vicious, their deed done in self-love will be harmful. Thus, 
there is not an other-centered versus self-centered motive that dictates the goodness of an 
action but rather an overarching ethic that dictates such standards. In this case, it is the 
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golden mean as determined by the narrative of the Athenian polis that dictates the 
goodness of an action. The ethic determines whether an act is good, not its status as 
other-centered or self-centered. 
Self-love can be regarded as blameworthy or virtuous depending on the actions 
and motives of the given individual in regard to their reasonableness—an epistemological 
standard that looks to nature and to the presuppositions of the polis for its ontological 
ground. In regard to activity, a good person acts in accord with reason. This 
reasonableness leads to a pure motive towards the absolute good. Thus, because of this 
reasonableness, one can be trusted to exercise self-love in a responsible, prudent matter, 
i.e., showing the virtue of pride rather than vanity or humility. On the other hand, a 
blameworthy person lives according to passion and has a motive that seeks what seems 
useful but is in reality harmful. That person cannot be trusted with self-love, for he has 
not “assigned himself to the noblest and best goods” (1168b29-30) in order to make 
rational, virtuous decisions. Recognize here the ethical motive dependent upon the polis. 
Love of self and love of other are derivatives of a focus on a higher calling—in this case 
reason and the polis. Thus Aristotle uses criteria of appropriateness and ethics combined 
to determine healthy relationships. We will find this sentiment repeated in Augustine 
especially concerning “love thy neighbor as thyself”—the preeminent dictum for 
navigating between self and other in the premodern period.  
Augustine and Caritas 
In comparison to Aristotle’s balance of self-interest and self-sacrifice expressed in 
obligation to the polis, Augustine deemphasizes self-interests in obligation to God. Pride 
is anything but a virtue in this approach to human relationships. Relational ethics for 
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Augustine are dictated by notions of charity which are determined by Christian Scripture. 
What I should give to others and what I should give to self are all derivatives of what 
should be given to God.  
“Love” in an Augustinian framework is an ordered desire that indicates where 
one’s priorities lie. In On Christian Doctrine, Augustine distinguishes between things to 
be enjoyed and things to be used. Enjoyment of something that should properly be used is 
to be “shackled by an inferior love” (OCD, 1.3.3). Distinction between the two is dictated 
by a focus on God. Augustine describes two loves in City of God: the love of self 
(concupiscence) and the love of God (caritas). Love of self is equated with the earthly 
city, a negative correlation: “When a man lives ‘according to man’ and not ‘according to 
God’ he is like the Devil” (COG, 14.4). For citizens striving towards the City of God, the 
self is deemphasized. This notion is expressed in caritas which is most widely defined as 
a “disinterested love” of both God and neighbor (Troup, 2001). “Disinterest” indicates 
the notion that all people are treated with compassion, justice, and love regardless of 
emotional attachment or one’s own personal stake in the matter. The same ethical 
obligations towards sacrificial behavior should be expressed for enemies and friends 
alike. Such indiscriminate love is an imitation of God’s love for humanity.  
While this seems straightforward enough, it is too glib to say that an Augustinian 
understanding of love is one of pure self-negation, a common perception in 18th century 
interpretations (as we will see in the next section). Love of self must also be taken into 
consideration:  
For when love of God is placed first and the character of that love is seen to be 
described so that all other loves must flow into it, it may seem that nothing has 
been said about the love of yourself. But when it is said, ‘Thou shalt love thy 
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neighbor as thyself’ at the same time, it is clear that love for yourself is not 
omitted. (OCD, 1.26.27). 
 However, before moving too much further along this line of discussion, we must 
denote a greater degree of subtlety in Augustine’s work—this requirement for nuance 
will be a common theme throughout this dissertation. There is a problem in drawing too 
sharp a delineation between love of others, love of self, and love of God. True, for 
Augustine, to act properly is to properly order the loves. But this is not a delineation of 
mere motives; it is an issue of the human condition. As a rhetorician, he is keenly aware 
of the practical difficulties of love; Confessions is a testimony to his own error-prone 
nature. Interpretations in a given rhetorical situation, thus, are attempted by people who 
have a nature that is limited. On Christian Doctrine testifies to this as multiple accurate 
interpretations can be reached due to the limitations of our words and the limitations of 
our understanding (OCD 3.27). The solution to this is not an escape from the body 
however, as in neo-Platonic thought; it is a focus on faith, hope, and love as shown in the 
Incarnation. Put another way, it is a turning towards, a focus upon, and an orienting in the 
direction of the Other. This begins a discussion of what exactly an Augustinian 
understanding of the self was. I argue for Augustine, the self is temporal, multiple, and 
embodied—a conception similar to that of Schrag (1986). Because Augustine is a central 
figure grounding this study, the issues of temporality, multiplicity, and embodiment will 
be explored in more detail. As we will see, this complicated understanding of a fractious 
self is very different from the confidence modernity places in the knowledge we can 
attain. As a result it will provide a contrast to self-interest as a driving force for ethics by 
reinterpreting the self as fractured and bound to a time and place. Similarly, Augustine 
contrasts the idea of a Platonic soul, instead understanding humans as embodied. 
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The temporal self. For Augustine, the idea of the self is tied to the present. The 
past and future have being (Conf. 11.17.22) but are existent only inasmuch as they exist 
in the present self. “My boyhood indeed, which no longer is, belongs to past time, which 
no longer is. However, when I recall it and talk about it, I perceive its image at the 
present time, because it still is in my memory” (Conf. 11.18.23). He speaks similarly of 
the future as an expectation of what is to come. All three however, are only understood in 
the present self through rhetorical interpretation. Thus the temporal spectrum which 
cannot be empirically “seen,” nevertheless can be properly expressed in the “present of 
things past” by memory, in the “present of things present” by intuition, and in the 
“present of things future” by expectation (Conf. 11.20.26).  These three are “in the soul 
but elsewhere I do not see them” (Conf. 11.20.26).  
I argue that throughout the Confessions, the human “soul” can be understood as a 
space of human subjectivity. This will be important in a postmodern time where 
subjectivity is deconstructed. While definitely influenced by Platonism, especially during 
his early years, the Augustinian soul cannot be reduced solely to Platonic thought. In a 
typical neo-Platonist system, the soul is a separate dimension of the human being. 
Through intellectual and mystical achievement the soul emanates to become greater than 
others around it. At the final emanation the body is left behind and the soul is merged 
with God, the One. For Augustine, this ideology is “puffed up with most unnatural pride” 
(Conf. 7.9.13) because it depends on one’s own knowledge, which is finite and separated 
from God. Additionally, emanating up and leaving behind one’s neighbor denies the 
second part of the greatest commandment to “Love your neighbor as yourself” in that it is 
essentially an individualist endeavor. Thus, neo-Platonism is a stumbling block to 
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Augustine, and becomes a target for critique rather than the foundation of his project 
(Troup, 1999).  
The soul then, I argue, if not primarily neo-Platonic, is redefined for Augustine as 
a space, a location of “innermost being” (Conf. 7.10.16), where, to use today’s term, 
subjectivity lies. Metaphorically, Augustine relates: 
I entered there [my innermost being], and by my soul’s eye, such as it was, I saw 
above that same eye of my soul, above my mind, an unchangeable light…From 
afar you cried to me, “I am who am.” I heard as one hears in his heart; there was 
no further place for doubt, for it would be easier for me to doubt that I live than 
that there is no truth, which is “clearly seen, being understood by the things that 
are made.” (Conf. 7.10.16) 
 
Using this metaphor, of “entering one’s innermost being” one can find several interesting 
dimensions to Augustine’s thought on the soul. First, the soul is that dimension whereby 
we can “see” and “such as it is” can see above us. When Augustine says “such as it is,” 
he is admitting to the shortcomings of the human soul, namely that it must interpret what 
is seen through imperfect lenses. Interpretation is a key dimension for fallible humans. 
This creates “levels of truth” (Conf. 12.30.41), multiple interpretive possibilities (OCD 
3.27), and dependence upon metaphor and figurative language (OCD 5.3). In fact, 
someone who makes incorrect literal interpretations can be “the death of the soul…that 
condition in which the thing which distinguishes us from beasts, which is the 
understanding, is subjected to the flesh in the pursuit of the letter” (OCD 5.3). As fallible 
creatures who must interpret through language, the soul, then, is not a place to find 
absolute truth but rather a place from which one can interpret truth. One thus “sees” from 
this space, “such as it is” (Conf. 7.10.16). 
 Secondly, this location of the soul is a facsimile of God as the “same eye of my 
soul above my mind” (Conf. 7.10.16). The soul then is that dimension of a person that is 
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“made in the image of God” as referenced in Genesis 1:27. Our nature as created beings 
is a pivotal point made by Augustine. We are children of a God who was for Augustine 
“my sweetness, my honor, my trust, my God, let there be thanks to you for your 
gifts…for you have also given it to me that I exist” (Conf. 1.20.31). This belief in God as 
the good and perfect creator is a narrated dimension of the soul—narrated in the sense 
that the story of our creation becomes the belief upon which one comes to understand. 
Thus, we are provided an example of a narrative of faith. Belief is a necessary dimension 
of the soul because it is the fundamental tenet for understanding. In the space of our soul 
we choose beliefs upon which to build arguments and worldviews even as we are 
retroactively chosen, through that belief, by a personal God who cares. As Augustine puts 
it, this interpretive ability towards narrative is the “eye of my soul” that believes or “sees” 
the “eye of my soul above my mind.” We interpret and then see for the first time the 
reality of God. This is what Augustine realized only after the “unchangeable light” is 
seen. The restless nature of the soul in order to find rest must first believe in the Lord, for 
“how shall they call upon him in whom they have not believed” (Conf. 1.1.1). The 
narrative of faith is housed in the soul thereby allowing understanding and interpretation 
to take place. This is why Augustine can claim “It is easier for me to doubt that I live than 
that there is no truth, which is ‘clearly seen, being understood by the things that are 
made’ ” (Conf. 7.10.16). Faith leads to sight. Sight leads to truth about ethics. Truth about 
ethics leads to hope. 
This leads to the third dimension of the soul: its guidance by an “unchangeable 
light” towards a narrative of hope. For Augustine, this is the place where freedom 
exists—where the soul is not subject to the will of the self but to the will of God, “not to 
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will what I willed and to will what you willed” (Conf. 9.1.1). There is a place of rest that 
lies outside this world “above the mind,” or outside the comprehension of our being. This 
becomes the “hope” component of “faith, hope, and love” from 1 Corinthians 13 that 
founds Augustine’s depiction of knowledge (OCD 1. 37.41). We hope to come to a place 
of rest, knowing by faith that this will happen, and living by love in order to enact God’s 
will. The narrative of hope coincides with the narrative of faith. The narrative of hope is 
the indicator of telos in the space of subjectivity or the soul. The realization that there is 
knowledge that guides our own knowledge and provides the “easy yoke of your Christ” 
(Conf. 8.4.9) allows a purpose and a direction for which to strive yet paradoxically never 
achieve in this life. Thus, the soul is the space from which we interpret and from where 
we hold our narratives of faith and hope that guide us in our actions.  
It seems important at this point to acknowledge the non-Christian, who may feel a 
bit overwhelmed and even off-put by faith-driven approaches. While this approach may 
be a bit heavy-laden in theological terminology, there is still ground for someone who 
does not embrace the Christian narrative to find relevance in Augustine’s approach. 
Regardless of religious perspective, a person believes in something as it takes place in a 
narrative rooted in a given time and place (MacIntyre, 1988). This narrative is assessed in 
as it is lived. As Fisher (1989) demonstrates, the extent to which a community lives by a 
narrative (fidelity) and thus finds it convincing (probability) is the extent to which one is 
able to make judgments about the narrative’s worth. Based on these conditions, a person 
can consider Augustine as a model for narration that provides a model for ethical life. As 
Schultze (2002) notes, “No matter how much technology and education we acquire, we 
are apt sometimes to wonder if there is more to life than information and technique” (p. 
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71). This impulse leads us seek ethical grounding, established and explored in narratives 
(Bochner, 2002; Arnett & Arneson, 1999; Fisher 1989). Such grounding take place. As 
Wolterstoff (2002), notes it is not possible or desirable to “render inoperative during our 
practice of learning all our particularities of religion, gender, class, and so forth, so as to 
function just as generic human beings” (p. 13). What Augustine teaches is one way to 
operate from an ethical narrative. Augustine opens a ground for moral inquiry into the 
ethics of intimate relationships through his lived narrative of faith from which he makes 
interpretations and thus sees truth. That truth gives hope and meaning to life (Augustine, 
Encl. 2.8). Later we analyze his view of charity which is the ethical expression of his 
presuppositions on humanity examined here. The ethical systems formed as a result of 
this hope are tested out in life which should provides actions from which one can 
determine the “goodness” of the interpretation. Thus, Augustine demonstrates the 
capacity for narrative to serve in interpretive schema. Faith and hope, in the sense of a 
believed system in the goodness of others, is both a part of his narrative and a part of an 
ethical system than may help others reflect on their own narratives. This is a common 
ground for believer and non-believer alike. 
Thus, to summarize the subject of temporality, the space from which we 
understand time is in the soul and not outside of it. The objective and subjective natures 
of time are reflected in a self—a presence—that interprets time in the soul in such a way 
to bring forward memories and make possible futuristic desires—absence. The soul is the 
place of the “present” where time is conceived. Augustine’s belief in an eternal God, 
whose timelessness—greater than a finite soul can comprehend—provides eternal life in 
the hereafter, does not preclude the understanding that we live in fallen temporal world 
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where time is interpreted and realized “in the soul but elsewhere I do not see it” (Conf. 
11.20.26).  
The multiple self.  Despite maintaining the hope of unity in eternity, Augustine’s 
version of the temporal soul remains fractured and in conflict. This is a hallmark of a 
postmodern conception of self (e.g., Foucault, 1977; MacIntyre, 1988). However, 
Augustine will found this multiplicity in a completely different way. For Augustine, 
human beings are fallen as a result of sin and thus they have been separated from their 
source of stability. This creates a conflict of wills: “Thus did my two wills, the one old, 
the other new, the first carnal, and the second spiritual, contend with one another, and by 
their conflict they laid waste to my soul” (Conf. 8.4.10). Throughout his life, Augustine 
struggled within himself to understand what would give him an understanding of 
goodness. It was only upon his conversion that he realized the source of goodness 
towards which his multiple and fragmented self could find direction. As he states:  
I am distracted amid times, whose order I do not know, and my thoughts, the 
inmost bowels of my soul, are torn asunder by tumult and change, until being 
purged and melted clear by the fire of your love, I may flow altogether into you. 
(Conf. 11.29.39). 
 God is described as the source of all goodness and “evil has no nature of its own. Rather 
it is the absence of good which has received the name ‘evil’” (COG 11.9). Thus he strives 
toward goodness as defined by God. Yet despite this unchanging source, there is no 
equanimity between God and man.  
Therefore, Lord, you who are not one thing at one time and a different thing in 
another, but the Selfsame, and the Selfsame, and the Selfsame…You created 
something, and that something out of nothing…But in no way was it just that 
anything which was not of you should be equal to you. (Conf. 12.7.7).  
The soul is fractured and will not in this lifetime gain unity because we are separated 
from the source of goodness.  
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It must be understood then that despite having a telos that strives towards 
goodness, there is a multiplicity of wills that undermines the process, thus requiring that 
we look at the soul within “the actual context of its practical concerns and discursive 
performances” (Schrag, 1986, p. 148). Paul’s discussion in Romans 7:14 of “doing what I 
do not want to do” informs Augustine at this point. The soul’s desire to do good is 
thwarted by habits that lead to the contrary:  
When eternity above delights us and the pleasure found in a temporal good holds 
us fast from below, it is the same soul that wills this course or that, but not with its 
whole will. Therefore, it is rent asunder by grievous hurt as long as it prefers the 
first because of its truth but does not put away the other because of habit. (Conf. 
8.10.24) 
 
 Justice becomes a difficult endeavor for human beings “whose hairs are easier to count 
than his affections and the movements of his heart” (Conf. 4.14.22). This requires that 
justice be meted out carefully and with interpretive charity, a suggestion that guides all of 
Augustine’s ideas. The self has desires of both caritas, the movement of the soul toward 
the enjoyment of God for his own sake and cupiditas, the movement of the soul toward 
the enjoyment of any corporal thing for the sake of something other than God (OCD 
3.10.16). Based on this guide, there is a consideration of time and place in relation with 
others rather than “absolute justice” known by a complete self. “Whatever therefore, is 
harmonious with the customs of those among whom we live, either because of necessity 
or because of duty, is to be referred by good and great men to utility or to beneficence” 
(OCD 3.14.22) both of which are functions of charity. Charity is the guide for a self that 
is decentered, multiple, and bound by interpretation in a time and place. 
The embodied self. Augustine conceives of the soul (i.e., the self) as analogous to 
the incarnation of Christ:  
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Our thought is not transformed into sounds; it remains entire in itself and assumes 
the form of words by means of which it may reach the ears without suffering any 
deterioration in itself. In the same way the Word of God was made flesh without 
change that He might dwell among us. (OCD 1.13).  
To understand this passage I will look first at Augustine’s consideration of language as a 
linguistic whole and secondly how this is understood through the incarnation. 
 To separate the body’s production of sound from the thought that conceived it 
fails to realize that language is greater than the sum of its parts. Rather than focusing on 
the particulars, the unit must be viewed as a whole in order to avoid “deterioration.” This 
rejection of a linguistic mind/body split—terminology admittedly anachronistic to 
Augustine’s age—is a holistic approach that claims human language cannot be 
understood except as a whole. In short, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. By 
separating language into its particulars the symbol loses its meaning—a point 
poststructualists make in their separation of the signified from the signifier. Regaining 
this meaning requires a consideration of time and space [i.e., a Bakhtinian (1981) 
chronotope]. Augustine discusses this notion of present-ness in an example of reciting a 
psalm:  
The life of this action of mine is distended into memory by reason of the part I 
have spoken and into forethought by reason of the part I am about to speak. But 
attention is actually present and that which was to be is borne along by it so as to 
become past. (Conf. 11.28.38). 
In a given linguistic moment the past, present, and future intertwine in one person so that 
the whole and the parts are indistinguishable. As Augustine states: 
What takes place in the whole psalm takes place also in each of its parts and in 
each of its syllables. The same thing holds for a longer action, of which perhaps 
the psalm is a small part. The same thing holds for an entire man’s life, the parts 
of which are all the man’s actions. The same thing holds throughout the whole 
age of the sons of men, the parts of which are the lives of all men. (Conf. 
11.28.38).  
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The life of a man is comprised of all the parts that came before and afterward. It is 
temporally tied and when a given word, text, and/or action is extruded from its context a 
dimension of understanding is lost. 
Augustine further articulates a holistic view of language by comparison to the 
incarnation. Theologically, this holistic view is a response to the Platonist Gnostics who 
viewed Christ, a part of the triune God, as incompletely human because the impurity of 
the flesh would prohibit Christ from fully taking on the human form. Flesh was 
something that was thrown off after death, liberating the soul so it could be reunited with 
God. Augustine disagreed with this Platonist view. He notes in City of God: 
Our corruptible body may be a burden on our soul; on the other hand, the cause of 
this encumbrance is not in the nature and substance of the body, and, therefore, 
aware as we are of its corruption, we do not desire to be divested of the body but 
rather to be clothed with its immortality…it is an error to suppose that all evils of 
the soul proceed from the body (14.3).   
 
There is no rejection of the physical but rather an articulation of the intertwining of the 
body and soul with corruption and later immortality.   
Additionally for Augustine, the incarnation is one of the fundamental features of 
the Christian faith. He argues that the mystery of the nature of man as a “body united 
with a soul” (COG 10.29) only makes sense in the comparison to the “Word made flesh” 
in John 1. For Augustine, words are embodied in us just as Christ was embodied as the 
Word. However, one should not mistake the temporal word for the Eternal Word. Troup 
notes an important distinction between “an unstable, disintegrating temporality versus a 
stable eternity in which we find integrity… Our stability comes via the Incarnation, 
through which the Word takes on flesh and thereby participates fully in temporality” 
(Troup, 1999,  p. 102). To use terms of poststructuralism, the signifier/signified split 
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cannot fully deconstruct language because the trace that is left behind is revealed in the 
embodied event. We enact language in a given chronotope that is fleeting and 
deconstructable but the stability for Augustine is in incarnation of the word—the trace of 
authorship. As Troup states, “The incarnate Word Himself, by securing the present of the 
semiotic moment, stabilizes what Barthes refers to as the ‘infinite deferral of the 
signified’” (154-5). Thus, the Augustinian “soul” is that place where the word is given 
meaning in action, but that action is imperfect and forever in motion.  
Summary of Augustinian self. The reason for spending so much time here is to 
emphasize the Augustinian notion that motives for action are embodied in a temporal and 
fractured human. There is no systematic approach to human relationships that can be 
found in such a condition. For Augustine, to even attempt such a task would be futile. To 
reduce our condition to that of avoiding self-interested endeavors and striving for other-
centered behaviors would be too simplistic given this complicated nature. What is 
suggested instead is an ethical framework for understanding how one should strive to 
encounter the Other. One could call it a direction rather than a directive. We travel on an 
ethical journey in a direction towards God or away, towards love or away from it. Our 
dictates may need to be reinterpreted and restudied as we approach life. The question is: 
what should we study? Augustine emphasizes faith, hope, and love. Faith is an 
ontological belief in the world as created, the Incarnation, and the usability of language 
for understanding.  Hope is an attitude where a person is expectant in the potential for 
human improvement on societal, interpersonal, and intrapersonal levels. Love is the 
“root” of action, exhibiting what is good and bringing about change for the better. As 
Augustine (Tr. Jo.) states:  
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Once for all, a short precept is given you: Love, and do what you will. If you keep 
silence, keep silence in love; if you speak, speak in love; if you correct, correct in 
love; if you forbear, forbear in love. Let love’s root be within you, for from that 
root nothing but good can spring. (7.8) 
 
For Augustine, love is an ethic that guides what our behavior towards self and other 
should be. We will assuredly fail in our attempts, but with faith and hope, we can 
continue to strive for improvement. 
 We see with the “premodern” perspectives an emphasis on ethical approaches to 
motive rather than subject-centered approaches. Slowly this begins to change as dictates 
become less fluid and are more dependent upon objective standards in nature. This starts 
ever so slowly with Aquinas and transforms radically with Hobbes’ pessimistic view of 
humanity. 
Aquinas and Reasonable Caritas 
 Simply put, Aquinas combines an Augustinian and an Aristotelian notion of self-
sacrifice in a systematic approach to philosophy and theology. Aquinas was a devotee of 
both Aristotle and Augustine, ideologies which were considered fundamentally in 
opposition to one another during the 13th century. Aquinas’s brilliance is in combining 
these two ideologies into one cohesive work thus, bringing them successfully into his 
historical moment. The heart of his argument lies in the notion of a rational Christian 
ethic, discernable through reasonableness and faith. On top of this Christian ethic is laid a 
modified virtue structure put forth by Aristotle. For Aquinas, the Nichomachean virtues 
were unable to perfect human beings because the virtues were not by nature able to 
perfect. Only virtues laden with caritas perfected by grace would be able to perfect the 
human condition.  
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 Based on this notion of charity, there is an ordering that takes place amongst the 
recipients of this love. According to Pope (1994), the priority is “first, to God and those 
who are objectively nearer to God (the meliores); and second, to those who are nearer to 
the agent in particular ways (the conjunctiores)” (p. 59). This prioritization denotes 
ordering the ethics of caritas based on proximity.  
Pope (1994) notes, “For Thomas the key distinction in this regard was not 
between self-love and neighbor love as such but between proper and improper self-love 
and proper and improper neighbor love” (p. 59). Thus begins a definitional procedure to 
describe what comprises proper self-love. This entails a prioritization of self-love over 
neighbor love in order to appropriately “love thy neighbor as thyself.” Appropriate self-
love references one’s spiritual nature—one should not sin to help one’s neighbor.  Yet, 
concerning one’s physical nature, a neighbor’s body is more important than one’s own 
body. Physical sacrifices of one’s time and possessions, even one’s life, should not be 
withheld from the other. One’s actions become ordered to fit the given situation, an 
ethical approach with a focus on the other. Also, because it is not physically possible to 
do good for all, one ought to apportion beneficence according to proximity (Summa 
Theologica, II.ii.26.6)—a practical dimension to an other-focused ethic. This 
combination of practicality with a rational Christian caritas is what drives Aquinas’s 
theology. However, this definition of rationality particularly in regard to faith was later 
questioned in a time period where science was the centerpiece of the narrative. It is to this 
modern time period that we now turn. 
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Modern Approaches to the Fractured Individual 
 Modernity denotes a time period beginning around 1500 and extending into the 
mid-twentieth century where there is a growing emphasis on empiricism and a growing 
optimism in the ability of humanity to overcome difficulties through scientific 
technological discovery (Heelas, 1998). Part of this process was a reframing of the way 
individuals were understood and how they related to one other. The shift that occurred 
reflected a growing distrust of the authority of the Church and a shift to State authority 
and the authority of the individual. With the emergence of several influential thinkers 
(see Grant,1997) among whom Thomas Hobbes looms large, there is a shift of relational 
understanding away from the Medieval assumption of self-fulfillment within an ethical 
structure of loving God, the Lord of the Land (a king, noble, etc), and family and towards 
a dichotomous balance of self-interest and self-denial. In this shift, self-interest begins to 
be prioritized until by the 20th century, its opposite, altruism, is deemed non-existent 
(Dawkins, 1978). The following material attempts to describe this intellectual shift. 
From Christianity to Humanism 
Several influences paved the way for an egocentric conception of self, most 
notably that of humanism. Kolenda (1999) notes the word came into use in the nineteenth 
century as a perspective on the world beginning in the Renaissance where “people dared 
to stand up and to rise to full stature” (p. 397). It occupies a philosophical idea of human 
being situated between the idea of transcendent, supernatural realm and the natural 
scientific order (Kolenda, 1999). The possibilities of life lie in the individual’s ability to 
discover truth namely through science:  
No longer the glory of God, but the enlarging of the bounds of human empire over 
nature—that is the new goal of science…It was science becoming more 
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humanized, less divine; it was science serving, not them that built the cathedrals 
to carry them to God , but the rising commercial and industrial classes. (Randall, 
1926/1976, p. 223-4) 
 
One symptom of this is the shift from community to self as certain Humanist strains 
moved from a centralized clergy to a newly empowered “priesthood of all believers.” As 
a result of the printing press and translations of the Bible into common languages, it was 
possible for large numbers of people to have access to scriptures. When combined with 
the humanist ideal, this lead to a diversity of opinion, which flooded forth after the Diet 
of Worms. Here Luther famously noted “I am bound by the Scriptures I have quoted and 
my conscience is captive to the Word of God. I cannot retract anything, since it is neither 
safe nor right to go against conscience” (Noll, 1997, p. 154). The consequence of this was 
noted by Johann Eck during this same council: “If it were granted that whoever 
contradicts the councils and the common understanding of the church must be overcome 
by Scripture passages, we will have nothing in Christianity that is certain or decided” 
(Noll, 1997, p. 155). Luther undoubtedly did not intend for an individualistic approach to 
religion to reign. Luther approached religion as centralized and authoritarian (see, Ekert, 
1955). Nonetheless his argument with humanism lost the day. Humanists “accorded a 
very prominent place to the human factor in setting up the classical achievements and 
refinements in form and beauty of the ancient world as a cultural ideal over against less 
cultured native civilizations” (Ekert, 1955, p. 7). The seeds of individualism sown from 
humanism led to individualism beyond the communal society; as a result, division 
occurred.  
There is debate on the extent to which Erasmus reflected this humanistic spirit in 
Christianity (Mansfield, 2003). However he is still largely considered a Christian 
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humanist (Rummel, 2004). Erasmus was not searching for schism as “consensus was not 
only a sociopolitical desideratum; it was an essential criterion and the touchstone of true 
religion (Rummel, 2004, p. 32). Nonetheless, Randall (1926) notes Erasmus’s desire to 
“reform the Church into a rational aid to the natural moral life that would absorb all the 
new learning and science into a well-rounded culture” (p. 147). As Erasmus states in the 
Praise of Folly, his approach: 
…would have women read the Gospels and the Epistles of St. Paul…why should 
knowledge of doctrine be reserved to a few men only, theologians and 
monks…True theology is possessed by every man who is inspired and guided by 
the spirit of Christ, be he a digger or a weaver. (p. 270).  
He is looking for change and rationality, and Scripture drove this process. (Rummel, 
2004). Scripture should be read individually and confirmation of that reading should take 
place within a community. The individual reading rationally opened a door in “pre-
reformation” (Rummel, 2004) that others walked through where a unified community of 
believers was deemphasized and the individual prioritized.  
This shift from community to individual found its means of expression in 
Descartes. Despite his continued adherence to a Christian perspective, Descartes, as one 
of the most influential scholars of the time, furthered splintered the corporate human 
“soul” through the idea that “this self, that is to say the soul, by which I am what I am, is 
entirely distinct from the body…” (Descartes, 1637/1981, p. 83). The mind/body dualism 
he created dominated philosophical thought and caused a self-consciousness to occur that 
Grant (1997) notes is “a necessary condition for the emergence of the assumption of self-
interest” (p. 325). For centuries the implications of a mind/body split flexed the 
intellectual muscles and perplexed scholarly minds as reason attempted to sort through 
the human condition. These reason-driven accounts of self were complimented by 
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empiricists like Bacon, who pushed rationality fully into scientific discovery where 
empiricism ruled as the means of knowledge. As he states “the true and lawful goal of the 
sciences is none other than this: that human life be endowed with new discoveries and 
powers” (Bacon, 1854, p. 69). This Baconian spirit carried through the following 
centuries, empowering humanity to reach greater heights—heights that required new 
management of a burgeoning human confidence (or arrogance).  
Hobbes and the Enlightenment 
Hobbes recognized that unfettered and divergent self-interests created power 
struggles, violence, and chaos within a society. In a pessimistic view of human nature, he 
believed humans were continually in competition, distorting words for their own gain, 
and bound only by covenant rather than by nature (Hobbes, 1981, p. 91-92). In a stark 
statement on the human condition, Hobbes notes six reasons why sociable animals such 
as ants and bees and our species’ ability to do likewise in terms of cooperation is 
incomparable: 1) Humans are “continually in competition for honour and dignity” thus 
breeding hatred and war; 2) Social creatures see no difference in the good of the public 
and private where humans “can relish nothing but what is eminent;” 3) Humans think 
themselves “wiser, and abler to govern the public better than the rest” and thus leading to 
“distraction and civil war;” 4) We lie about the nature of goodness and evil; 5)While 
irrational creatures can be contented, man “is most troublesome when he is most at ease: 
for then it is that he loves to shew his wisdom;” 6) Our agreements with one another are 
artificial requiring a “common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to 
the common benefit.” Thus, the only way of containing this corrupt character was to 
create a “generation of that great Leviathan” or a “mortal god to which we owe under the 
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immortal God our peace and defence” (p. 93). Interpersonally, this does not mean that a 
person is never motivated by passions other than those that benefit their own self. As 
Hobbes (1651/1985) states there is a “Love of one singularly, with the desire to be 
singularly beloved, the passion of love.” Other-centeredness is possible—but note the 
split of self and other here. He emphasizes that love of others is not a natural inclination. 
In short, we must fight our human nature to be other-centered. Thus by nature humans are 
individualistic and self-interested; community and ethics are forced upon us by necessity 
for survival. 
MacIntyre (Cambridge) here provides the fundamental question that Hobbes’s 
philosophy initiated that has since framed the way the social sciences and philosophy 
have understood the human condition:  
Given that human nature is competitive and self-seeking, why and how can 
altruism and benevolence be treated as virtues? One’s immediate response to this 
brief and cryptic statement of the problem may well be to inquire why—if one 
does not share Hobbes’s premises—one should take it as given that human nature 
is essentially self-seeking? To this one replies by posing another question: How 
can any actual or possible object or state of affairs provide me with a 
motive…unless it appears to be what will satisfy some desire of mine?...And to 
seek only to satisfy my own desires is surely to have an entirely self-seeking 
nature. (p. 463) 
 
It is in this vein of thought that the next several centuries continued. Motives are 
conceived as a dialectic between self-interest and self-negation. If we are self-interested 
creatures, how then do we understand altruism? The following is an account of the 
pervasiveness of this dichotomous approach to human relationships and how it has been 
perpetuated in the current cultural milieu.   
By the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Augustine’s concepts had been 
translated into an antithesis of Hobbsian ideology. The corrupt body, as in Hobbes, was 
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completely corrupt and fallen. Thus, people should focus entirely on self-negation rather 
than self-interest. This pessimistic interpretation of Augustine’s ideology taught man to 
revile the self, finding no good in the efforts of man. By radically disconnecting the love 
of self and love of God, pessimistic Augustinians felt people could never achieve caritas 
because of their inherent corruptness (i.e., original sin) stemming from the Fall of Man, 
and focused their efforts on the realm beyond. There was a sharp line of distinction 
between the City of God and the City of Man. Man was worthless until death. In practice, 
this was a rather hopeless view, at least in temporality. Thus, moderates attempted to 
soften the distinction through a new vocabulary distinguishing a benign and acceptable 
self-love (amore de soi) from a vicious and unacceptable self-love (amore-propre) 
(Cladis, 2000). In the public realm, authors as diverse as Raimond Sebond, Pierre Le 
Moyne, Rene Descartes, and Blaise Pascal argued that people should put the common 
good above their own and could be freed from isolating self-love through a love of God 
(p. 226). Essentially, this period represents a reinterpretation of the Augustinian soul to 
represent mankind as reprehensible to the point of self-negation, a point Augustine 
himself would never have touted. The “moderate” approaches to self-love were an 
attempt to take this straw man and tear it down.   
The governmental ideas of Rousseau (e.g., The social contract and discourses) 
were an attempt to answer both radical self-negationists and radical proponents of self-
interest. However, despite his overall opposition to Hobbes, he continued to emphasize 
self-interest. This self-interest was not amour proper (harmful self-love) as in a 
Hobbesian or a pessimistic Augustinian perspective but amore de soi (beneficial self-
love) that permitted a healthy view of self. Cladis (2000) notes three “paths” that 
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Rousseau took in his understanding of self-love. In A History of Poland Rousseau gives 
an extreme public path. On this path, love is a public matter and cannot be left up to 
individual preferences. Education is the primary method by which passions should be 
directed in responsible directions. In a somewhat schizophrenic turn, Reveries of the 
Solitary Walker advocates an extreme private path. On the private path of the “solitaire” 
true happiness can be achieved, free from the corruption and pain of other influences. Yet 
this path was limited by its inability to affect anyone other than one’s self. The final path 
from Social Contract is the most important and remembered of Rousseau’s treatises 
because it is out of this “path of mixed loves” that the modern liberal state is born. 
Evidence to this fact can be seen within Cladis’s (2000) contrast between the extreme 
public path and the path of mixed loves:  
If the extreme public path is marked by an intense patriotism in which there is no 
conflict between public and private, then the path of mixed loves is marked by a 
temperate republicanism in which there is some conflict. On the extreme public 
path, one’s interests are shaped at birth to match those of the state; on the path of 
mixed loves, the state appeals to one’s interests (as defined by amore de soi) to 
live peaceably in a just nation. On the extreme public path, the self is unitary and 
devoted to the good of the state; on the path of mixed loves, the self is multiple 
and only one’s civic self is dedicated to the good of the state. On the path of 
mixed loves, the private self is not obliterated; diversity is permitted, indeed, 
guaranteed by law. (Cladis, 2000, p. 246). 
It is evident that these facets of Rousseau’s path of mixed loves have carried over into the 
modern liberal state, especially in the United States.  
However, while Rousseau was a pivotal proponent of individualism within 
political science, he was by no means the only founder of the concept. As Grant (1997) 
notes, the humanism of Freud in psychology, the conflict theory of Marx, the 
organization theory of Max Weber in sociology, and the theory of capitalism of Adam 
Smith in economics all reflect a direct assumption of an egocentric view of humanity (p. 
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323). Stemming from the sense of self-consciousness that was created by Cartesian 
dualism, the notion of self-interest became engrained in human thinking. 
Scientific Maintenance of Self-Interest 
The Baconian Spirit still lives on through the primacy of science (MacIntyre, 
1988), and it is science that serves as one of the major lenses through which egoism and 
altruism have been explored and maintained. Much attention has been paid to altruism 
because of the threat it serves to scientific theories founded on the idea that humans are 
fundamentally self-interested (e.g., Dawkins, 1978; Wilson, 1975). This has led to 
interpretations de-emphasizing self-sacrifice and prioritizing self-interest, vis-à-vis 
experimental observation noting the improbability of altruism evolving. Early efforts to 
reframe altruism relied upon speculation about self-interested motives. For example, 
Hobbes suggested that altruism emanates not from genuine concern for the other but for 
one’s own discomfort at seeing their pain (Monroe, 1996). Others who touted altruism 
found the concept undermined by an inherent focus on self-interest within their views. 
Comte (1875), the father of sociology, whose intent was to see the “ascendancy of 
altruism over egoism” (p. 500), ironically founded a field dominated by self-interest due 
to the ideal of total control that dominated his conception of positivism (Grant, 1997). 
Such inherent self-interest began to overtake speculation about motives to the point that 
sociobiology and evolutionary biological explanations avoid definitions concerning 
motive at all and only focus on altruism or the lack thereof within nature. Wilson and 
Dawkins are two of the most notable figures in this regard. 
Wilson (1975) describes best the “central theoretical problem of sociobiology: 
how can altruism, which by definition reduces personal fitness, possibly evolve by 
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natural selection?” (p. 3). His own efforts towards answering this question lie in 
reciprocal altruism whereby one eventually gets a “return” on one’s social “investment.” 
Animals work together towards a social goal in order to ensure their own well-being. For 
example, ants cooperate with one another taking turns gathering food in order to reach a 
greater gain. As Ruse (2002) notes, “Animals work in an ‘altruistic’ fashion, thus 
ensuring that their units of heredity (the ‘genes’) are passed in higher percentages to 
future generations than otherwise would be the case” (p. 154). But reciprocity is not 
enough to explain this phenomenon as cases of genetic sacrifice (e.g., bees killing 
themselves to protect the hive) indicate. Kin altruism is also adopted in that such a 
sacrifice would save the genetic strains in the close kin who are warned or protected. 
Thus, all seemingly altruistic concepts are actually attempts to save one’s own genetic 
code. As Wilson (1975) states, “The theory of kin selection has taken most of the good 
will out of altruism. When altruism is conceived of as the mechanism by which DNA 
multiplies itself through a network of relatives, spirituality becomes just one more 
Darwinian enabling device” (p. 120).   
Dawkins (1978) furthers this theme in his book The Selfish Gene where he touts 
the primacy of genetic self-interest. “Selfishness” is used as a metaphor to describe the 
impact that genetics has on the human condition and the evolutionary implausibility of 
altruism. This implausibility is represented in an illustration concerning three different 
behaviors within a bird species, who to survive, must have parasites removed from their 
backs. The “sucker” (a telling title) behaves altruistically, grooming indiscriminately. The 
“cheats” accept grooming but never return it. The “grudger” will groom anyone once but 
will not groom that individual again until the act is reciprocated. The theory notes that a 
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population entirely comprised of suckers will operate nicely until a cheat is introduced. 
These “cheat genes” are predisposed to survival within such a community. As the 
cheaters flourish, there will be less suckers grooming, causing the entire population to 
decline or become extinct. Grudger genes, because they discriminate between cheats and 
others, would cause the population to be “more fit.” This behavior would be preferred 
evolutionarily over the altruism of the suckers. As Dawkins (1978) states, “If there is one 
selfish rebel, prepared to exploit the altruism of the rest, then he, by definition, is more 
likely than they to survive and have children” (p. 8). The goal then, is to maximize the 
benefits to genetic survival through a system resembling cost-benefit analysis. Dawkins 
(1978) notes, “One should always ask whether it would pay in the future, to cut his 
losses, and abandon the project now, even through he has already invested heavily in it” 
(p. 162). Thus, “Altruism is largely nepotism, occurring whenever br>ca/r—when the 
benefit to the recipient exceeds the cost to the altruist divided by his or her coefficient of 
relatedness” (Konner, 2002, p. 195). Sacrifice is ultimately viewed in terms of genetic 
benefit to one’s self or to one’s future offspring. For some, that is the extent of what one 
might perceive as “altruism.” 
Altruism “Discovered” and the Scientific Response 
After Dawkins, a number of experiments were carried out by Bateson to 
determine whether pure altruism, giving solely for the sake of other, actually existed 
beyond cost-benefit analyses and genetics. Grant (1997) calls this process of 
experimentation the “ABC’s of altruism” as Bateson responded to the challenges from 
Archer and Cialdini. The initial experiment (Bateson, 1991) attempted to identify 
altruism at the behavioral level rather than the motivational level. Bateson defined 
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empathy as an expression of altruism through a number of tests and discovered that 
altruism, defined as a willingness to help others out of empathy, exists. In response, 
Archer challenged that the “altruism” found, in reality stemmed from a self-interested 
motive concerned with negative social evaluation. Additionally, Cialdini challenged that 
altruism was simply a relief of personal feelings of distress such as sadness or guilt, thus 
creating another egoist motive. In each case Bateson responded with new experiments 
that undercut these claims. Essentially Bateson created a scientific defense of altruism 
that severely challenges traditional notions of the primacy of self-interest. As Bateson 
(1991) notes, “If we are capable of altruism then virtually all of our current ideas about 
individual psychology, social relations, economics and politics are in an important 
respect wrong” (p. 3).  
In light of evidence in support of altruism, there has been an attempt to reframe 
the argument to escape the reductionist tendencies of Wilson and Dawkins and still 
maintain the self-interested system. Thus, in an attempt to go beyond genetics, Burhoe 
(1981) indicates the need for a “culturetype” in addition to a “genotype” in describing the 
human condition. A culturetype includes those characteristics of an individual inherited 
upon birth that “shape the specific characteristics of a sociocultural organism—its 
specific language, technology, rituals, rites, etc.” (Burhoe, 1981, p. 213). Without this 
culturetype, the sociocultural organism is no different than the other creatures in the 
animal kingdom, unaware of their surrounding culture. Thus, human altruism can be 
explained as “genetically generated reciprocity” with other “sociocultural organisms” 
through “the framework of the symbiosis model” (Meisinger, 2000, p. 754). Genetics and 
culture work together to explain the dilemma. 
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Another way of reframing evolutionary biology to explain the presence of 
altruism in nature is given by Sober and Wilson (1998). By using group selection, they 
claim “the evolution of altruism is easily explained, genuine altruism exists in nature, and 
‘the central theoretical problem of sociobiology’ has been solved” (p. 34). Group 
selection, which looks at evolution on a corporate level, is contrasted with individual 
selection, which looks at evolution on a largely genetic basis. Sober and Wilson argue 
that because group selection has been shunned by sociobiologists, these sociobiologists 
have not had the means to describe altruistic behavior and thus have dismissed it as non-
existent. Sober and Wilson show that altruism exists through a statistical phenomenon 
known as Simpson’s paradox, which demonstrates that group level phenomena (e.g., 
more men than women on a college campus indicating discrimination) may not be 
present on the individual level (e.g., admission practices of individual departments) due 
to statistical percentages (e.g., one small department high in incoming females admits 
30% males compared with a large department low in incoming females admitting 60% 
men). This leads to two premises that dictate the evolution of altruism: First, altruism 
evolves whenever group selection is stronger than individual selection. Second, there 
must be no other way to benefit others with a lesser degree of individual expense. 
Because of the second premise, the concept of self-interest is still inherent within the 
method. If someone senses they can lose less by behaving in a different, less self-
sacrificial way, they will take that path. However, if Sober and Wilson are correct, group 
selection at least raises the possibility for altruism from within evolutionary science and 
thus, keeps the theory from collapsing all together.  
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And yet, regard for other is still problematic within the modernist paradigm 
inherited from Hobbes. The dichotomy between altruism (i.e., self-sacrifice) and the idea 
of desire being the product of a fundamentally self-interested nature easily paints other-
regard as an impossibility or a genetic flaw. Even those approaches that advocate the 
existence of self-sacrifice continue to use a notion of self-interest inherent within the 
Darwinian system to approach the issue. A modern perspective would lead us to believe 
that our duty is towards our own self-interests with a subdued yet morally-functional 
option for altruism. The difficulties in finding ground for other-centered behavior just do 
not seem to go away. How do we navigate this dichotomy then between self and other? If 
a person thinks human nature is not primarily self-interested as seems evident from a 
person’s everyday experiences, how does he or she counter claims that these actions are 
self-interested? Is there another way of framing the issue that may make other-centered 
behavior less perplexing? Postmodern approaches begin this process of opening ground 
to reframe the modern paradigm. 
 
Postmodern Approaches to the Fractured Individual 
Beginning roughly with Nietzsche and his deconstruction of religion and 
philosophy, we begin to see a “rhetorical turn” in philosophical thinking that radically 
undermines objectivity, metanarrative, and the metaphor of progress (Schrag, 1986). This 
shift has provided a new ground from which we can conceive interpersonal relationships. 
There are several people who are foundational to this transition, but again I will highlight 
only a few in order to illustrate major elements in the way the altruism/egoism dichotomy 
can be deconstructed in order to provide ground for the metaphor of charitable 
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acknowledgment. Foremost towards this end are Derrida and Foucault, two scholars who 
highlight the ability to deconstruct language and consequently demonstrate the fragility 
of subjectivity. As a result of the ideas they present, the foundation upon which we 
conceive being shifts from the notion of a subject-centered epistemology to one of a 
deconstructionist epistemology in which we find trouble establishing an ethical basis for 
relationships.  
 Plato (1984) in the Symposium cites Socrates as stating:  
Once a thing is committed to writing it circulates equally among those who 
understand the subject and those who have no business with it; a writing cannot 
distinguish between suitable and unsuitable readers. And if it is ill-treated or 
unfairly abused it always needs its parent to come to its rescue; it is quite 
incapable of defending or helping itself. (§275, p. 97).  
Indeed this ancient commentary on the fragility of texts seems to highlight the 
postmodern dilemma: Who is the “suitable” interpreter of a work? If that is the “parent,” 
what happens after a “parent” of a work has died? Why is language so helpless to 
“defend” itself? If it is so fragile, how is it that any “subject” can be knowable? These 
questions have been pivotal to Derrida and Foucault, two of the foremost critics of the 
over-reliance on linguistic signifiers. It is the deconstruction of language and 
consequently the subject that have had profound consequences for today’s understanding 
of self and other. 
Derrida and différance 
 Derrida propagates deconstruction, the idea of breaking down traditional 
constructs through word play in order to create new meanings and understandings. 
Derrida (1974) takes a grammatological approach where writing takes priority over the 
spoken word. This as we will see has serious consequences for relationships in that the 
foundation for ethical behavior is radically decentered if not undermined completely. 
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With a prioritization of writing it is difficult to hold a perspective on the nature of the 
subject. Whether one takes a mechanistic approach to relationships or alternatively an 
idealist approach, it is quite difficult to maintain in the light of the signifier/signified split. 
Consequently, we begin down an ethical road to relativism or, at best, emotivism (see 
MacIntyre, 1984). Social scientific endeavors explore how to quantify human relational 
phenomena in measurable and static variables for the purpose of reliability and 
reproduction of results (see, Poole, McPhee, & Canary, 2002). While the reliability of 
social scientific studies’ methodologies are impressive, there is a call for research to 
avoid treating individual subjects as what Poole, McPhee, and Canary (2002) describe as 
“nonindependent,” meaning individuals are observed outside the relationship at hand. 
Otherwise separation from context can lead to a mechanistic view of the variable being 
studied and of the relationships they are measuring. This tendency towards mechanism 
will be explored in more depth in the next chapter on interpersonal communication 
theories. Here we will look at one potential consequence of prioritizing the written over 
the oral—relativism. Derrida would never claim relativism to be a necessary result of his 
approach; nevertheless, he struggles to ground reconstructive endeavors due to his 
prioritization (and consequent deconstruction) of the written word. 
One of the pivotal concepts in Derrida’s (anti)philosophy on language and thus 
the subject is the concept of différance. A complex ideology compacts itself into this one 
term that refuses to submit to terminological confines. Derrida having “never ceased to 
write on différance” (Moore, 1994, p. 11) admits, himself, that “it cannot be exposed” 
(Derrida, 1986, p. 398). This is an initial paradox that is crucial to grasp to understand the 
paradigm shift toward rhetoric in postmodernity. To arrive at a definition of différance, 
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Derrida spends much of his time describing what the term is not. Derrida (1986) portrays 
a conception of his ideology that cannot be “elaborated simply as a philosophical 
discourse, operating according to principles, postulates axioms or definitions, and 
proceeding along the discursive lines of a linear order of reasons” (p. 399). Instead it is 
explored through what Derrida delineates as “strategic and adventurous” word play. (p. 
399). The term différance, by definition, defies definition. In essence, there is no 
definition because “to say ‘deconstruction is X’ is precisely to miss the point.” (Moore, 
1994, p. 25). Différance thus becomes a series of word associations and disassociations to 
arrive at a model for discussion.   
A good starting point for understanding the roots of the concept lies within the 
text of Ferdinand de Saussure (1986), the famous French linguist. His work exposed 
clearly that “the bond between the signifier and the signified is arbitrary” (p. 150). The 
fact that “tree” corresponds to a vascular, pithy, member of the family Plantae that has 
cellulose supporting the cell walls and a cork cambium layer is nothing more than an 
arbitrary linguistic assignment to a physical object—in short, a sign comprised of 
signifier (the word “tree”) and signified (the idea of treeness) that refers to a referent (the 
actual physical tree). The unit that is a linguistic sign “follows no law other than that of 
tradition” (p. 154). As such, the definitions of words only have meaning inasmuch as the 
nearest arbitrary sign holds meaning. E.g., the phrase “cork cambium” only defines “tree” 
as effectively as one can identify the term “cork cambium.”   
This leads to an important insight for Saussure (1986): in language, there are only 
differences. More importantly, “a difference generally implies positive terms between 
which the difference is set up; but in language there are only differences without positive 
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terms” (167). This means there is no such thing as a “grammatical fact” when a signified 
and signifier are taken independently of each other. If “tree” is simply treated as an 
independent phonetic syllable, it means nothing and is negative. The differences between 
the independent words “tree” and “bark” (one fundamental aspect of what makes a tree a 
tree) do not create objective meaning. Independently they in fact hold negative value—
negative denoting that no meaning can be established within the words in and of 
themselves because each is explained by other terms that hold no meaning in and of 
themselves.   
A natural conclusion to this is that everything in language is negative having no 
consequential meaning. But Saussure is reluctant to carry this idea to its full fruition as 
noted by Moore (1994): “Alarmed at his own audacity Saussure backs away from the 
brink to which he has brought us . . . [saying] ‘the moment we compare one sign with 
another as positive combination . . . the term difference should be dropped’” (p. 17).  In 
other words, it is fine to recognize the tentative nature of signified and signifier but when 
real life application is considered, there is the ability to establish positive meaning 
between the sign and referent. According to Saussure, once a “linguistic sign” is 
developed the two negatives become a positive, and meaning is established. 
Derrida begins to make his claims about différance by taking Saussure’s notion to 
its apparent conclusion. For the sign to represent positive meaning from two terms 
founded in negative difference is a contradiction of terms according to Derrida. There is a 
“necessity of usurpation [of the sign] once it has been shown to be a priori possible” 
(Harvey, 1986, p. 67). Différance reflects the quintessential difference between not only 
the signified and the signifier but between the sign and the referent. No absolute meaning 
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can be established. Thus, “bark” is fundamentally unable adequately to describe “tree” 
because the terminologies at their core are ultimately unstable. Terms are forever defined 
by other signifiers that are defined by other signifiers ad infinium, all rooted in the 
arbitrary world of negative differences. Thus anything based on linguistic terminology 
(which includes everything in public and private discourse) is subject to deconstruction. 
Based on this concept, Derrida’s (anti) philosophy is able to take shape. The 
notion of a priori linguistic difference becomes a new starting place for epistemological 
grounding and Derrida chooses as his target none other than the entirety of Western 
metaphysics. Simply put for Derrida, philosophy is a kind of writing. Because 
“philosophy cannot transcend its medium,” it is forever subjectivized, destroying the 
“illusion of ‘pure’ reason” (McCarthy, 1991, p. 100). Thus, even “being” becomes a 
subjectivized philosophical notion. However, to approach a discussion of being without 
using ontological or metaphysical terms is tenuous. As Moore (1994) explains, 
“Derrida’s deconstruction of metaphysics can be undertaken only from within the edifice 
that metaphysics provides—a project requiring vigilance, stealth, and extreme cunning” 
(p. 20). The stealthy term that does this work is différance.  
Derrida’s assessment of Being is a response to the delimitation of the ontology of 
presence, which is the ontology of beings and beingness. Being is what différance 
attempts to interrogate and dethrone. The concept of Being is constantly redefined and re-
established by various philosophies (e.g., Heidegger) in order to understand the definition 
of what it means to be human, or more generically, being. For Derrida, because of 
différance and the impossibility of “pure” reason due to language, “Being has never had a 
“meaning.” (Derrida, 1986, p. 414). This means that “in a certain and very strange way 
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[différance] is “older” than the ontological difference or the truth of Being” (p. 414).  
This is another way of affirming the death of God and the death of any sort of 
metanarrative that alludes to anything of objective nature. Différance, in a sense, encloses 
Being. “There is no maintaining, and no depth to this bottomless chessboard on which 
Being is put into play” (p. 415).   
The importance of spending so much time on deconstruction for this study is 
because of the implications this approach has on relational constructs. In this conception 
of language, constructs of relational motivation such as altruism and egoism become 
inherently “playable.” That a sociobiologist is able to interpret all motivation as self-
interested would not be surprising, nor particularly accurate to Derrida. If, as he states, “a 
written sign carries with it a force that breaks with its context” (Derrida, 2001, p. 1481), 
then motives represented by symbols such as “altruism” or “egoism” are not able to carry 
with them the meaningfulness of true “motivation.” The scholar interprets, frames, and 
characterizes them within their own context of a metanarrative, in this case evolution and 
scientific method. Given the biological need for self-preservation in an evolutionary 
model, sociobiologists may find it natural and indeed necessary to carry this 
preservationist tendency over into our ethical and social behaviors. In this biological 
model, we are animals (emphasized) with (who have evolved to have) logos. But as 
Derrida (1974) notes, animalness is a construct as deconstructable as our logos. The very 
notion of animalness is in question as a result of the tentative nature of logos, which he 
would also call into question from a perspective of grammatology. “Animal language—
and animality in general—represents here the still living myth of fixity, of symbolic 
incapacity, of nonsupplementarity” (p. 242).  
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But Derrida does not stop here. In this quote from a discussion of the origin of 
languages, Derrida deconstructs how we construct our very being: “Man calls himself 
man only by drawing limits excluding his other from the play of supplementarity: the 
purity of nature, of animality, primitivism, childhood, madness, divinity” (p. 244). We 
are bound to the notion of play. When these limits are deconstructed, we see how fragile 
discussions of motive can be. We cannot even frame solidly our place in society; this is 
what Derrida calls the “game of the world” (p. 50). This is a game “within the becoming-
unmotivated of the symbol” (p. 50). The game itself is always active and always deferred. 
Essentially this translates life into a language game in the realm of deferred meaning—
that is, the realm of the written word. Thus, what Derrida accomplishes is a 
deconstruction of the meaning of the subject and a problematization of the way we 
currently look at society. “Why did I do that?” is a question that cannot be answered with 
the simple answers of “for me (egoism)” or “for you (altruism).”  There is a “bottomless 
chessboard” of meaning that can be attributed to human motivation. Altruism and egoism 
are pawns easily sacrificed in a game that exposes their inflexibility as linguistic 
signifiers. We cannot simply attribute motive to self-interest. Why we do something is a 
chimera—an interpreted event, and thus the meaningfulness of an action is deferred 
indefinitely. 
So what then can we “know” about human relationships? While deconstruction is 
useful for exposing the fragility of motivational interpretation and the inadequacy of the 
altruism/egoism dichotomy, there is a seemingly unconquerable difficulty in 
reconstructing meaning for relationships as a result of the deconstructive move. The 
paradox of communication created by différance is that it demands the usage of words in 
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a process that deems them inadequate for understanding. In essence, we muddle through 
life, valuing continual openness (i.e., play) and freedom. Is there a space for the subject 
given such a stark description of reality? Where do we find ground for the ethical life? 
Richard Rorty (1989) argues the only space for such talk is in mutually agreed upon 
narrative based on individual choices—in his case a liberal, capitalist state. This is 
accomplished without explicitly arguing for its rightness or wrongness; it simply is. It 
was chosen based on personal choices in life. These choices are agreed upon in society 
but are always contingent. However, this approach results in problems of emotivism 
when individual choice is the presupposition upon which an ethical system is built. These 
will be depicted by MacIntyre later on.  
First, we will discuss the practical implication of choice and the deconstructed 
subject as it pertains to relationships for the next author, Michel Foucault. We see in 
Foucault another expression of the death of the subject. However, he approaches it from a 
perspective of power and more explicitly stated purposes—those of establishing freedom 
and beauty. After the subject has been completely torn down, we will look at the error of 
an aesthetic solution and a potential answer in communicative praxis. 
Foucault and the Death of Man 
When considering Foucault, we need to begin with an account of the postmodern 
condition, where death looms large. Nietzsche’s “Death of God” could be considered the 
author of one of the first “postmodern critiques” as he deconstructs the causal 
relationships founded by the assumed objectivity of metaphysics in the Kantian a priori 
and religious doctrine. In On the Genealogy of Morals, he notes “There is no ‘being’ 
behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed—the 
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deed is everything” (45). Causality, especially vis-à-vis God, is rejected, deemed a 
cultural creation leading to human fragility. In its place, Nietzsche claims to “discover the 
way that leads to a Yes and No” (Will 33), through subject-centered virtues of strength—
e.g., our will to power. As he states, “the ripest fruit is the sovereign individual, like only 
to himself, liberated again from morality of custom…in him exists a proud 
consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been achieved and 
become flesh in him…(OGM 59). In short, we should look inside ourselves to become 
the greatest we can be—a notion that is thoroughly in line with the Enlightenment 
project. 
Foucault critiques this notion of subjectivity by noting that language frames the 
reference point for the subject’s “will to power” just as much as a “will of God”—
collectively referenced as the “will to truth.” In a spirit Derrida would appreciate, 
Foucault (2001) suggests that society should “call into question our will to truth, restore 
to discourse its character as an event, and finally throw off the sovereignty of the 
signifier” (p. 1470). However, the emphasis is not explicitly on the written word as it is 
for Derrida, but more broadly “discourse,” which includes all linguistic forms without 
explicitly calling for one to take a primary position. Language is just as instable but not 
explicitly because it is written. This instability leads to the insignificance of the author 
and/or the subject. Foucault (1977) notes that in our interpretations of discourse, “We 
would hardly hear anything but the stirring of an indifference: What difference does it 
make who is speaking?” (p. 376). It is in this stroke that the “Death of Man” necessarily 
follows the “Death of God,” reflecting the loss of subjectivity as well as objectivity. As 
we call into question the very nature of language, it is impossible to also hold onto a firm 
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truth based on rationality and sense experiences. We are creatures of language, bound by 
interpretation, and thus must create meaning within actual discursive moments rather 
than discover meaning in metaphysical or subject-centered procedures. 
This creative action is laden with power dynamics. Foucault (1978) puts forth a 
number of elements of power. In his History of Sexuality, he notes, “Power is not 
something that is acquired, seized, or shared…power is exercised from innumerable 
points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations” (p.94). Thus, the view of 
power as contained by someone who is hierarchically above someone else is too narrow 
an approach. As Foucault (1978) notes, “There is no binary and all-encompassing 
opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations” (p. 94). We are shaped 
by power as it is expressed in relationships. Resistance is a fundamental dynamic of this 
relationship. Resistances  
do not derive from a few heterogeneous principles…are there no great radical 
ruptures, massive binary divisions? Occasionally, yes. But more often one is 
dealing with mobile and transitory point of resistance, producing cleavages in a 
society that shift about, fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, furrowing 
across individuals themselves… (Foucault, 1978, p. 96).  
Power represents a complex dynamic of humanity whereby we are shaped by and are 
shaping others as we bring relational events into being. 
Looking at this view of power, one can say of altruism and egoism as 
interpersonal motivations that the simplistic binary oppositions this creates are not 
adequate for representing the complexity of the power dynamics involved. Indeed, while 
self-interest explains a sub-set of our being, it does not adequately frame being, providing 
only two ingredients in the complicated casserole that is humanity. The limitations of this 
dichotomy are radically explored by Foucault (1994) as he frames the search for 
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subjectivity as a search for historical contingencies to answer the question “What can be 
played?” (p. 140)—a gesture of creativity’s import. 
 The potential for ethical relativity opened by this ability for “play” requires some 
sort of answer; this is attempted by Foucault with his notion of “care.” Within an ethical 
horizon he suggests through “care,” we attempt to breach the bastions of power-ridden 
language to arrive at a “playable” game guided by an aesthetic form for a beautiful life. 
As Foucault (1984) states in “On the Genealogy of Ethics,” “What strikes me is the fact 
that in our society, art has become something which is related only to objects and not to 
individuals, or to life…But couldn’t everyone’s life become a work of art?” (243). 
Harmonious existence is a product of the types of power relations that shape a person’s 
life and the beauty that is created as a result. Schuld (2003) puts it well when she states: 
For Foucault…the harmonious or discordant existence, the skilled or the unskilled 
life is not a matter of becoming free from all control. It concerns what kind of 
control and governance shapes one’s life and how this control and governance 
interacts with and shapes the lives of others, and vice versa. (p. 74).  
A beautiful existence is the standard by which one can axiologically see to what extent 
this “shaping and governance” is effective. For Foucault, this comprises a largely 
aesthetic answer to the question of ethical purpose.  
 
Summary 
As with Derrida, we see a deconstruction of the subject in Foucault’s writing. In 
addition, we also see an aesthetic answer to the question of what comprises “good” power 
relationships. This in combination with the largely self-interested interpretations of the 
modern paradigm have led to some profound consequences for moral thinking. In the 
next section we will see the dangers of aestheticism and preference as the primary criteria 
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for ethical action. However, this does not demand a return to the dichotomous depiction 
of the human motive as altruistic and egoistic. The deconstruction of this framework is 
well-conceived. To where, then, shall we turn? If modern conceptions of self are 
insufficient and postmodernity vis-à-vis deconstruction has left us rather rudderless, what 
then is the ground upon which we can build our work?  
Indeed, these are the issues with which the field of interpersonal communication 
continues to struggle today. The major influences of Hobbes, Rousseau, and sociobiology 
can be seen throughout the field. Interpersonal communication often feels dichotomous 
and stiff in its approach to intimate relationships. While deconstruction has the effect of 
opening ground, it often has problems reconstructing theory. Let us turn now to the state 
of interpersonal communication to analyze some of the major theories that adhere to a 
modernist approach. After this we can demonstrate a reconstruction of the space of 
subjectivity vis-à-vis Schrag which will provide a foundation from which to launch into 
the metaphor of charitable acknowledgement as a means of expressing relational ethics in 
intimate interpersonal communication. 
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Chapter 3 
Interpersonal Communication and the 
Egoism/Altruism Dichotomy 
 
 To this point we have dealt largely with the broader humanities in our discussion 
of altruism, egoism, and the problem of ethical ground. This has been done to provide a 
review of pertinent literature so that we can now venture out into a discussion of the 
theories of interpersonal communication, specifically in the way they relate to intimate 
romantic relationships. What are those areas that interpersonal communication finds 
foundational to its study of relationships? With the Enlightenment philosophy of self as 
its primary guide, the field of interpersonal communication tends to develop descriptive 
theories in an effort to explore assumptions about self-interest rather than develop 
interpretive theories and philosophies to navigate ethical ground. While there are 
important exceptions to this (e.g., certain dialogic theories), the dominating theories of 
social exchange, goal-orientation, and interpersonal skills that undergird portions of the 
field perpetuate the idea of a self/other dichotomy with a prioritization of the Hobbesian 
idea that self-interest is fundamental to human nature. While not explicitly touting an 
ethic, these egoist theories nonetheless have ethical consequences, namely an overarching 
hyper-individualism that leads to emotivist tendencies. This prioritization of 
individualism creates a problematic base for fostering such bastions of intimacy as the 
institution of marriage, definitions of love, and the foundations of trust. Thus this chapter 
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begins with a discussion of emotivism and then explores how social exchange, goal-
orientations, and interpersonal skill literature all perpetuate this ethical tendency through 
their concerns with self-interest, subjective opinion, and personal satisfaction. The broad 
critique of individualism [e.g., MacIntyre (1984) and Arnett, Fritz, & Holba (2007)] is 
thus narrowed into a narrative of individualism specific to interpersonal communication. 
 
MacIntyre and Emotivism 
MacIntyre (1984) in After Virtue demonstrates a fundamental problem in the way 
the realm of ethics is portrayed not only in philosophical circles but in the mainstream: 
“We have—very largely, if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both theoretical and 
practical, of morality” (p. 2). All we possess are “the fragments of a conceptual scheme, 
parts which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess 
indeed simulacra of morality…” (p. 2). This is not what could be called a hopeful state of 
affairs. Indeed, his optimism at changing this condition is not high. He continues: 
It is the aim of this book to make that thought [that moral language is fragmented 
and ineffective] available to radicals, liberals, and conservatives alike. I cannot 
however expect to make it palatable; for if it is true, we are all already in a state 
so disastrous that there are no large remedies for it. (pp. 4-5).  
His assessment reflects sensibilities and conditions of a time where individualism has 
caused the engagement of ethics within a community to become theoretically 
impoverished and intractable in application. Indeed, the argument made here is that 
several important interpersonal communication theories encourage such an ethical system 
of individual preferences based upon its Enlightenment presuppositions.  
MacIntyre describes an ethical system based on preferences as emotivism. 
“Emotivism is the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral 
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judgments are nothing but expressions of preference” (1984, p. 12). Moral judgment in an 
emotivist system comes less from an overarching value or transcendent ideal than from 
an individual preference for a given value or ideal. Feelings dictate moral decision-
making and the language we use to justify decisions. Thus, you get MacIntyre’s concern 
for the state of moral language and the foundations of ethics. We are becoming a society 
unable to make judgments on behavior. For example, when one refers to a particular 
understanding of God yet couches it in language of personal taste (e.g., God does not 
send anyone to Hell because I just could not worship a God that was so judgmental), the 
focus is on the individual, not the standard. Whether the community accepts it or not is 
not particularly important (e.g., the Catholic Church may hold this standard but I disagree 
so I do not live by it). It namely depends upon individual beliefs and feelings. Thus there 
is little ground upon which to make overarching judgments; judgments are based 
overwhelmingly on personal preference.  
To understand this focus on preference, we must understand the economic system 
upon which it is founded. Preference has become the cornerstone of today’s consumerist 
society. Marketing has shifted from an integrated approach to one that looks at archetypes 
and the experience of the consumer (e.g. Hammer & Champy, 2001). A person should 
gain an experience from a product, not just have it meet a basic need. This has led to a 
multiplication of products to reflect an individual’s differing desires. Thus we have a 
deodorant aisle full of different shapes, smells, and striations of products to make men 
musky, desirable, fresh, and appealing to women rather than merely dry and without body 
odor.  
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The consumerism of the personal care aisle has bled over into the ethical realm. 
MacIntyre notes that the concept of “this is good” for an emotivist translates into “I 
approve of this; do so as well” or “hurrah for this.” The feeling or experience of the good 
for the individual is what dictates it being so. Thus, in regard to emotivism, MacIntyre 
states, “In moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for 
expressions of personal preference” (p. 19). The good is not a function of principles but 
of feelings. It is easy to see how a person who is uncomfortable at a suggested ethical 
tenet (e.g., it is wrong to lie) could define the good such that they could get out of the 
tenet altogether (e.g., the truth would make me uncomfortable as well as my spouse; this 
is not good) and then feel they are still standing on solid ethical ground (e.g., we both still 
feel good so it is good).    
The implications of this position follows:  
What emotivism asserts is in central part that there are and can be no valid 
rational justifications for any claims that objective and impersonal moral 
standards exist and hence that there are no such standards…Emotivism thus rests 
upon a claim that every attempt, whether past or present, to provide a rational 
justification for an objective morality has in fact failed. (p. 19).  
The phrase “true for you but not for me” could be considered emblematic of an emotivist 
perspective. In this view, history has little consequence and moral judgment becomes if 
not impossible then certainly improper—ground for judgment is impoverished.  
So what has caused this ethical stance to become the dominant framework? 
MacIntyre (1984) attributes emotivism to the failure of the Enlightenment project. He 
demonstrates this through the prioritization of self caused by the Cartesian mind/body 
split. Because the individual is rent asunder from non-subjective sources, there are no 
criteria beyond individually adopted ones upon which to found ethical argumentation. 
Community ceases to act as the primary source of criteria for decision-making. In fact, 
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there are no criteria outside those the individual chooses to adopt. This makes the 
individual all-encompassing in his/her judgments.  
The specifically modern self, the self I have called emotivist, finds no limits set to 
that on which it may pass judgment for such limits could only derive from rational 
criteria for evaluation and, as we have seen, the emotivist self lacks any such 
criteria. (p. 31).  
Thus, MacIntyre frames the debate as one between an aesthetic and an ethical foundation 
for the moral life, with the exemplar being marriage. Marriage is paradigmatic of the 
ethical as a “state of commitment and obligation through time” (p. 40) whereas a 
romantic lover is paradigmatic of aesthetic expression as one “immersed in his own 
passion” (p. 40). The following example from MacIntyre portrays the issue at hand: 
How I live at any given moment is irrelevant to the question of how I must live. 
This is why marriage is the paradigm of the ethical. Bertrand Russell has 
described how one day in 1902 while riding a bicycle he suddenly realized that he 
was no longer in love with his first wife—and from this realization there followed 
in time the break-up of that marriage. Kierkegaard would have said, and surely 
rightly, that any attitude whose absence can be discovered in sudden flash while 
riding a bicycle is only an aesthetic reaction and that such experience has to be 
irrelevant to the commitment which genuine marriage involves, to the authority of 
the moral precepts which define marriage. But now whence does the ethical 
derive this kind of authority? (p. 41-42). 
 
Indeed, emotivism is unable to provide understanding for a number of relational 
constructs that participate in an ethical paradigm—love, trust, and marriage being 
foremost on the list. Modernity’s rational approach to relationships has led to a hyper-
subjective understanding of ethics and thus made it difficult to give foundation to ethical 
distinctions beyond preference. The freedom to choose based on the standard of 
rationality is not sufficient in and of itself for morality beyond emotivism. MacIntyre 
(1982) notes, “If the ethical has some basis, it cannot be provided by the notion of radical 
choice” (p. 43).  
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We are struck then with a significant problem. Society is based on the ability to 
judge between the just and unjust; legal systems would fall into decay without this basic 
ability. More importantly for this discussion however, relationships, the building blocks 
upon which society is based, also are based on such agreements. For example, consider a 
marriage. The overarching premise is one of commitment, fidelity, and agreement to a 
life together. A bride and groom are agreeing legally to the courts, socially to witnesses 
such as family and friends, and often religiously to God that they will (as the Catholic 
vows go) “Promise to be true to you in sickness and health, good times and bad; I will 
love and cherish you all the days of my life.” This is a judgment in essence on what 
comprises marriage. It overarches the individual. 
Emotivism undermines this ability. When preference enters in as a moral trump 
card—a Right—it rescinds such authority that is vested in society, government, and 
religion to dictate standards and vests it instead in the individual. Even interpersonal 
relationships have the “we-ness” that creates a unified whole deconstructed into two “I”s 
negotiating personal preferences. In this ideological framework, whatever marriage is or 
was in society is really important only to the extent that the individual buys into it. When 
preferences change, the commitment could be dismissed. In this emotivist system, “I felt 
trapped” is an acceptable ethic for divorce as well as any other feeling that may give rise 
to distance in a couple. The happiness of self should not be usurped unless the individual 
chooses it. Whether or not one believes in marriage as an institution, it is easy to see how 
the relevance of marriage is significantly limited in a society where its sanctity is usurped 
by individual preference and where society accepts this as a standard.  
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This phenomenon is not limited to marriage alone. Trust, the foundation for 
intimacy, is at stake. According to Burgoon and Hale (1984) trust includes character 
dimensions such as sincerity, dependability, trustworthiness, and honesty. These are not 
preferences but rather issues of truthfulness—I do what I say and I say what I do. As 
Weber and Carter (2003) note, “Trust makes social life possible” (p. 1). In their treatise 
on trust, their primary argument is that trust is an orientation emerging from a 
relationship rather than a tool by which to achieve goals. “Modernity necessitates trust, 
but more often than not this trust is more systemically based than interactionally based” 
(p. 2). Thus they note a distinction between holism and atomism seen by Lewis and 
Weigert (1985) where holism looks at the trust of individuals as reflective of communal 
understandings of trust where as atomism looks at trust as a function of autonomous 
agents looking out for their own self-interests (p. 2).   
Acknowledging the importance of trust to intimacy, we are led back to the 
problem of emotivism. To what extent can one have trust in an emotivist system? Only to 
the extent that an individual values it. People who prefer lying to get their way undermine 
the very foundation of their intimate relationships. When deceit, the intentional 
separation of word and deed, is the preference, there is no foundation upon which to build 
a relationship. This foundational decay occurs on two levels. The first is one of accuracy 
in knowledge: “Facility with words bespeaks a capacity to learn relations…” (Weaver, 
1970, p. 162). Without accurate words, there is no true learning and thus one is living a 
fiction. The second level is belief in the person. Without belief in a person’s words, it is 
nearly impossible to appreciate their deeds. Baer (2002) notes, “A lack of faith in other 
people means that we remain doubtful and fearful, and that we continue to protect 
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ourselves. And in that condition, loving relationships are impossible” (p. 78). As such, it 
is fairly evident that we cannot lie and expect intimate relationships to be encouraged.  
Thus, for professors of interpersonal communication, among the most important 
tasks in the classroom is to emphasize trust, integrity, and the need to avoid lying as 
cornerstones to healthy intimate relationships. But can a person effectively teach such 
values in an atmosphere where emotivism is the ethic? I would argue no. When 
interpersonal communication theory is predicated by modern assumptions of self-interest, 
it encourages emotivism and thus presents difficulties in teaching trust with any sort of 
relevance. Merely describing implications for the individual (instead of suggesting 
interpretive frameworks) is often the fullest extent to which a theory grounded in modern 
notions of self-interest and emotivism can go. To explore this issue, we will use trust as a 
lens for an ethical foundation in relationships. As we will see in the next three IPC 
theories, trust cannot operate effectively as a function of commodity (social exchange), as 
a means rather than an end (goal-orientation), or as a technique (intimacy skills). In short, 
trust and therefore intimacy is not solely a function of self-interest, the foundational 
assumption of these theories. Intimate relationships require a different philosophical 
ground upon which to generate moral power for a discussion of trust, intimacy, and thus 
healthy intimate relationships.   
 
Social Exchange Theory 
 Social exchange is an outgrowth of an Enlightenment mentality and as we will 
show, exacerbates emotivist understandings. According to Homans (1958), social 
exchange theory is one of the oldest, most pervasive theories of social behavior. Indeed, 
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it is not hard to accept that “interaction between persons is an exchange of goods, 
material and non-material” (p. 567) considering the preponderance of everyday 
conversations revolving around rewards (“I got a good deal”) and needs (“I’d do anything 
for a bite to eat”). One might even say the problem is not that the theory inaccurately 
depicts human nature but perhaps that it too accurately portrays it—it is uncomfortable to 
think my life is a mere series of transactions chosen based on potential profit. It is this 
discomfort that needs explored in more detail. 
 Exchange theories depend on an economic metaphor to explain social behavior. 
Apart from pure economics which focuses on more innate mechanistic propensities in the 
market and the fledgling field of economic sociology (see Zafirovski, 2001) which 
emphasizes the importance of social institutions and relational networks in shaping 
economic behaviors, exchange theories take economic terms and attempt to explain social 
behavior through the lens of marketplace activity. As the basic tenet of all economic 
theory, the foundational equation, rewards minus costs equals profits, is used to explain 
human behavior. As Higgins, Grant and Shah (1999) state, “The principle that people 
approach pleasure and avoid pain has been and continues to be, the fundamental 
motivational principle” (p. 244). In social exchange theory, the formula denotes that a 
person strives for the greatest rewards with the least amount of costs. The rewards in this 
system are numerous. Foa and Foa (1974) list love, status, services, goods, information 
and money. Nye (1982) re-categorizes this list, including social approval, autonomy, 
ambiguity, security, money, value agreement, and equality. Weighing benefits against the 
costs, one can determine the profits of a given action that in turn provide a sense of 
happiness. Within social exchange, happiness as an end-goal is understood as a 
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generalized state of being indicating a perceived threshold of profits as dictated by self-
determined and societal criteria. This presupposes human self-interestedness as geared 
towards a sense of happiness—we are predisposed to act towards our own ends on our 
own behalf.  
These general principles of profit and self-interest are foundational to five 
primary approaches of social exchange, as catalogued by Roloff (1981). First, Homans 
(1958) uses a behaviorist approach that takes to heart the operant conditioning of Skinner. 
We are rewarded for behaviors that please others and are thus conditioned to repeat them. 
In this vein, he produces five propositions to which all interpersonal behavior can be 
attributed. Second, Blau (1964) continues the work of Homans but embraces emergent 
properties from the social environment to account for broader interpersonal contexts. 
Through an emphasis on the economic metaphor, he draws parallels with pure economic 
models to show the parallels of profit-based economic behavior to profit-based relational 
behavior. Third, the sociologists Thibaut and Kelley (1959) describe the necessity of 
interdependence for people to acquire the greatest rewards. Using a number of grids to 
illustrate gaming theory, they display the need for trust and dependence in order for the 
most people to net the greatest gain. When a person works on a solely independent basis, 
losses incurred to society and to self are often greater than when working together.  
Fourth, social psychologists Foa and Foa (1974) emphasize the role of resources within 
relational exchanges and the emergent patterns that can be predicted when certain 
variables arise. They find that we enjoy exchanges of similar resources (money for 
money, love for love) based on the nature of the relationship (friendships involve more 
exchanges of love). When a resource is denied people attempt to deny a similar resource. 
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Finally, the equity theory of Walster, Berscheid, and Walster (1978) notes the need for a 
person to perceive that gains by both participants in a relationship are equitable. People 
and groups try to maximize their own individual profit while equitably distributing 
resources to others in as much as other people can contribute to greater profits in the 
future. Whenever inequity occurs, it is normally corrected expeditiously, whether through 
changes in personal perception or through changes in societal rules or distributive 
practices. These five theories serve as a broad base from which one can understand the 
economics of relationships. 
The heuristic power of exchange theories has been vast. For example, extensions 
to the theory made in terms of investment (Rusbult, Drigotas, & Verette 1994) and social 
penetration (Altman & Taylor, 1973) have provided greater explanatory power to 
exchange models. Attempts to provide scientific support to the theory reach even to the 
present day (Koper & Jaasma, 2001). Numerous social scientific studies have been 
conducted regarding family relationships (Gottman, Notarius, Markman, Bank Yoppi, & 
Rubin, 1976), intimate relationships (Hatfield, Traupmann, Sprecher, Utne, & Hay, 
1985), dissolution of relationships (Levinger, 1982), risk and trust (Molm, Takahashi, & 
Peterson, 2000),  and affection (Floyd, 2002), to name a few. Granted, there have been 
several critiques leveled particularly against Homans (Davis, 1962; Abrahamsson, 1970) 
and Blau (MacIntyre, 1967). These have led to more generalized critiques of the theory 
(Chadwick-Jones, 1976; Heath, 1976). Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of our own self-
interests in determining social behavior based on the premise of an economic metaphor 
seems solidly established. Social exchange theory seems to indicate rather emphatically 
the foundational role of self-interest in the human condition.  
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And yet, there is still something off-putting in the nature of this assessment. 
Consider Nye’s (1982) statement: “Whenever an individual or group has better 
alternatives (as they perceive them), the theory predicts they will leave their present 
relationship, position, or milieu for the alternative that offers the better reward—cost 
outcome” (p. 16-17). Approaching relationships in this regard seems too calculating, 
overly selfish, and lacking in some fundamental human element. As Planalp (2003) 
states, “The monetary metaphor makes us all seem so crass, mercenary, and unfeeling” 
(p. 80). Indeed, there is an off-putting sensibility towards this theory so heavily invested 
in our own selfishness. 
But it is more than just a mere “sensibility" that makes exchange theories seem 
insufficient. Simply put, humans are composed of factors beyond economic calculation. 
Psychologist Kent Berridge (1999) notes, “The quality of life is not reducible to its mere 
quantity of pleasures and pains but includes purposeful, aesthetic, and moral 
considerations, too. Life is still a series of pleasures and pains, however…and hedonic 
states determine at least one important aspect of life’s qualities” (p. 525). This seems an 
accurate portrayal. Pleasures and pains are obvious driving forces in human relationships, 
thus explaining the power of a social exchange model. However, this does not give 
license to cite self-interest as an exclusive explanatory factor, ignoring other important 
facets of humanity—namely our emotions and our ethical decisions. Planalp (2003) and 
Planalp and Fitness (1999) have urged the incorporation of emotions into interpersonal 
communication research, noting that emotion and cognition work hand in hand. She and 
her colleagues document the emotional capacity of humans as a driving force behind 
decisions beyond self-interest. I would add ethical decisions and “ontological 
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approaches” (Stewart, 2002) as a fundamental human capacity that drives our decisions, 
often contrary to social exchange paradigms.  
Regardless of the approach, ethical implications are present within interpersonal 
communication research models. This has been shown repeatedly through the 
consequential ideas of Weaver (1970), the scientific rhetoric of Kuhn (1996), or the 
dramatism of Burke (1965; 1967). In particular, one must take to heart Weaver’s (1970) 
statement that “language is sermonic.”  By nature, a person, regardless of his or her 
intent, will be implying some course of action by the very fact that they are speaking. 
Theories have consequences and those consequences are interpreted ethically. When we 
use language we are, by its very nature, demonstrating a standpoint. People must 
participate in an ethical realm, regardless of intent, by nature of their usage of language.  
So what are the ethical consequences of social exchange? Most social exchange 
theories frame human relationships in terms of what Rousseau would call amour-propre 
or amour de soi, where pitie is merely a desire to reduce another person’s pain in order to 
gain direct or indirect rewards for ourselves. In other words, the important distinction is 
between “fitting” self-interest and “unfitting” self-interest. Will this action be effective or 
not? Will it meet my goals or not? Will I be enhanced over the long term or not? There is 
an assumption that all interpretation is to be grounded in these terms. Mention of pitie or 
compassion for others is an enigma at best or a fallacy at worst. When considering how 
emphatically scientists, social and otherwise, have worked to maintain self-interest as a 
sole explanatory force, it is not surprising that a theory in interpersonal communication 
would also advocate this approach. The work of sociobiologists has analyzed the animal 
kingdom to maintain our genetic predisposition. Economists have instituted a financial 
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model solely on our self-interests. Our government has followed with our individual 
rights. And philosophers of the Enlightenment such as Descartes and Hobbes began this 
march in their explication of our selfish natures. Social exchange is the interpersonal 
communication extension of this effort. Embedded in the language of self-interest and 
gain is the Hobbsian idea of an ontological understanding of human nature as 
individualistic, power-hungry, and in “continual competition.” Social exchange brings 
this into an interpersonal forum. Take the example of a husband caring for a sick spouse. 
The gaming theory of Foa and Foa (1974) would explain this man as taking an immediate 
loss in rewards in hopes of future reciprocation; if reciprocation occurs the result is a net 
gain in profits between the couple. Equity theory (Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1976) 
would note that raising the status of the less-fortunate individual would enhance one’s 
own self-image and instate a more appropriate equilibrium by which that person would 
have no cause to complain. In both cases, everything is framed in terms of self-love. 
Individual self-interest is theorized to determine action. To a large part, social exchange 
is responsible for interjecting the ontology of modernity concerning human nature into 
interpersonal communication theory. The ethical consequence of this Enlightenment 
approach to the individual is in fostering ground for emotivism (MacIntyre, 1984). 
Ontologically prioritizing subject-centeredness leads to a dismissal of criteria outside the 
subjective realm. This radical choice removes possibility for communal ethical standards, 
and the aesthetic standard enters as a substitute. Preference and the emotivist mentality 
become the norm, the effects of which perpetuate a “true for you, not for me” mentality 
and an inability to distinguish a “right” way of thinking.  Thus, exchange is rife with 
emotivism, perpetuating aestheticism. 
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A critic will immediately reply that most social exchange theorists are not in the 
business of prescribing behavior; they are describing behavior as it exists and predicting 
the likelihood of it reoccurring. They are doing an analysis, not creating social change. 
However, this argument assumes neutrality when it comes to ethical consequences. To 
believe a given theoretical perspective is ethically neutral ignores Kuhn (1996), Burke 
(1969), and others who note thatour language, indeed our very being, is anything but 
neutral. When subjected to deconstruction vis-à-vis Derrida, these linguistic features of 
partiality and imprecision are exposed even more clearly. People cannot be ethically 
neutral in their theories or teaching. Also problematic is the relevance question posed at 
the beginning of this dissertation. In regard to students, to what extent can someone help 
them find healthy relationships if they can only describe and not encourage? A teacher 
who claims to take no stand will find it difficult to maintain relevance. It is incredibly 
difficult to be both descriptive and relevant when it comes to human relationships. By 
only offering a description of what exists, a scholar cannot help guide the norms and 
precepts that dictate life. We are vested in the ideas through our embodied use of 
communication. When this fact is recognized, the goal for an interpersonal professor 
should be able to articulate a better idea of actions that would lead to a “good” 
relationship in order to retain relevance. The ability to claim this good is impaired by the 
emotivism encouraged by rampant individualism vis-à-vis social exchange.  
Emotivism is but one of the issues emerging from adopting exchange theories in 
interpersonal communication ontology. Certain dynamics within human relationships are 
difficult to analyze when understood solely through the lens of self-interest. Trust is one 
example we will explore here. As one of the fundamental elements of intimacy, trust is 
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undermined when understood within the exchange paradigm as a means for gaining 
compliance. From a social exchange standpoint, trust equates to a tool much like the tool 
of formality (Burgoon & Hale, 1984). Formality is the use of decorum to achieve a 
greater likelihood of persuasion. Just like one communicates with proper titles in order to 
persuade through an enhancement of ethos, trust functions as a means for influencing an 
audience or individual through means of truthfulness, support, and belief. One garners 
these elements of trust as levers for motivating further compliance. Thus, in social 
exchange trust is considered a tool for gaining rewards. 
However, in action, trust often requires genuine care for the other in order for it to 
operate and exist. What is special about the compliance-gaining that occurs from one’s 
trust in another person is that it occurs as a result of belief in the speaker’s sincerity and 
authenticity. One must actually be truthful—word is connected to deed—not just act 
truthful. In fact to just act truthful, defies the nature of truthfulness shown most clearly in 
the fact that being revealed as insincere in one’s claims is to lose ethos. Thus trust, a 
correlate of truthfulness, is a function of embodiment, not technique. It is something 
someone is rather than something someone does. This makes “trust-as-a-tool” an 
oxymoron. Trust used as a tool, i.e. a means towards an end, is an artificial use of ethos. 
The artificial use of ethos as a means rather than an end indicates a lack of character 
which, if perceived, will greatly impair one’s persuasiveness. For example, to make 
chicken soup for a sick girlfriend to elicit future favors lacks ethical character, apparent 
(on a strictly observational level—one could find other sources of support) in the fact that 
if she discovered his insincerity, the boyfriend would be regarded as less loving or at least 
very calculating. Realizing he did this act only so she would be available to clean the 
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apartment or to cook upon getting well diminishes the kindness. She is being treated as an 
object rather than a person which makes it difficult to foster intimacy. In short, her trust 
in his motives would be violated. For trust in this example to be obtained and intimacy to 
be fostered, one must become more than a commodity. A new vocabulary is needed here 
to describe what is going on. It is not mere exchange going on here, but rather a decision 
to treat the girlfriend as an end in herself with the motivation coming from the decision to 
act on behalf of the other, an ethical motive, rather than profitability. We are not 
exchanging—we are being spouses or intimate or loving. This is a function of being (later 
described in terms of acknowledgment), not a function of commodity. Discussions of 
intimacy are impoverished if explained as a commodity because they cannot recognize 
anything beyond self-interest. 
This brings us back to the fact that altruism is one of the conundrums for Roloff 
(1981) at the end of his treatise on exchange and the main source of consternation for 
Wilson (1975) in sociobiology. I would argue this has less to do with other-centeredness 
as a construct and more to do with the division of self-interest and altruism in the first 
place. We must go back to the root of the problem—the modern dichotomy of self and 
other. It has led to the current condition and it would behoove us to put them together 
again. The metaphor of charitable acknowledgment attempts such a move. First however, 
it is important to reveal the epistemological and axiological implications stemming from 
social exchange, which serves as an ontological foundation to several other pervasive 
theories in communication. Specifically, goal-orientation and intimacy skills depend 
upon this view of human nature to found their research sets.   
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Goal-oriented Theories 
 Berger (2002) states, “Few would dispute the postulates that social interaction is a 
goal-directed activity and that various kinds of knowledge are vital to the achievement of 
the goals people pursue in their daily encounters with others” (p. 181). Indeed, goals play 
a fundamental part in relationships, and at first glance, research on the subject would 
seem to be neutral when it comes to the self/other dichotomy and emotivist ethics. After 
all, a goal is an end point, much like a telos, requiring a given set of knowledge and 
communication skills to make it achievable. Rawlins (1985) divides the conceptions of 
goals into three major dimensions, asking 1) whether people should use interpersonal 
communication for communal or individual objectives, 2) whether interpersonal should 
be used primarily to influence others or achieve understanding, and 3) what the 
characteristic qualities are of effective speakers (p. 110). It seems sensible that the 
ethicality of a given goal would be pivotal to the answering of such questions. A person 
could have a goal of happiness for others just as easily as a goal of gaining compliance. 
Within Rawlins’ criteria is basis for asking questions towards this end. However, as it is 
currently framed in several sets of literature, goals prioritize a social exchange mentality 
and thus have difficulty expressing ethical consequences beyond individualistic motives. 
This social exchange mentality in the goal-orientation literature begins with the 
assumption Berger (2002) states here: “People use social interaction to achieve goals. 
Like language, social interaction is simply a tool” (p. 187). It is this utilitarianism of the 
human relationship that advocates an exchange model and consequently brings in an 
emotivist ethic as a result. Research agendas bear this out in the interpersonal 
communication literature. 
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 Let us start with the research itself. In his discussion of knowledge bases, Berger 
(2002) indicates the need to “identify types of knowledge that are important to the 
attainment of goals across a wide spectrum of communication contexts” (p. 183). 
Namely, this context is in “effectiveness,” defined as “interaction that brings about 
desired instrumental and communication goals” (p. 183). Efficiency and accuracy are 
often close correlates of this idea. However Berger notes, relational goals such as 
“comforting” (Burleson & Goldsmith, 1998) may not be achieved by mere accuracy or 
efficiency but may require different knowledge. Thus, Berger (2002) divides the classes 
of knowledge into five areas. Role knowledge concerns what social role you play and 
how you should act in that role. Person knowledge concerns knowledge as it pertains to 
what can be expected from a given characteristic known about an individual. Emotion 
knowledge regards identification of and anticipating actions based upon emotional states. 
Procedural knowledge concerns what actions should be done to achieve a goal. Finally 
context knowledge concerns the environment and how it impacts effectiveness.  
 In and of themselves, these knowledge bases are helpful in describing conditions 
by which one might construct a message or anticipate action. From a rhetorician’s 
perspective, one could include “role knowledge,” “emotion knowledge,” etc., into the 
category of invention and indicate, for example, that an employee should consider the 
role of his boss as well as her emotional state before asking for a raise. Cicero would not 
be surprised to see such knowledge bases present in a communication classroom. What 
becomes problematic is when the ontological assumptions brought to bear upon the use 
of these knowledge bases lean too heavily on processes centralized on the individual. 
Knowledge in communication understood namely as a function of the individual, 
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subjective as a Cartesian philosophy would dictate, analyzes what should be interpersonal 
goals in a very intrapersonal way. The issues of concern in this individualized theorizing 
are cognitive in nature, attempting to understand what is happening in the mind between 
stimulus and response—the classic black box dilemma—rather than relational in nature 
where the relationship is seen as a unit, indivisible, lest the meanings be changed into 
something different than interpersonal.  Here, cognition is defined differently than 
interpretation. Interpretation is the contextual, embodied event of making connection to 
the other. Cognition is what the biological process by which this occurs. In cognition, to 
understand the mind translates into understanding motive which in turn provides 
understanding for relational actions. To find meaning, one must look intrapersonally to 
the individual to find meaning. Interpretation is the broader term taking a stance where 
individual cognition, context, and relationship are all necessary to accurately assess goals.  
To demonstrate the inclination to rely too heavily on cognition alone in goal-
orientation theories, we will turn to Hewes and Planalp’s (1987) categorization of 
“communication science.” They break communication into three categories: trait 
approaches focused on individual action, transindividual approaches focused on 
“regularities in communication as emergent, conventionalized, products of social 
aggregates” (p. 149), and cognitive/interpretive approaches—the favored approach—
focused on the internal workings that actualize goals. The assumption in a 
“cognitive/interpretive” approach is that:  
To be true to our claims as communication theorists, we should always contrast 
our assertions about the social nature of phenomena with alternative explanations, 
usually cognitive/interpretive explanations, that reduce the seemingly social to the 
individual. Thus are the viability and the parsimony of our claims put to the test. 
(Hewes & Planalp, 1987, p. 170)  
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The individual’s thought processes, and in particular his goals, provide insight into how 
relationships are functioning. “An understanding of the individual’s knowledge, cognitive 
capacities and emotion is the necessary point of departure for building adequate theories 
of communication” (p. 172).  Cognition is certainly important for comprehension 
(Bransford & McCarrell, 1974). However, it does not seem to be the only necessary point 
for departure, nor is it necessarily the best. An active approach to communication (e.g., 
Schrag, 1986) would argue the subject is multiple, embodied, and temporal (see Chapter 
4), and holistically incorporates the biological, the (fragmented) rational, and the socially 
embedded elements of humanity together. The human relationship is not able to be 
reduced to the individual because to do so would be to lose interpretive meaning. While it 
is important to acknowledge we do indeed “focus,” “integrate,” “store & retrieve,” and 
“select & implement” information in an attempt to achieve goals, such processes can be 
understood beyond cognition and beyond a metaphor of a tool. There is no separating the 
individual from the relational context, without a loss of meaning. Thus, what is 
disconcerting about a cognitive approach to goal-orientation is the assertion that a) the 
individual is a necessary “departure point” for building “adequate” communication theory 
and b) the resulting ethical irrelevance for those looking for guidance in their 
relationships from such studies. Let us address these assertions. 
Beginning with a), the focus upon individuality in communication relationships is 
only truly “necessary” in theories when one has so separated the individual part from the 
relational whole that one can analyze individual motives separately and without the need 
of further context in order to justify that theory. When a cognitive/interpretive approach 
claims the “seemingly social” should be understood via the individual motive, the 
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communication theory is reducing the whole to the level of the parts. One could call it a 
synecdoche; the part represents the whole. Such a move oversimplifies the human 
relationship and thus is not “adequate” as Hewes and Planalp (1987) claim in describing 
humanity. Premodern thinkers, Aristotle prominent among them, recognized the part 
cannot stand for the whole without losing meaning. In his discussion of thought, desire, 
and decision, while he notes that “the principle of decision is desire and goal-directed 
reason” (Nich., vi.2.1139a), he also recognizes “The function of each of the 
understanding parts, then is truth. And so the virtues of each part will be the states that 
best direct it toward the truth” (Nich., vi.2.1139a). The truth in this case is an ethic based 
on virtues and the polis. Cognition is only important to the extent that those goals lead to 
ethical consequences; this is firmly in the interpretive realm. Augustine too discusses the 
“doubt and darkness” of the cognitive realm where “when my mind questions itself about 
its own powers, it is not easy for it to decide what should be believed” (Conf, 10.32.48). 
In isolation, cognition can create no goals. The mind is “dark” without an ethical context 
to make sense of the relational outcomes. Thus, to study interpersonal goals with the 
individual as the center requires simultaneous consideration of the context of such goals. 
Granted such context is often present in interpersonal studies—Rawlins (1985) notes as 
much. However, when goals are viewed with too high an emphasis on cognition, 
communication begins to play the role of neurobiologist. Communication scholars, 
recognizing there is a whole that is bigger than the sum of its parts, are poised well to 
appreciate how context shapes goals in an active moment, which, in turn, is shaped by the 
relationship. Thus, in the case of intimate communication, the concern is what the effect 
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of a given action and interpretation has on the relationship. This requires that the holistic 
relational context be incorporated. 
To further demonstrate, let us look back at the issue of trust. As we saw with 
social exchange, trust is more than a tool. It functions as a condition of a relationship 
where the other is an end, not a means. Thus, Weber & Carter (2003) note trust as an 
orientation: “The term orientation lies midway between the idea of trust as a structure and 
the idea of pure malleability found in trust a purely individualized or psychologized 
phenomenon” (p. 3). Here, “structure” indicates familial bonds that build trust inherently 
and “malleability” refers to the psychological approaches that “use” trust in multiple 
ways to achieve self-interests. Orientation refers to the fact that trust is not to be taken for 
granted or used. It is emergent. Trust cannot be atomized lest it become less than what it 
really is: an orientation to the other. When we use trust to get what we want, we are no 
longer participating in trusting behaviors. Thus, individualizing this construct by making 
it a goal creates too narrow an approach, atomizing the phenomenon, and missing several 
important relational dynamics.  
 The narrow “psychological” approach to trust is the way goal-orientation feeds 
into an exchange mentality. We communicate to get what we want. When Berger (2002) 
states, “Social interaction is an instrument for attaining a wide panorama of goals” (p. 
205), he begins down this path, understanding interaction to be a tool of the individual. 
We “use” interaction rather than “participate in,” “engage in,” “generate” or otherwise 
manifest those conditions indicative of a joint or mutual communicative event. This is 
indicative of a utilitarian process for achieving a foreordained self-conceived goal. 
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Essentially, this continues with the assumptions of an ontological self-interest, depicted 
in social exchange theory. In another example, Berger (2002) notes:  
Because the emergences of human intelligence, language, and technology are 
related, language too is a potentially important tool for improving the ease and 
consistency with which important goals are achieved. Thus, by extension, the 
ability to coordinate goal-directed actions with others through social interaction is 
one that potentially augments the human capacity to recognize and get beneficial 
results (p. 187). 
When interacting with others, we look for “beneficial results,” which can be read 
“achieving the goals of the group or individual.”  At first, this seems to open the door to 
ethical discussion, but there are two issues. First is the issue of effectiveness. Inherently, 
goal-orientation is well-suited to use the criterion of effectiveness. Unfortunately, this 
criterion can be ethically problematic (e.g., Nazis were very effective at achieving their 
goals across Europe but one could hardly call them ethical). Thus, scholars wishing to 
find ethical ground or “beneficial results” using goal-oriented theories find it necessary to 
apply another standard—a goal that is more palatable than mere effectiveness. This leads 
to the second issue. All too often the standard is that of satisfaction because achieving 
goals is easily tied to personal fulfillment of goals. The individual develops human 
cognitive capacities in order to achieve individual goals that are believed to be satisfying. 
Using others for personal gain is a natural extension of this approach. Thus we get the 
claim that “social interaction is a tool for achieving goals.” An exchange mentality is 
undeniably a part of this paradigm. Self-interest so dictates our motives that we really 
have no need to analyze the impact of others beyond how they can serve to make our 
goals realities. It is a hyper-individualism that leads to emotivism.  
This leads to the issues of b) concerning the ethical relevance of goal-orientation 
when separated from any ontology. It is possible someone might try to separate goal-
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orientation and frame it as a deontological method of knowing. However, the relevance 
of these studies without an ontology is severely limited. Upon getting to the issue of 
“beneficial results” one cannot, with any confidence, provide guidance on said “benefits” 
unless one adopts a given ontological assumption about human interaction. Without 
ontological assumptions, studies in goal-orientation adopt mere descriptive accounts 
(e.g., “messages will have impact to the degree that the listener’s attention is focused on 
them…” [Hewes & Planalp, 1987]) which are limited in their application to the field. 
Unfortunately, time after time it seems description is the best communication offers 
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Lindsey, Greene, Parker, & Sassi, 1995; Planalp & 
Honeycutt, 1985).  
For those who wish to avoid mere description, it is easy to adopt the 
individualized assumptions of social exchange. Where individualism takes center stage, 
emotivism is the expected ethical outcome. While goal-orientation does not necessitate 
this outcome, the implications of understanding relationships as a tool easily facilitate 
this idea. Hardin (2003) looks at this in terms of trust and gaming theory. Brehm (1992) 
devotes nearly her entire text on intimacy to such an exchange mentality. McCabe (2003) 
reflects on cognition and exchange, emphasizing biology as a predicate to relationship. It 
is possible for other ontologies aside from exchange to be brought to bear upon a goal-
orientation (e.g., value theory, utilitarianism, Christianity), but when the assumption is 
“start with the individual,” we are bound by a Cartesian mentality. An individual adopts a 
goal based on personal beliefs and desires and there is a necessary subject/object split. 
The result is often an orientation that emphasizes self-interest which makes it difficult to 
navigate away from exchange and the road towards emotivism. 
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While belief is a product of individual assumptions, it is just as much a product of 
community narratives. This must be seen in any discussion of goals. The lessons of 
postmodernity explain that language provides more than a tool to achieve individual 
goals. Language is the channel through which we establish meaning in life. It is the 
substance of the goal. It is reality and that reality is pliable, unsteady, and 
deconstructable. Additionally, the subject is deconstructable. Social interactions (i.e. 
relationships) are not merely tools to get goals accomplished but rather are reasons for 
existence. The subject is a non-entity outside of this realm of action. This will be 
defended in more detail in Chapter 4. In the final section, we address how the skills 
literature teaches intimacy from the technique-driven basis of self-interest. 
 
Intimacy Skills 
To this point, we have discussed what essentially serves as a prevalent ontology 
and epistemology for an individual-centered narrative of interpersonal communication. 
The ontology is social exchange that assumes individual self-interest as the main human 
motivation driving relationships. Epistemologically, goal-orientation provides a means to 
this end as cognitive processes describe how our motivations work, with language 
serving as the tool for getting work done. Now we can discuss the skills literature which 
often serves as an axiology for a “narrative of individualism” in the field of interpersonal 
communication.  
The term “skill” denotes actions valued as a result of the given presuppositions. 
Much like goals, skills are not inherently tied to a self-interested paradigm. What is 
deemed a “skill” is dependent upon a person’s notion of a “good relationship.” Thus, 
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differing presuppositions, theoretical backgrounds, and philosophical perspectives would 
lead to different understandings of what skills should be employed. The skills stemming 
from an individualist paradigm tend to emphasize psychological ways to foster self-
esteem and self-actualization, rhetorical ways to improve persuasive arguments to change 
ideas, and overall ways to maintain passionate love. These approaches have valuable 
applications to third parties (e.g., researchers) in confirming or denying “common sense” 
(Cohen, 1994) or in observing problematic behaviors (e.g., Gottman, 1992). However 
when these skills are used as ethical guides by individuals (i.e., an axiology) two 
problems emerge. First, they are easily separated from their narrative structures which 
leads to technification (Schrag, 1986) and a cynicism about the field’s applicability. 
Secondly when the interpersonal skills literature uses the criteria of relational satisfaction 
and effectiveness to determine healthy relationships, measurements are of individual 
preference and goal achievement. This is essentially measuring the emotivist tendencies 
of society, and judging good or bad relationships based on the popularity of individual 
preferences. When the overarching emphasis in an individual-driven intimate relationship 
is on what makes the self satisfied and/or what is viewed to make the other satisfied, the 
primary criterion for judging between “good” skills and “bad” ones in this paradigm 
takes an emotivist ethic.   
This leads to two questions: 1) To what extent is a skill disembodied and 
disembedded? 2) To what extent are satisfaction and effectiveness serving to reinforce 
emotivism through measuring popular preference? Discussions of interpersonal ethics 
will be helpful in navigating the answer to these questions.  
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Technification and the Disembodied, Dis-embedded Skill 
What is a skill and how does that understanding serve in interpersonal 
communication? Skills, according to Spitzberg and Cupach (2002), are “primitive terms 
referring to behaviors that facilitate competence in interaction” (p. 564). Indeed, 
competence is an enduring legacy of rhetorical practice. How and when to speak and in 
what manner have been explicated by Aristotle in Rhetoric through ethos-pathos-logos, 
catalogued by Cicero in De Inventione into 5 canons, continued by Quintilian in his 
expressions of “good men speaking well,” rediscovered through the Renaissance in the 
works of Valla and later Vico, and has expression today in public speaking textbooks 
(e.g., Lucas, 2007; Zarefsky, 2007). Rhetoric has never shied away from competence, nor 
should it. It is fundamental to the active component of communication.  
However competence can be defined in different ways. As a result of Sophism 
and its moral relativism, rhetorical theory has attempted to ground ethical standards in the 
time and place in which they are located to avoid the manipulation and degradation of 
society that comes with the deconstruction of language and meaning. Aristotle is 
functioning out of the Greek polis in his claims about the “golden mean” as a way to 
achieve ethos; Cicero is very Roman when it comes to describing humans with inborn 
virtue that is either present or absent; Italian humanist Valla takes Christianity as his 
moral foundation to temper manipulative tendencies. Simply put, many rhetoricians of 
the past embedded their theories in culture and tacitly acknowledged this fact in their 
writing, touting what amounts to a “narrative of faith” (described in Chapter 4).  
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Interpersonal communication attempts the same thing when it attempts 
“situational integration” (Rawlins, 1985) where competence is the “earmark of the era” 
(p. 115). However, interpersonal communication skills can ground themselves outside of 
communal efforts where rhetoric and situational approaches find moral conditions and 
into what Burleson and Samter (1994) call a “functional approach.” In definition, “a 
functional approach stresses the things that certain relationships typically do for people 
and, consequently, the things that people come to look to those relationships for” (p. 62). 
This is a personal standard of goal achievement and emotional fulfillment. While one 
might contest the use of satisfaction and effectiveness as its sole criteria (see next 
section), a functional approach can have valuable explanations of communication 
phenomena (e.g., social support; Burleson, 1990) as they pertain to individuals. However 
can be a tendency among those interpreting these studies (e.g., interpersonal textbook 
authors) to separate the technique from the person enacting it, the situation it is enacted 
in, and the ethical standards which dictated its use.  
For example, Gottman and Levenson (1992) note the need to balance the ratio of 
positive to negative communication behaviors to at least 8:1 to avoid dissolution; 5:1 is 
recommended. This measurement can be helpful for a counselor or a researcher studying 
a relationship, and has been confirmed in further studies (Huston  & Vangelisti, 1991). 
However, there is a distinction to be made between the usefulness of this standard for the 
researcher and the average person in an intimate relationship. For someone attempting to 
enact this standard, the focus on the ratio can disembody the act from the ethical conduct 
it is requesting (e.g., acknowledgment of the other through positive remarks). If a spouse 
just says kind words to elicit the outcome suggested in the study, this separates the words 
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of the study from the ethical context in which the relationships were being studied. In 
other words, someone enacting kindnesses must really mean the positive comments he or 
she is saying, not just say them to meet a ratio. The ratio only is “real” to the extent that it 
fits to a given time and place, with appropriate ethical reasoning. It is embedded in a 
narrative and embodied in a time/place. Paradoxically, the person enacting the ratio must 
do so without focusing on the ratio. This is an example of what Schrag (1986) describes 
as “technification”:  
When the production of a work of art is reduced to the techniques of its 
realization, that which is seen to be at work in the work of art is occluded. But the 
universalization of technique into a technicism is a phenomenon separate from 
techne itself, and can with equal consequence infiltrate the regions of episteme 
and phronesis. (p. 20). 
Schrag here is referring to the three realms of knowledge described by Aristotle. In all 
three, “technification” or a separation of the production of a work to its mere techniques, 
results in reduction of the whole to its parts. In other words, the divorce “skills” described 
above are performances seemingly devoid of performers. 
Textbooks, because of their extra distance from the research, are particularly at 
risk for the technification of skills because they are taking valid, well-researched ideas, 
useful to the third party, analyzing them, and trying to use them as guidance for 
relationships. If recipients of this knowledge use it as a technique outside of a narrative or 
ethical paradigm, then there is a risk of technification. For example, consider the very 
popular description of communication practices that are preludes to divorce—Gottman’s 
(1994) “four horsemen of the apocalypse” and “5:1 ratio” of positive to negative 
comments for relational health. When couples practice communication patterns of 
criticism, contempt, defensiveness, and stonewalling, Gottman notes divorce is not far 
behind (p. 414). There are at least two ways to approach his work as it pertains to its 
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usefulness to people in conducting their intimate relationships. One would be the 
rhetoric-based approach where Gottman advocates an ethic that should be adopted within 
a community. In the case of divorce, the argument would be that divorce is bad for 
society and interpersonal relationships and should be avoided. Gottman (1994) points 
towards this by commenting on the need for “systematic research on interventions 
designed for divorce prevention” (p. 381). He cites a variety of negatives of divorce for 
society on the couple, their children, and family and then proceeds to describe those 
actions that lead to divorce. This research is all embedded in an implied narrative that 
divorce is negative for relationships and society and should be prevented—an approach 
that could be helpful to someone seeking guidance for their marriage and their society. 
However, when textbooks both lack an overarching narrative and are using skills as 
suggestions for healthy relationships, they take a different interpretive approach, framing 
divorce “de-escalation” as a technified skill. This occurs because the text is removed 
from the situation in which the phenomenon was embedded. The 5:1 ratio is not in and of 
itself the act that creates the healthy relationship. It is the ethical acknowledgment that 
comes with the act. However, Trenholm and Jensen (2004) cite it in terms that show it as 
more “firm” than it is. Consider this statement on criticism: “Frequent episodes of mutual 
criticism can quickly drown any desire to praise or make affirmative character statements 
about one’s partner, making it less likely that the couple will be able to maintain the 5:1 
ratio that typifies stable relationships” (p. 317). Or consider this antidote to stonewalling: 
“One of the simplest methods of resisting the tendency to stonewall is to make conscious 
efforts to replace your blank stares with back-channeling, which is the use of head nods, 
brief vocalization…or other gestures to indicate that you are listening and have not 
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withdrawn emotionally” (p. 318). In both cases suggestions made by Gottman in the 
context of overarching relational health have been technified, i.e., separated from the 
situation they are researched, to the degree that they are missing the embedded “spirit” 
which brings meaning to the research. Head nods without true acknowledgment will not 
show positivity. Following a ratio will not bring a healthy relationship unless backed by 
genuine concern for the other. When a textbook shows an interpersonal phenomenon as 
separate from an over-arching narrative structure (i.e., an ethical reason for a given 
action), it risks technifying a given phenomenon rendering it less helpful for students.  
This indicates a helpful necessity for communication pedegogy: skills if used 
must be embedded in a narrative that provides an ethical set because it is embedded in an 
individual who believes that narrative. When interpersonal communication is portrayed 
as “disembodied,” it is also dis-embedded from the ethical standards that provide 
meaning to a set of research. This leads to a description of techniques that ultimately are 
of limited use to an individual as it only generalizes the thoughts and feelings of other 
individuals rather than providing ethical guidance through a defense of an embodied 
practice. The framing of these actions as technified rather than framing them as 
embodied, textured events is problematic. Essentially, the ability to find two-variable 
correlations in human relationships with out losing meaning is difficult. The mind simply 
is not that linear or simplistic, a point acknowledged by Burleson and Denton (1997). 
Gibbs (2006), who studies cognitive science notes “All human activity involves 
embodied correlations. It is misleading to suggest that perception and action are discrete, 
independent processes that are causally related in a linear way” (p. 43). The brain alone is 
insufficient to explain our perceptions and motives. According to Gibbs (2006), 
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“Evidence shows that people represent certain properties quite differently in different 
contexts” (p. 81). To separate a given action from its context and attempt to generalize it 
is to deny its embodied nature.  
IPC Skills and the Criteria of Satisfaction and Effectiveness 
There is a common presuppositional set that tends to be adopted by the skills 
literature—that of social exchange. Earlier in this dissertation, the downsides of 
emphasizing self-interest too heavily were discussed regarding its emotivist tendencies. 
Such emotivism is counter-intuitive to the nurturing of trust which is a necessary 
condition of intimacy, undermines long-term commitment in institutions such as 
marriage, and problematizes ethical judgments because of the individual relativism that 
comes from emotivism. The over-emphasis on satisfaction and effectiveness as criteria 
for determining healthy relationships tends to perpetuate this emotivist ethic. 
Criteria need to be emphasized that serve an overarching ethical criterion that 
conjoins with appropriateness (i.e., competence).  When communication emphasizes 
satisfaction and effectiveness as measures, the field is measuring individual preference, 
and thus making claims about “good” skills that may only be good in the sense that they 
make people feel good—the emotivist trap. To demonstrate, let us look to IPC literature 
and the primary criteria for establishing “good” relationships. As described in the 
introduction, there are primarily five criteria (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2002) used in 
determining what is “good” for a relationship: satisfaction, efficiency, effectiveness, 
appropriateness, and ethics. As Vangelisti (2002) attests, “Relational satisfaction has 
been the outcome variable of choice for most scholars studying interpersonal 
communication in romantic relationships” (p. 667). These studies have led to numerous 
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skill sets. To increase satisfaction, relationships should avoid high dominance and 
neuroticism (Thomsen & Gilbert, 1997), equalize power in the dyad (Richmond, 
McCrosky, & Roach, 1997), maintain “impulse control” (Kelly & Conley, 1987), have a 
high ratio of positive to negative comments (Gottman & Levenson, 1992), lessen “trait 
anxiety (Caughlin, Huston, & Houts, 2000), use clear communication (Boyd & Roach, 
1977), lessen negativity (Huston & Vangelisti, 1991), and even avoid smoking (Gilbert & 
Spielberger, 1987). While the list could continue suffice it to say there are several skills 
given to improve relationships. All the above use satisfaction or effectiveness as criteria.  
Why is there this prioritization of the criteria of satisfaction? On a theoretical 
level the criteria of satisfaction corresponds well to a self-interested paradigm. When the 
health of the relationship is measured solely in terms of self-satisfaction, what are 
essentially being measured are degrees of preference—in short a study of emotivism. 
This puts ideas such as self-esteem and persuasive techniques at the heart the skills 
literature. Consider the study by Huston and Vangelisti (1991). They conclude that 
“receiving affection was positively related to satisfaction” (p. 729) and that negativity 
predicts future declines in satisfaction (p. 730). Implicit in this is that people should 
practice the communication skills of giving affection and avoiding negativity. The study 
does not suggest how to do this but gives the implied message that it should be done for a 
“healthier” marriage. This health is determined by the long-term satisfaction in the 
individuals. People prefer affection and prefer positive comments. When they get this 
they are happier with their marriage—a point that fits perfectly with a self-interested 
paradigm.  
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So why is this overemphasis on satisfaction so problematic? The self is after all a 
very important part of communication. One could argue at this point that IPC is 
inherently oriented towards the self in this regard and such studies are perfectly 
acceptable. Indeed the self is an important dynamic in a relationship. However, to explain 
the problems of using the self as the sole orientation for criteria of relational health, 
consider a metaphor from chemistry. Relationships are “compounds” like carbon 
monoxide created by individuals which are the “elements” (a carbon molecule and an 
oxygen molecule) composing them. To understand the compound one must understand 
the element. In this regard, the study of the “human element” is interesting and necessary.  
However, when separated out, these elements display distinct properties from the 
compound. Oxygen is necessary to life. Carbon is the building block of life. However, 
carbon monoxide is poisonous. Similarly, relationships display different properties when 
studied as a “compound” than when studied as “elements.” A study of the relationship as 
a whole takes on properties more like that of organizational communication with 
ethnographies, critical methodologies, and interpretive studies. As Burleson and Denton 
(1997) note, satisfaction alone is too simplistic and understanding of relationships; in 
addition to satisfaction one should also consider the function of the skill examined, the 
person examined, the distress of the couple, and the gender of the individual as 
moderating factors. 
One of the relational properties that is most difficult to ascertain through studies 
of individual satisfaction is love. Indeed, Vangelisti and Huston (1994) separate it out 
from marital satisfaction in the sense that the emotion love is not predictably tied to 
satisfaction. I would argue the same could be said when love is considered ethically. In 
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an ethic of unconditional love, there is a long-term ethic that is denoted as the source of 
long-term relational health but it does not always correlate with short-term satisfaction. 
As Baer (2003) notes, “We all must be in relatively one-sided relationships at one time or 
other. If it’s true that we all need to be loved at times when we have little to give in 
return, it’s equally true that we all need the experience of loving without expectation of 
reward” (p. 259). In this case, satisfaction would not be the standard to which one would 
attribute a happy marriage but rather the standard of unconditional love.  
There is a standard of “health” in a relationship. That standard often revolves 
around personal satisfaction when it comes to the skills literature. Yet one must often go 
beyond expressed personal preferences to determine what makes someone “happy.” To 
lean too heavily on satisfaction as the primary criterion for establishing positive 
relationships puts the self in the central role of determining what is “competent” 
communication for a given situation rather than looking more broadly to the society or 
the relationship for ethical guidance. The self is the judge of the good rather than a 
moderating factor that comes with regard to the other. As Spitzberg and Cupach (2002) 
note, scholars should not depend upon one criterion too heavily because each has its 
flaws. To depend too much on appropriateness is to become what Hart et al. (Hart & 
Burks, 1972; Hart, Carlson, & Eadie, 1980) define as a rhetorical reflector, always 
looking to the other person to determine behavior. To become too dependent on fidelity is 
to become a noble self, where there is little need for such outside influence. The 
“rhetorical sensitive” uses a mixture of society and self, determining an ethic, in order to 
establish what is appropriate. What this seems to be saying is that to judge the worthiness 
of a skill based only on its creation of self-satisfaction is an insufficient criteria set. 
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Interpersonal communication should look for adequacy in skills from other sources, with 
the overarching one being ethical consequences. 
 
Review of the Narrative of Individualism 
What has been attempted in this chapter is to depict a “narrative of individualism” 
as represented in the field of interpersonal communication. Social exchange is the 
primary theory which provides the basis for this narrative. Starting with the assumption 
that all human motivations are founded on self-interest, the theory depicts actions in 
relationships as dependent on individual satisfaction or “profits.” If “losses” are 
experienced and there is no potential for future gain, an individual is likely to leave the 
relationship. One could even say he or she should leave the relationship because 
happiness, the primary goal for individuals, will probably not be achieved. Goal-
orientation in interpersonal communication, adds to the narrative of self-interest by 
providing a cognitive approach to how individuals make decisions. Language is a tool 
that allows us to construct arguments and navigate circumstances in order to achieve our 
goals. The criterion of effectiveness, inherent to this approach, presents moral dangers, so 
satisfaction serves as an easy correlate. Exchange dovetails nicely with the idea that 
social interaction is a tool for achieving goals. Finally, one must develop intimacy skills 
to achieve the goals and self-interests. Several suggestions were mentioned in studies, 
such as a balance of positive and negative behaviors, empathetic concern, and handling 
criticism.  
Over the course of this chapter, the narrative of individualism presented several 
areas of concern. The ethical consequence of a focus on individual satisfaction or 
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preference is often emotivism, which provides very little ground upon which to justify 
standards of right and wrong. In place of a community, which provides a socially agreed-
upon standard or belief, an individual’s taste provides an aesthetic standard for moral 
decisions. As a result of this difficulty judging between aesthetic preferences, professors 
would have difficulty recommending one practice above another unless it is in stated in 
terms of popularity i.e., a majority of people were satisfied as a result of this practice. 
While this might seem effective, it essentially amounts to an ad populum argument.  
Additionally, social exchange is unable to provide ground to foster important 
elements of intimacy requiring authenticity rather than technique. Intimacy skills have a 
tendency to hold a posture of technique rather than embodiment as a result.  Trust, a 
major factor in intimacy, serves as an example of such an authenticity-based concept. 
Self-interested individuals provide help in order to elicit future gains. Thus the partners 
can only foster trust to the extent that he or she can provide future gains—a risky 
proposition for long-term relationships. One final critique is that of relevance. When 
there is an inability to create standards beyond individual preference, there is an 
inclination to avoid prescribing behaviors of any sort so as to respect individual choice. 
Understandably, there is a need to refrain from absolutism; yet, it is equally bad to merely 
maintain a descriptive posture that has little bearing on everyday relationships (Weaver, 
1970).  
There may be a way to regain a posture of relevance and ethical guidance from 
within the narrative of individualism. However to this point, such ground has been 
difficult to find. Therefore, rather than continue trying to navigate through the 
presuppositions of this narrative, a new narrative is suggested for reinterpreting relational 
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literature in terms of charitable acknowledgment rather than individual self-interest. In 
the second half of this study, the move is made to establish relationships as sites for 
ethical action. To do this the self must be reframed, deconstructed even, in order to de-
prioritize a subject-centered perspective. But this must be done without submitting to 
relativism. It is hoped that through communicative praxis, ground can be established so a 
narrative can be constructed to provide an alternative to the narrative of self-interest with 
the narrative of charitable acknowledgement.  
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Chapter 4 
Active Relationships 
The goal of this chapter is to reestablish the philosophical ground from which to 
make ethical claims by reestablishing the ground from which to conceive of subjectivity 
(i.e., the individual).  In other words, this is the interpretive method by which one can 
avoid the errors of the self/other dichotomy, and thus reinterpret interpersonal 
communication in terms of charitable acknowledgment. This is done in three sections. 
First, a review is given of the lessons of modernity and postmodernity to depict the 
problems to overcome. The problems of modernity for the ethical conduct of 
relationships are noted in the emotivist ethic and the oversimplification of relationships 
into a self-interest/other-centered dichotomy. The problems of the postmodern response 
have been noted in the impoverished ground for judgment between ethical standards, the 
deconstruction of the subject, and the aesthetic standard for the good. So how do we 
reflect both the need for complexity in dealing with human motive while maintaining a 
standard by which to judge relationships? In response, we turn to Schrag, Augustine, and 
Hyde to reestablish the subject and provide ground from which to make ethical claims.  
The second part of the chapter depicts communication as a function of a 
decentered subject, as conceived by Schrag and Augustine, that takes place in action. We 
must conceive of communication in active paradigms, not static ones. As we will see, an 
active approach can help resolve some of the pitfalls of a technified approach. 
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Communication is defined as an embodied and embedded use of symbols to depict ideas. 
This is the philosophical framework from which one can build a view of relationships 
that incorporates ethics without entering into a mode of objectivism or absolutism. We 
will show how the active view of a relationship necessitates a focus on the ethic chosen 
within the relationship rather than the individuals who comprise it. As Wilmot (2002) 
states, the relationship comprises a “third” that exists as an entity in and of itself 
comprised of both people together enacting a given story but larger than either one in the 
sense that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Thus the focus on the ethic can be 
put in terms of a narrative, a story with a past, present, and future, that defines the right 
thing to do in a given situation. By identifying the ethical perspectives agreed upon 
within the relationship and studying the corresponding actions that emerge from these 
perspectives, one can begin to anticipate “healthy” relationships. An alternative narrative 
of interpersonal communication emerges focusing on relational ethics rather than 
individual self-interests.   
 
A Review of the Lessons of Modernity and Postmodernity 
There are several lessons to be learned from modernity as they relate to intimate 
relationships. As depicted throughout the preceding chapters, modern approaches to the 
individual primarily look at motive in terms of self-interest and the degree to which a 
given action is driven by subject-centered intentions. Rousseau believed that for a society 
to be healthy there must be a sense of amour de soi (beneficial self-love) that was 
contrasted to amore propre (narrow self-interest/unseemly pride) and conjoined with 
charité (pitié) (produces anguish when we see suffering). This was an attempt to provide 
 104 
   
an appropriate balance of self and other in relationships and society at large. Today, the 
navigation between self-love and pitie, also framed as egoism and altruism, is still 
disputed, but today some people doubt that charity is a viable phenomenon at all. The 
modern attempt to simplify this “love conundrum” has resulted in a de-emphasis of 
altruism and a prioritization of individual power and potentiality (e.g., Nietzsche, 1967; 
Sartre,1981; Rorty, 1989). The philosophical ground for altruism has disintegrated to the 
point that some sociobiologists even claim pitié does not exist (e.g., Dawkins, 1978; 
Wilson, 1975). Psychology, sociology, and economics all have dominant strains 
reflecting a direct assumption of an egocentric view of humanity (Grant, 1997, p. 323).  
The notion of inherent self-interest has become so ingrained in human thinking 
that several ethical treatises disagree that other-centeredness can be a fundamental human 
characteristic and move the argument instead to how to most efficiently manage self-
interests for maximum gains for both the individual and society (e.g., Bentham’s 
teleological arguments [1789/1948], Mill’s [1863/1993] theories of utilitarianism, 
Gauthier’s [1986] notion of morality and advantage, and Rawls’s [1971/1999] 
deontological contractual justice). Simply put, when the field of interpersonal 
communication focuses on romantic relationships as ways of satisfying self-interests, it is 
continuing in the modern trend of psychology, philosophy, ethics, economics, and 
biology. 
But there are ethical pitfalls to looking at relationships in terms of self-interest as 
do social exchange, goal orientation, and intimacy skills theories in interpersonal 
communication studies. Emotivism is the most profound of these pitfalls. Emotivism is 
directly tied to a self-interested paradigm. When individual preference is the only way to 
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distinguish right and wrong we are left without ethical ground to establish community or 
relationships. To get my needs met is the top priority—self-interest reigns. Yet trust, a 
concept fundamental to intimacy, can be depicted as a function of an ethical commitment 
to the other (Weber & Carter, 2003) that stands in contrast to depictions of trust as a 
function of self-interest and reciprocity (see Ostrom & Walker, 2003). Trust, argued in 
the previous chapter, is undermined by pure self-interest. When someone’s relational 
goals are prioritized based on personal satisfaction, there is a significant decrease in the 
likelihood that, for example, a man can trust a woman not to use him merely as a means 
to get what she wants.  
So what is the alternative? Immediately one could jump to other-centeredness as a 
focus. Negate self through a focus on the other. In short, practice altruism over egoism. 
But arguments have been levied that this should not be considered a “healthy” 
perspective either (e.g., Dawkins, 1978). One cannot deny that individuals have needs. 
Should a person practice self-negation that results in his/her own pain and suffering? To 
sustain this practice is to deny one’s own life. While philosophies such as those of 18th 
century French neo-Augustinians may have claimed such denial was virtuous, it certainly 
is not sustainable. Hobbes (1985/1651) notes our own incapacity towards sustained 
motives of benevolence. And thus, the whole debate has gone around and around as 
philosophers from Hobbes and Rousseau to Dawkins and Bateson discuss the place of 
egoism and altruism. Are we self-interested? Should we be self-negating? Are we capable 
of altruism? Are our motives pure? Here the question is asked, why must the debate be 
framed in terms of some over-arching motive of self versus other?  
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MacIntyre (1967) argues against this “a priori characterization of human motives” 
(p. 466). When relationships are framed in terms of a dichotomy between self-interest 
and other-interest it is difficult to conceive of ways to ground ethic-driven approaches to 
relationships. While scholars of self-interested approaches recognize from experience the 
need for others, it is difficult to incorporate them into self-interested theories. Thus we 
get Dawkins (1978) intimidated by altruism, Roloff (1981) cataloguing social exchange’s 
shortcomings, Planalp (2003) relaying the on-going difficulties of social exchange in 
explaining altruism, and a field devoted to interpersonal communication that has a hard 
time finding ground upon which to explain trust and love, ideas that defy self-interest. 
Theories that have perpetuated a priori self-interest, as seen in interpersonal 
communication, lead to an intellectual cul-de-sac where it is incredibly difficult to 
incorporate complex human motives because they are only framed in terms of self-
interest or altruism. So what is the way out of this cul-de-sac? The journey begins by 
reframing the view of the subject. 
Thus enters postmodernity. The past several decades have seen mounting 
questions against the modern notions about the primacy of science, the idea of progress, 
and, more important for this dissertation, the primacy of the “self.”  In looking for 
philosophical ground, postmodern deconstructions provide a means to clear intellectual 
space. When we consider recent philosophical thinking called postmodern, we begin to 
recognize clearly that the subject’s ideas are dependent upon the norms of a given 
community as established in linguistic interaction. These rhetorical roots make the 
interpretation of individual action very open and “playable.” Derrida clearly showed us 
the fragility of words and the ability to deconstruct meaning. With words being so 
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“playable”, it is a short step to also question the ground upon which the subject is 
constructed. Cartesian logic is no longer capable of establishing an a priori subject 
predicated on the ability to think. Our very thoughts are rhetorical and open to 
interpretation. The subject is deconstructed and the conception of action being a 
dichotomy of self-interest and self-denial is seen to be overly simplistic as it misses the 
more subtle power dynamics at work in a given action (Foucault, 1978). We see that 
interpretation can be as broad as the rhetorical possibilities allow—in theory limitless.  
But what becomes of ethics in this environment where actions take place on “a 
bottomless chessboard where Being comes into play” (Derrida, 1986, p. 414)? This 
question of ethics is the problem that emerges from the reinterpretation of the subject. It 
seems difficult to reinvigorate the philosophical ground for other-focused action in 
today’s historical moment in regard to the study of interpersonal intimate romantic 
relationships when the intellectual ground is “unstable” and at “infinite play.” There is no 
stability when rhetorical theory cannot establish strong foundations for meaning. Without 
ground for making ethical distinctions, there is little hope for encouraging “healthy” 
relationships. 
Thus there are two problems here. The first deals with modernity. Stemming from 
rampant individualism, MacIntyre (1984) describes the dangers of “emotivism” as it 
prevails in ethical decision-making in today’s society. The second deals with 
postmodernity. One cannot deny the persuasive argument that the subject is not the center 
of knowing and that language is not an objective medium. Indeed, the accuracy of the 
postmodern critique of subjectivity and the introduction of deconstruction as an effective 
approach to hegemonic institutions is hard to deny. So what ground is there upon which 
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to make ethical distinctions? Or put another way, what is the interpretive methodology by 
which one can understand interpersonal communication in intimate relationships so that 
the pitfalls of the self/other dichotomy can be avoided. The restoration begins with the 
following: 1) To reinterpret the subject out of its central position where emotivism is 
rampant while avoiding deconstruction of the subject to the point of relativism, a “middle 
ground” is suggested here founded by Schrag’s decentered self and Augustine’s idea of 
the subject. This is a subject who is embodied, temporal, and multiple; this nature is 
established in action. 2) The priorization of context and groundedness stresses the 
importance of the “third.” The third is the relationship one has with another individual, 
group, or community providing an over-arching ethical conception of a “fitting 
response.” This third often takes the structure of a narrative  This third, when expressed 
vis-à-vis the philosophical constructs of Hyde and Augustine, can create an interpersonal 
narrative that may be helpful for providing more practical ethical application in 
interpersonal communication—a conception that moves beyond mere description to 
provide guidance in healthy relationships. 
 
Communication as a Function of Action 
 Victor Hugo (1987/1862) notes, “There is one spectacle greater than the sea: That 
is the sky; there is one spectacle greater than the sky: That is the interior of the soul” (p. 
219). The self has been a source of intense study especially during the Enlightenment 
largely because it is such a “spectacle.” It is vast, complicated—and imperfect. Scholars 
who have inherited modernity, in their attempts to encapsulate intimate relationships in 
terms of self-interest, have been handicapped by a vocabulary that has been limited to 
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dichotomous motives—either egoist or altruistic. Intimate relationships are frequently 
judged in terms of satisfaction (e.g., Vangelisti & Huston, 1994; Vangelisti, 2002), and 
communication within these relationships is framed as a tool (e.g., Berger, 2002). By 
adopting this “tool” mentality, there are certain elements of relationships such as trust and 
love that cannot be “wielded” without losing their inherent nature and thus become 
warped or diminished. Additionally, communication as a tool understands words as 
neutral (Berger, 2002), which is problematic in a postmodern world. The biggest lesson 
of postmodernity and indeed much of rhetorical theory is that words, by their very 
connection to imperfect humans, do not allow such neutrality. However, this lack of 
neutrality does not necessitate relativism. There is ground where words can be connected 
to deeds, allowing experience and reality to build trust in symbols. 
By understanding communication and consequently relationships in action, an 
attempt can be made to depict Hugo’s “spectacle” with more flexibility of interpretation. 
Consequently, such a framework for relationships would allow interpersonal 
communication theory the ability to provide more ethical guidance rather than being 
limited to mere description. To establish this intellectual ground, first there needs to be a 
solid emphasis on the importance of connecting word and deed. Augustine provides 
several metaphors on this account. Secondly, the subject needs to be reinterpreted such 
that one can avoid the pure subjectivity that gives the illusion of philosophical foundation 
while resisting the deconstruction that comes so easily with a purely rhetorical 
understanding. This falls in the realm of what Schrag describes as the “decentered self.” 
Finally, the subject needs to be understood in action, thus looking for valences within 
which the self is established (i.e., narratives, relationships) rather than relying on motives.  
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Word and Deed 
 Connecting word and deed is the fundamental metaphor of an active paradigm of 
communication. This approach avoids the relativism of the deconstructionist metaphor of 
“infinite play” while avoiding the technification of the “neutral tool” metaphor of 
modernity. The active impetus of connecting word and deed emphasizes the nature of 
symbols as embodied in a human being whose use of these symbols concurrently shapes 
his or her worldview as that world shapes the use of those words. This is not a process 
with parts parsed out, but rather is an interpretive action where words are only as 
understandable as the corresponding actions to which they are associated. Meaning is 
greater than the sum of its words—the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. The 
words used in conversation correlate to reality around us and this must be taken seriously, 
i.e. enacted, in order to avoid relativism.  
To make this claim, the word must be understood first not as a written symbol but 
as a spoken symbol. Derrida is able to advocate deconstruction as an epistemology 
because of his emphasis on the written word. The written symbol is static, limp, and in 
need of enlivenment through an interpreter, a role deconstructionists fill however they 
deem fit; this interpretation may or may not be the imagined interpretation of the 
embodied author. When used sparingly by someone within a given narrative, such 
unconventional interpretations are thought-provoking and can allow growth. When used 
liberally as the primary approach to life, these interpretations can be damaging to the 
fabric of community. This is the difference between the sophism of Isocrates and the 
sophism of Gorgias. Isocrates was a proponent of dissoi logoi, yet his participation in 
Athenian society and belief in the pan-Hellenic movement tempered his words lest the 
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land he loved be harmed by his actions. Gorgias was an outsider whose dissoi logoi was 
not tempered by the communal narrative, and thus felt no objection to training students to 
argue any side of an argument. Rhetoric was primary, not the narrative. In short, Isocrates 
subjected rhetoric to a narrative that connected word and deed, whereas Gorgias viewed 
rhetoric as all-encompassing and thus was bounded only by his own intellectual inventive 
capabilities. To avoid an all-encompassing deconstructionist paradigm, texture must be 
provided by a recognition of embodiment coming from a connection of word to deed—a 
lived narrative. Interpretation is done by a linguistic being who breathes life into words 
because they have been spoken, enacted, and thus understood. In this sense, the oral takes 
precedence over the written in an active paradigm. 
Consider an active communication paradigm in regard to the example of “beauty” 
as conceived by Diatima (vis-à-vis Plato) in Phaedrus. Beauty is depicted as a Form to be 
discovered, independent of human interpretation and Sophistic manipulation. However, 
from an active communication paradigm, this is only a partially correct assessment. 
Beauty is discovered in lives lived and experienced. Plato does not acknowledge the 
enactment and reformation of beauty that takes place in the human dynamic world that 
connects word and deed. Sophists Gorgias and Protagoras acknowledge this dynamism of 
the word. They would likely claim beauty is not static in a transcendent realm but is 
living in the world around us in argumentation. Our words shape our deeds. Yet at the 
same time, argumentation-as-epistemology, because of its instability, fails to provide 
ethical ground from which the polis can remain stable and vibrant. There is no source 
outside individual preference from which beauty can be understood, because there is no 
stability in language—a popular reason for the Athenian population’s mistrust of latter-
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day Sophists (Herrick, 2007). Thus actions must ground words as well. This simultaneous 
connection of words shaping deeds and deeds grounding words is only possible when 
communication is dynamic and fluid. In an active paradigm, a community together 
interprets what is beautiful, shares it with one another, learns through our mistaken 
identifications, and respectfully disagrees with community members whose 
interpretations are outside lived reality. 
But what of errant communities? The “disagreements with community members” 
mentioned in the last statement is especially pertinent to a post-WWII world. “Lived 
reality” as determined in the community of Germany interpreted a holocaust as necessary 
for a “good society.” Rhetoric played a role in making this word enacted. How then can 
we judge communities? The tempering agent is the necessity for respect as a 
presupposition of active communication. Respect is defined here as acknowledging the 
value of peoples’ beliefs, actions, or at the very least their being. It is feasible that 
someone may not be able to respect belief or actions; but being is always to be respected. 
For example, if a Quaker mother fundamentally disagrees with her son’s going to war, 
she may not in fact be able to respect his beliefs; they are fundamentally at odds with her 
own beliefs. She may indeed not even respect her son’s actions, viewing them as 
senseless, violent, and contributing to a world of sin. Nonetheless, because she respects 
her son as her son, i.e. his being, all hope of communication is not lost. Indeed, as with 
most mothers, they never lose this unconditional love. As James Joyce states, “Whatever 
else is unsure in this stinking dunghill of a world a mother's love is not” (Khurana, 2007). 
Thus, it is on the foundation of respect that love can exist despite ideological differences. 
Were she to abandon respect all together, all bonds would be broken and his potential 
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death in a war would be met with scorn. When Bok (1999) notes violence as one of the 
primary actions that destroy society, this is what she is talking about. To deny a person 
the fundamental respect that allows them to live is to deny the ground from which healthy 
interpersonal communication can continue. To deny respect predicates violence whether 
in the microcosm of relational dysfunction or a macrocosm of communal destruction. 
Thus, respect serves as an important presupposition for the connection of word and deed 
as enacted in relationships.  
Two other presuppositions for an active paradigm of communication connecting 
word and deed emerge in the work of Augustine—humility and a narrative of faith. Let 
us look first to the narrative of faith. First, the question should be answered why use 
Augustine here? Indeed, a chain of individuals in rhetorical theory hold ideas that 
advocate such a word/deed metaphor and thus an active paradigm. Isocrates has already 
been discussed as an advocate of the Greek ethical structure. Aristotle through the 
“golden mean” pursues a lived, experiential word with an emphasis on technique. Cicero 
continued and expanded upon this train of thought within a Roman setting. Quintilian 
advocated rhetoric as lived by a “good” person, namely a Roman citizen. Burke (1969) 
would look at the dramatistic word put into action by symbol-using animals whose 
identification with one another and their environment gives ground for meaning.  Bahktin 
(1993) looks at utterances as enacted and polyphonic, emphasizing an oral understanding 
of the word. Each of these authors could defend the active communication paradigm. 
However, Augustine is chosen here as the primary subject through whom word and deed 
is discussed for a couple of different reasons. First, his presuppositions for the active 
approach give guidance in how faith in a narrative provides ethical guidance. In addition, 
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his Christian narrative is still adopted by millions today, thus giving an exegetical 
purpose (as opposed to the Greek polis or the Roman forum). Finally, his ties to rhetoric 
provide nuance that avoids the Platonic temptation to castigate rhetoric for its 
manipulative qualities, thus simultaneously avoiding the static, lifeless word that is open 
to deconstruction. The appreciation for an embodied narrative of faith that advocates 
respect and humility provides adequate presuppositional ground for an active approach to 
communication.  
However, the use of a narrative of faith requires more defense, especially when 
considering a modern understanding of “rationality.” When it comes to interpreting 
reality, those who espouse social exchange ideologies often look at language as a neutral 
tool, with human rationality providing the guiding hand. Rationality in this case 
commonly means a modern scientific approach—translated in interpersonal 
communication as a “theory-method” complex (Poole, McPhee, & Canary, 2002). For 
those individuals, Augustine, with his emphasis on faith, might be seen as a figure who is 
anachronistic to today’s world due to what might be considered an “irrational” approach. 
For example, arguments like Augustine’s have been cited by Dawkins (2006) as “actively 
debauching the scientific enterprise. It teaches us not to change our minds, and not to 
want to know exciting things that are available to be known. It subverts science and saps 
the intellect" (p. 284). This “sapping of the intellect” composes a common argument 
against “narratives of faith” because such beliefs are deemed unreasonable in that they 
are unscientific. Indeed Augustine’s understanding of humanity relies upon a Christian 
narrative of faith. Nonetheless, it is not the Christian argument necessarily that needs to 
influence today’s scholar but rather the indirect appeal to a narrative of faith that should 
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be adopted and understood. “Faith” in this sense is understood as a belief system that 
underlies one’s ethical choices. A narrative of faith composes a public story of how that 
faith is chosen and expressed (i.e., Arnett & Arneson, 1999). It is argued here that the 
private sphere can also be approached in terms of how a narrative can establish a 
dwelling place for ethical action. Ethical consequences of a given narrative are of utmost 
importance to intimate relationships. It is this generalized ability to speak from a 
narrative that can (and I would argue should) be accepted. The specifics of the narrative 
are the grounds for moral debate as judged in terms in their embodied practice (e.g., vis-
à-vis Fisher’s [1989] fidelity and probability). Narrative, then, is not a process but an 
orientation towards ethics, action, and motives. 
Simply put, it must be recognized that Dawkins, too, is speaking from a narrative, 
in that he speaks from a “rational tradition beginning from the contingency and positivity 
of some set of established beliefs” (MacIntyre, 1988, p. 360). That narrative is one of 
modernity related in depth in Chapter 2. His sociobiological perspective is critiquing a 
narrative of Christianity as unreasonable based on sociobiology’s presuppositions of 
reasonableness. Indeed, such a discussion of presuppositions is the level on which this 
dissertation argues interpersonal communication could be conducted with more rigor; we 
tend to focus heavily on epistemological methodology rather than ontological 
presuppositions and axiological effects. Problems stem as much from a subject’s assumed 
neutrality as with the content of their argument. Communication scholars should make 
themselves aware of personal biases they may hold against belief systems that compose 
narratives. It is these belief systems that shape ethical approaches and thus shape the way 
relationships are understood. Thus, in addition to whether something is being measured 
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correctly, an equally valuable question to ask when considering human relationship is 
whether a belief of a narrative produces healthy or unhealthy consequences as seen in 
their embodied practice within a given community.  
Augustine speaks to us today because he provides an example of a narrative and 
then defends that narrative as healthy. To do this, he admits to the errors of interpretation 
in humanity which may pervert a given narrative, and simultaneously defends the 
“reasonableness” of faith in that it is enacted in word and deed. Thus, in defense against a 
modern claim of “unreasonable” faith, Elshtain (1995) notes, “Augustine is sometimes 
seen as a being in a headlong plunge from reason into that heart of darkness the 
enlightened think of as faith. Wrong. He is in flight from a distorted love of reason” (p. 
52). Rather than avoiding reason, Augustine searches to “order” reason in submission to a 
narrative of faith. As Elshtain (1995) notes:  
Augustine navigated the rough waters between the extremes of a fideism that 
despises reason and a rationalism that excludes faith. He granted wide epistemic 
berth to what we would now call natural science. Whatever can be explained in 
this way, let it be so. The mistake lies in thinking that everything can fall under a 
singly epistemic domain. (p. 57). 
Indeed, Augustine famously stated that “wherever he may find truth, it is his Lord’s” 
(OCD, II.xviii.28) indicating there is nothing to fear in truth because it cannot fall outside 
of the believed Christian narrative. Additionally, he states “A knowledge of inference, 
definition, and division aides the understanding a great deal, provided that men do not 
make the mistake of thinking that they have learned the truth of the blessed life when 
they have learned them” (OCD, II.xxxvii.55). What he admits here is that the world 
provides truth both physical and intellectual. There is, however, a realm of belief called 
“faith” that organizes that world and gives guidance to a “blessed life.” As he states: 
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I considered how countless were the things that I believed, although I had not 
seen them nor was I present when they took place. Such were so many events in 
human history, so many things about places and cities that I had not seen, so 
many things about my friends, so many things about physicians, so many things 
about countless other men. Unless we believed these things, nothing at all could 
be done in this life. (Conf. 6.5.7).  
For make action possible, belief must be held in the accounts of others. For Augustine 
those beliefs were a part of recorded narrative that consists of the Christian God, Christ, 
and the Scriptures.  
Adopting a narrative of faith is not an anachronism or illogical. In fact MacIntyre 
(1988) would call it the ordinary state of affairs for human existance. To come to a “true 
account of justice and of practical rationality” requires that one undertake “tradition-
constituted and tradition-constitutive” enquiry (p. 389). Augustine is presenting a 
narrative that orders rationality. It defines the “true” and “practical” as bounded by 
“humility” and “respect.”  
So what in his narrative provides insight into human relationships? One of the 
most important lessons is that of humility, depicted by Augustine through the story of the 
Fall of man. To Augustine, the Fall indicates the way sin entered into the world through 
Adam and Eve’s enticement to sin.  Here is the story as described by Augustine in the 
Enchiridion: 
After his sin he [Adam] became an exile from this place [paradise] and bound also 
his progeny, which by his sin he had damaged within himself as though at its root, 
by the penalty of death and condemnation. As a result, any offspring born of him 
and the wife through whom he had sinned…would contract original sin, which 
would drag it through various errors and pains to that final punishment with the 
deserter angels, his corruptors, masters, and accomplices. Therefore, sin came into 
the world through one man, and death came through sin, and so it spread to all: in 
him all have sinned. (8.23) 
Thus, in the root of mankind is the propensity to sin as a result of Adam. What makes this 
narrative element relevant to the discussion of communication is in the implications 
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resulting from our own error-prone will. Augustine strongly distrusted human will. In 
Confessions there are numerous instances of Augustine distrusting himself (5.2.2) and his 
motives (4.16.30), used as an example to show the failings of society as a whole. Thus, 
because of this low view of humanity, we must constantly be on guard to avoid poor 
interpretations and unhealthy actions.  
A post-WWII society, witness to the atrocities of the scientific “reason” proffered 
by Nazi Germany, should be able to appreciate Augustine’s sentiment of distrust, 
regardless of whether one embraces his narrative of the Fall. The technologies of 
scientific minds led to the potential for human annihilation. The utilitarian sentiments of a 
rational mind resulted in a people’s mass execution. While the narrative of individualism 
does not rise to this level of negative consequence, one cannot ignore the fact that 
emotivism has negative consequences for society (MacIntyre, 1984). In interpersonal 
communication, this exposes itself as an inability to judge one preference as better than 
another, leading to an inability to foster and defend the basic building blocks of intimacy 
such as love, trust, and forgiveness. Reason itself, centered on scientific study, is not in 
itself sufficient when concerning such phenomena; that is the difficulty presented by 
modernity. It must be realized that rationality is centered on tradition and begins, as 
MacIntyre (1988) notes, “from the contingency and positivity of some set of established 
beliefs” (p. 360). The “intellectual maturity” of a tradition depends on its ability to “have 
passed through an epistemological crisis successfully” and to “rewrite its history in a 
more insightful way” (p. 363). In other words, tradition is based on those words passing 
through lived experience. Words are connected to deeds; deeds are connected to words. 
This is an active paradigm. 
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This returns us to the issue of word and deed. Augustine, whose doubt of human 
reason rounds out his doubts in all elements of mankind’s ability as a result of the Fall, is 
not countering today’s mindset by questioning an over-dependence on rationality. He is 
offering, in essence, a postmodern-like critique. Because we are saturated in error from 
our linguistic and existential fallibility, we are prone to hopelessness in our ability to 
know truth. But for Augustine, there is hope in the ability to connect word with deed. 
“Moreover, there is often no other way for the human soul to know itself than by trying 
its strength in answering not in word, but in deed, the questions posed by the experience 
of temptation” (COG, xvi.32). We look to action to see what could be in relationships. 
“In our present state, we believe that we possess these three things—being, knowledge, 
and love—not on the testimony of others, but because we ourselves are aware of their 
presence, and because we discern them with our most truthful inner vision” (COG, xi.28). 
There is something about humanity that is able to discern reality, rationality, and ethics. 
Ethics to Augustine is love. Love is not a mere word but an action. But what about the 
person who is putting these words into action? How should we understand the self in an 
active paradigm? Schrag helps in this regard. 
The Decentered Self 
The presuppositions of respect, humility, and narrative of faith culminate in what 
Schrag (1986) calls the “decentered self.” Schrag (1986), coming from a philosophical 
perspective, recognizes the complicated situation in which philosophy finds itself as a 
postmodern world emerges: “Can we still maintain that philosophical discourse is about 
things of the world and what they are like...Or is [philosophical discourse] about 
‘problems’ created by other philosophers?” (p. 1). In short, he asks whether philosophy is 
 120 
   
driven by reality or some sort of articulated reality. Postmodern scholars such as Foucault 
and Derrida have pointed out that ideology and reality are intertwined. Reality is 
linguistically conceived and cannot be separated from our ability to represent it 
symbolically. Because of the interpretive flexibility of language, the quest for an 
absolutely “proper position on matters of mind, language, perception, or action” (Schrag, 
1986, p. 5) is a futile quest. But is there ground for judgments beyond preference and 
aesthetic choice? This requires a new interpretation of the “self after postmodernity.” 
The self after postmodernity is defined succinctly by Schrag (1986; 1997) as 
“decentered,” which implies a certain sense of instability about it without untethering it 
from reality completely. There is an ability to reclaim subjectivity—though not in the 
modernist view of the term. It is through language that humans position themselves as 
subjects. We are linguistic beings. We construct ourselves and our society. This is not the 
first time this has been expressed; Gorgias would have stated as much. So in modern 
times would Rorty (1989) or Derrida (1974). But does this necessitate Gorgias’ other 
infamous statement that “Nothing exists; If something does exist we could not know it; if 
we could know it we could not communicate it”? Is relativism a consequence of calling 
reality linguistic? Schrag in fact is trying to avoid this Sophistic pitfall that he senses 
from deconstructionists and even pragmatism. Rather than moving towards the “end of 
philosophy” (Schrag, 1989, p. 10), Schrag notes the existence of a “trace of subjectivity” 
that leads to a means for establishing meaning. Schrag would argue that language is not at 
infinite play if it is able to be grounded by action, namely communicative praxis. There 
may be multiple paths to understanding, but not infinite. As Augustine would note, we 
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are tethered to the word by the deed. The I is found in the nexus of speaking, acting, and 
writing.  
Communicative Praxis is Schrag’s seminal work that articulates his position of 
how, in the face of postmodern relativist, individualist, and antisubjectivist challenges, 
phenomenology can reclaim subjectivity as a “decentered subject” in the space of 
“communicative praxis.” Essentially, what we find is a grammar describing the self in 
action through the terms “praxis,” “texture,” “conversation,” and the “decentered self,” 
which is broken into the elements of “temporality,” “multiplicity,” and “embodiment.”  
“Praxis” deals with the realms of the ethical and political rather than the 
metaphysical and epistemological. It is a break from philosophy as it is typically 
understood to gain a greater connection with the active, even rhetorical elements of 
reality. It is in line with the “rhetorical turn” in philosophy, but does not turn so sharply 
that it moves into relativism. Communication is understood as an act or action of 
imparting or transmitting, “a performance within the topos of human affairs” (Schrag, 
1986, p. 21). Praxis is in the sphere of human action guided by phronesis (practical 
wisdom), which is a different sort of knowing than theoria (theory of rigorous science 
from episteme—knowledge). There is no dichotomy between theory and practice—they 
are united into one term which is dependent on performance. Thus praxis is contrasted 
with poiesis (artificial production). Guided by techne (techniques), poiesis indicates a 
state where one can separate performance from the individual context and retain both 
meaning and practicality. As we have already indicated in the previous chapter, much of 
the interpersonal skills literature in regard to intimacy depends upon poiesis, rather than 
praxis; these are performances seemingly devoid of performers. The unfortunate 
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consequence of the technique-driven approach to communication is a separation of word 
and deed that opens the door to deconstruction. What Schrag tries to do with the idea of 
communicative praxis is tether the word more tightly to the actions that ground it in order 
to render deconstruction absurd. For example, if I am running, and you try to deconstruct 
the word “run” to mean something else (e.g., dance), the witnessed experience will render 
your deconstruction worthless. Power might transform this experience—consider whether 
in the tale of the emperor’s new clothes, the people would have pretended to “see” 
clothing if he was a commoner—but the usage of power is still an issue of ethics and still 
remains in line with the active paradigm (e.g., the emperor was still seen as foolish). 
Action provides texture with which the word is provided meaning. Without action, words 
are at infinite play.     
Communication and praxis are mediated by “texture” which is neither prioritizing 
the text nor prioritizing perception or action but rather “encompasses the play and display 
of meanings within the field of perception and the fabric of human action” (Schrag, 1986, 
p. 30). The metaphor of texture elicits the multifaceted nature of communicative praxis. 
We do not participate in a realm that is solely action—that negates transcendence. In 
other words, there is a “beyond-ness” to our existence, but this understanding refrains 
from suggesting a universal or metaphysical dimension. We also do not participate in a 
realm that is mere perception—that enters into emotivism. The aestheticism in culture 
that so frustrates MacIntyre is founded upon the over-emphasis on perception. Finally, we 
do not participate in a realm driven by text—that lends itself to deconstruction. Derrida’s 
grammatology must emphasize text to accomplish deconstruction because it is separated 
from an author and a reality. Were it to be tethered to reality, several of the turns taken by 
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someone attempting deconstruction could be avoided. What Schrag wants the metaphor 
of texture to accomplish is a way to exhibit the physicality of communication, and its 
dependence on orality as much as textuality. It is the “act of text.”  
The benefit of “texture” as a metaphor over “context” for Schrag is its ability to 
avoid characterizing a factor as interior or exterior. Communicative praxis does not abide 
by the metaphor of interiority or exteriority as separate domains (p. 47). “Context” often 
indicates some sort of outside factor surrounding the discussion. There is a realm inside 
the text and a realm that impacts the text. This misses the expressive nature of 
communication where discourse and action are amalgamated. Texture indicates an 
overlap that would consider all factors of the conversation without denoting a distinction 
between “where” it “exists.” The factors are amalgamated in such a way that nothing is 
“con-textual;” it is the “act of text” or texture.   
The metaphor of “foundation” is also suspect, to be replaced by the metaphor of 
“conversation.” There is no solid rock, no ultimate presupposition which will uphold all 
argument. To let a presupposition “sit still” long enough for it to become a foundation is 
to open it to deconstruction as it becomes “text.” As an “act of text” or “texture,” issues 
become more fluid and cannot be solved for all time across all peoples. The privilege of 
universal knowledge or even subjective knowledge is lost. Communicative praxis enters 
into the realm of faith-based action as opposed to the One True Faith, the realm of 
expressed ethics, not the Good, and the realm of humble interpretation, not Justice. A 
postmodern world does not allow the comforts of absolute knowledge, but, as Schrag 
(1986) suggests neither does it unavoidably lead to relativism. Schrag (1986) suggests 
“conversation” vis-à-vis Rorty as the preferred metaphor (p.110) to “foundation.” The 
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benefit of “conversation” is that the mobile, interactive, expressed nature of an argument 
is reflected. Without this plasticity, deconstruction looms. But it also avoids relativism 
through embodiment in the subject. 
But can there be some “place” for the subject to exist such that meaning can be 
established? With the philosophical background emphasizing an active, expressed and 
conversational truth, Schrag begins to develop his claim that the subject is “decentered.” 
For Schrag (1986), the subject is not a foundation for communicative praxis but is an 
“implicate” of it (p. 138). In praxis, the subject is implied. Schrag (1986) notes “traces of 
subjectivity” in the work of Levi-Strauss, Heidegger, and Derrida that indicate “markings 
that point to an involved speaker, a situated author, and an engaged actor at work” (p. 
10). From these traces, one can begin to envision the self as “decentered,” described as 
“temporal,” “multiple,” and “embodied” (p. 147). Schrag claims that in communicative 
praxis, a new sense of humanism can be found, “one that will provide a sheet anchor 
against the recurring tendencies toward an aestheticism of textuality which pervade the 
discursive strategies of the post-modern age” (p. 213).  
When Schrag (1986) discusses a temporal self, he is indicating a “praxial space 
which presence and absence inhabit” (p. 146). Presence is the living present in which we 
operate. Absence enshrines those past and future occurrences that compose our actions. 
For Schrag, praxis is the space where all this comes together. As Schrag (1986) states: 
The restoration at work in praxis is the repetition or recollection of that which has 
been said and done, not through a representation that facilely mirrors a state of 
affairs that once had reality but now is gone by, but rather through a reclamation 
that continues to inform the living present, without which it would have no 
concretion. (p. 147).  
Kierkegaard informs this idea of “concretion” through his notion of “recollecting 
forwards” (Schrag, 1986, p. 70). Schrag (1986) gives an example in the symbol 
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“Napoleon” (p. 68) which is an “interpreted text of historical inscriptions” but not a 
representation of Napoleon himself. Representation collapses when interpretation 
intervenes. There is no firm representation of the actual individual able to be expressed. 
Yet recollection understands the hermeneutic procedure through which one reclaims 
knowledge. It is through recollection, the “reminiscence and reenactment of these 
communications and practices” (p. 69), that one is able to understand the temporality of 
the self. Through recollection, praxis reclaims the past to the present thus making the 
“deferred” subject a positive possibility for invention (p. 147). We all participate in 
temporality, so our recollective abilities represent a space where past is reclaimed 
through interpretation.  
 However, this interpretation will never be singular due to the second facet of the 
human subject, multiplicity. Multiplicity depicts the subject as having different 
personalities (not in the sense of a psychosis) within the same person. Schrag (1986) 
states, “Historically there has been an obsession with the values of unity and identity in 
the boldly metaphysical reflections on selfhood and subjectivity” (p. 147). Indeed, the 
emphasis of modernity was on the unity of the self until Freud interpreted the subject as 
uncontrollable (partially) and fractured (i.e., id, ego, superego). Now, in postmodernity a 
“multiple personae” is a common assumption: “In the hermeneutical space of 
communicative praxis…temporality and multiplicity are native citizens of the terrain, 
accepted as indigenous inhabitants of the historical life of discourse and action” (Schrag, 
1986, p. 148). Thus, texture is important to an understanding of subjectivity at any given 
moment. The “right” belief on who one really is is “set aside” in order to look at the 
“subject within the actual context of its practical concerns and discursive performances” 
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(p. 148). We are different people in different times and places. For Schrag, this stands in 
contrast to the “classical metaphysicians of the soul and modern philosophers of mind” 
who “were frightened not only by temporality but also by multiplicity” (p. 147) because 
of its inability to enact a given system.  
Finally, the subject is embodied in the world and in social practices, not in a 
position but in an event (Schrag, 1986, p. 155), and thus is finite (p. 176). Schrag’s notion 
of the embodied self is a response to the mind/body split that positions the decentered 
subject as “already at the world and already in the social practices” (p. 152). As he notes, 
“We see the illustration of bodily presence not as an abstracted corporeal datum but as a 
web of polysemic descriptions of the speaker, author, and social agent within the space of 
communicative praxis” (p. 154).  This is not, however, legitimizing certain cognitive 
approaches [e.g., action assembly theory (Green ,1984)] to communication where 
“embodiment” indicates the effort to catalog the human brain to determine both 
scientifically and metaphorically how we create knowledge. While scientific studies on 
the physical dimensions of how the brain works may be beneficial, these are certainly 
efforts best engaged by neurologists and not communication scholars. The physics of the 
brain is an encapsulated representation of our physical thinking process. “Embodiment” 
is indicative of human thinking on physical, rational, and ethical levels. It is thus 
important not to reduce “embodiment” to mere “biology”—rather, it is the corpus of 
humanity figuratively “in the flesh.” 
The metaphors for how we create meaning in an embodied approach to the self 
means we cannot disconnect ideas and words too far from deeds or authors too far from 
their texts. “The decentered subject as embodied is already at the world and already in the 
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social practices” (Schrag, 1986, p. 152). Meaning is tied to an event in which the self 
takes part. Our self is not “still” enough to capture it exactly. To attempt to eke out a 
process by which the brain makes meaning is to miss the nature of the self. Meaning is 
embodied and embedded. 
Thus here we have a grammar of the decentered self. It is multiple, embodied, and 
temporal.  It is active in that the self is only understood in a space of praxis. One could 
also call this connecting word and deed. Within this understanding of self, it is important 
to understand texture as opposed to context. With this language we move to summarize 
the approach taken 
 
Summary of Active Relationships in Interpersonal Communication 
So what is the implication of this approach to interpersonal communication? 
Embeddedness indicates the self is found in action, and is not stable; nevertheless, there 
is sufficient knowledge for meaning. In other words, there is no foundational subject with 
firm definitions of truth, but there is a decentered subject found moving about in a 
“hermeneutical play of perspectival descriptions of the life of discourse and action” 
(Schrag, 1986, p. 214). There is no meaning without tying it to action.  
 Subjectivity exists much as an electron does in the atom. Electrons exist in a 
constant state of flux, but despite this constant movement, they maintain a consistent 
orbit around the nucleus as determined by their energy state. These orbits are called 
valences. A scientist can know in what valence an electron can be found but can never 
know the exact location. This theorem, known as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, 
applies to the decentered self, always in flux but situated such that it is possible to 
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communicate a “valence” of ethics from which one’s life is meaningful. Thus, an 
understanding of such a mainstay of the subject as motive should be thought of less in 
terms of definition and more in terms of valence when understood in terms of active 
communication.  
Active communication stands in contrast to the idea of communication as a tool. 
Instead of viewing communication as a disembodied technique used to achieve goals, 
communication is understood as embodied and inseparable from the person and situation. 
Communication cannot maintain the neutrality that allows for generalized guidance. 
Thus, the pitfalls of technification, namely the inability to incorporate texture and 
relevance can be avoided by looking at communication under the metaphor of 
embodiment.  
Active communication avoids the dichotomy of egoism and altruism as the 
either/or motives of human relationships. While situations do exist where my own well-
being clashes with others, this is only one case out of many where incompatibility must 
be resolved. It is possible to understand a relationship in such a way that motive is not a 
dichotomy between self-interest and benevolence but one of a desire to live a certain way 
according to an ethic (MacIntyre, “Cambridge”). As MacIntyre notes:  
If I want to lead a certain kind of life, with relationships of trust, friendship, and 
cooperation with others, then my wanting their good and my wanting my good are 
not two independent, discriminating desires. It is not even that I have two separate 
motives, self-interest and benevolence, for doing the same action. I have one 
motive, a desire to live in a certain way, which cannot be characterized as a desire 
for my good rather than that of others. (p. 466).  
There is no real need to distinguish self-interest from other-interest. The need is to 
distinguish between different narratives for “living a certain way.” The good of self and 
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others is all wrapped up in the idea of the good as established in a narrated ethic. To parse 
out other-interest from self-interest is a left over conception from Descartes and Hobbes.  
To provide an example, consider love in the realm of romantic relationships. It is 
conceivable that love could be viewed in a couple of different ways. When considering 
love as a feeling that one desires to meet self-interests, the interests of one’s significant 
other are navigated in order to get one’s self-interests met, in this case the need for love 
(namely emotional in nature). Another way of framing love accepts that other-centered 
and self-centered motivations congeal into a desire to live life, and ideally to live life 
well. Love is neither about self nor other but maintaining a certain relationship, found in 
a valence of ethical practices (e.g., acknowledgment, forgiveness, humility)  In order to 
find ground upon which to reinvigorate communication ethics in relationships, it is 
necessary to embed personal action in a narrative other than self-interest. To do this, one 
must escape the Enlightenment mentality of an altruist/egoist dichotomy all together. 
After centuries of scholars attempting to navigate these two constructs, attempting to find 
ways to balance them or negate one or the other, it seems no matter how it plays out, the 
explanation misses something. It takes too mechanistic an approach to human motives—
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Egoism and altruism, or self-interest and 
other-interest are two interconnected desires that cannot be isolated without sacrificing 
some element of human relationality. There is a “between” providing “space” for both to 
occur simultaneously under the motivation of “ethical action.”  
Active communication also contrasts with the idea of communication as a process 
which would identify stages of growth through which, generally, humans pass in order to 
achieve intimacy (e.g., Knapp, 1999). Process is a matter of defining categories, an effort 
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to discover the order in which humans use particular types of communication and is 
depicted as ethically neutral. For example, whether or not a relationship should be 
declining or escalating is not of interest in establishing process; this effort is merely to 
describe phenomena. Thus, you have Baxter and Montgomery (1996) suggesting a non-
teleological dialectic approach to communication. Process, while helpful as a starting 
point, still stands as a descriptive endeavor if it is not couched in an ethic. Action, in 
contrast, is a matter of identifying valence, an effort to identify fuzzy boundaries within 
which a given relationship can be considered healthy. One cannot separate ethics from 
communication, in an active paradigm. There are good and ill effects that are seen based 
on given actions. For example, a declining relationship is not a neutral state of affairs. To 
identify it as “stagnating” (Knapp, 1999) is only helpful to the extent that this is 
determined ethically. An active paradigm would note the “stage” of a relationship only if 
it cannot be textured by ethical actions so as to assign meaning to actions. A good 
question for determining valence is is this action good or not? “Valence” indicates this 
healthy or unhealthy active state. Is the relationship generally moving in positive 
directions or not?  
The epistemological question obviously looms in this perspective. How does 
someone determine “health”? What determines what is good and ill is in fact some sort of 
overarching “third” such as a communal/relational perspective, narrative, and/or ethic. As 
Schrag (1997) states, “Community is constitutive of selfhood. It fleshes out the portrait of 
the self by engendering a shift of focus from the self as present to itself to the self as 
present to, for, and with the other” (p. 78). In active communication, there is a self 
embodying a given word connected to a deed. This connection means there is an 
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investment in a relationship (or in the community on an organizational level) that 
determines what is ethical. In the act of being to, for, and with the other, ethical conduct 
is determined. Relationships are formed. Life is lived. This is the level on which debate 
needs to be conducted in interpersonal communication—the ethical implications of 
action. This takes place within a narrative. Thus, active communication is dependent on 
the presuppositions of a narrative of faith. We believe in a set of standards that guide our 
actions and our relationships in healthy and unhealthy ways as determined in action. 
Rhetorical debate needs then to take place on the level of narrated ethics, not describing 
satisfaction-inducing processes. 
To determine this health responsibly, active communication is dependent on a 
presupposition of humility. Society can witness an action, evaluate it in light of the 
narrative, and determine whether this falls within the boundaries of ethical conduct as 
interpreted by individuals. Word/deed complexes are seen in their narrative contexts and 
interpreted within a valence as beneficial or negative. However, because humans are so 
vested with differences in interpretive standpoints, this negotiation of valence requires a 
great deal of humility in interpretation and flexibility in understanding. One needs to be 
able to say, “I could be wrong,” simultaneously couching such humility in an orientation 
towards the other.  
One final determinant of responsible assessment of healthy relationships is the 
requirement that active communication presuppose respect for all human beings. While 
one might not agree with someone’s beliefs or actions, one can still respect someone’s 
being. When this breaks down, the potential for interpersonal relationship breaks down 
with it.  
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Thus, the active communication paradigm contrasts with the modernist paradigm. 
This sets the groundwork to understand the self in a new way beyond the narrative of 
individualism and self-interest that currently guides the field of interpersonal 
communication. In the next chapter we will explore how understanding the self through 
active communication vis-à-vis the decentered self and a humble interpretation of a 
narrative of faith (see Arnett & Arneson, 1999) allows the debate to shift from one of 
motive to one of ethics. These two factors establish ground from which to discuss ethics 
without prescriptive pretense. Thus, the section addresses the narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment as an alternative to the narrative of individualism. 
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Chapter 5 
A Narrative of Charitable Acknowledgment 
 What is a narrative of charitable acknowledgment and how does it help us 
understand interpersonal communication? This chapter attempts to answer this question. 
By framing intimate interpersonal communication in terms of the narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment, an example is provided for navigating healthy expressions of “love” 
and “trust”—two dynamics foundational to intimacy. The word “narrative” indicates that 
charitable acknowledgement is imbued with what Bakhtin (1981) would call 
“polyphonic” meanings. There are not simple one-to-one causal correlations that describe 
life. Creation, understanding, and guidance are intertwined. As Bochner (2002) states, 
“Narrative is our means of recollecting the meanings of past experiences, turning life into 
language, and disclosing to us the truth in our experiences” (p. 87). The goal is a “moral 
one of enlarging and deepening the sense of human community; building better, more 
satisfying relationships; and learning how to converse with people who are different from 
us” (Bochner, 2002, p. 75). This philosophical approach to personal narratives carries 
over into the broader scope conceived of here. In conjunction with Arnett and Arneson’s 
(1999) movement towards a narrative of dialogic civility to assist in public interactions, 
this narrative is an attempt to look for basic guidelines to assist interaction in a private 
ethos or dwelling place. 
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Certainly, the field has touched on ideas presented here in other ways [e.g., 
Burleson’s (1990) comforting skills; Baxter’s (1996) dialogue]. However, the difference 
lies in ethic over technique. While perhaps it is possible to create a means of 
measurement of the effects of such a narrative, the thrust here is to describe the dynamic 
implications of its ontological and ethical guiding factors. Hyde (2006), too, notes that 
while research on supportive communication would augment a study of acknowledgment, 
“What is revealed here about the phenomenon is thus directed toward certain of its 
essential (ontological) aspects whose existential robustness is too often left 
unacknowledged and thus unappreciated when the measurement of effects is given 
priority in the scientific study of the phenomenon” (p. 5). The focus then is on texturing 
the ethical implications of acknowledgment and the narrative framework of charitable 
acknowledgment that informs intimate relationships. It is to this robust texturing that we 
now turn. 
 The chapter begins with an explanation of acknowledgment as a way to avoid 
emotivism. First acknowledgment is defined as it relates to interpersonal communication, 
as an active, pluralistic ground for the ethics of trust and love in intimate relationships. 
Revealing the connection of acknowledgment to Schrag places interpersonal relationships 
in an active communication paradigm. This embodied and embedded approach to 
interpersonal communication avoids the main problems of the self/other dichotomy 
recognizing the multi-faceted motives for acknowledging others. Additionally, 
acknowledgment is pluralistic in that several narratives of faith can operate within its 
boundaries. While an exchange paradigm adopts a largely secular narrative with an 
emotivist ethic, acknowledgment has the capacity to envelop plural narratives of faith, 
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whether religious or secular. This pluralism provides broader contexts from which to 
discus ethical questions so pertinent to communication. Someone who frames 
communication in terms of acknowledgment is able to discuss spiritual questions, ethical 
consequences, and “healthy” relationships in ways the field currently finds difficult 
without resorting to emotivism.  
 The second section discusses how charitable acknowledgment as a lived, 
embodied narrative can foster healthy interpersonal communication in romantic intimate 
relationships. First a connection is made between charity and acknowledgment through a 
focus on rhetorical competence, the emphasis on connecting word to deed, and the 
importance of will and habit. Rather than approaching Augustine through a Platonic or 
Hobbsian hermeneutic, here acknowledgment serves as the hermeneutic. This approach 
opens up charity to a postmodern society on an axiological level. This level is explored in 
depth through interpretations of faith, hope, and charity in terms of a transversal rather 
than vertical or horizontal approach. Charity, understood transversally and applied 
specifically to intimate romantic relationships, is the enactment of unconditionality, 
sacrifice, and the forgiveness of errors. When intimate partners choose, particularly 
through marriage, to commit to love one another, charitable acknowledgment indicates 
this as an embodied ethic, enacted as their fractured will allows. Thus love takes the form 
of an ethic to be unconditionally committed, willing to sacrifice, and able to forgive. This 
approach to romantic relationships through charitable acknowledgment opens up ground 
for research and future discussion on the ethical implications of the narrative shift. 
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Acknowledgment in Interpersonal Communication 
Michael Hyde (2006), the main proponent of acknowledgment in the 
communication field, asks the question, “What would life be like if no one acknowledged 
your existence?” (p. 1). It is from this question that an ontology and ethic of 
acknowledgment is devised that can hold relevance for those being taught about 
interpersonal relationships. As Hyde (2006) states: 
The story I have to tell about the ontological and rhetorical workings of 
acknowledgment speaks of creation and hope. Acknowledgment is a moral act; it 
functions to transform space and time, to create openings wherein people can 
dwell, deliberate, and know together what is right, good, just, and truthful. 
Acknowledgment thereby grants people hope, the opportunity for a new 
beginning, a second chance, whereby they might improve their lot in life. (p. 7) 
In other words, one of the bedrocks of humanity is our need for others’ acknowledgment 
and consequently our need to provide it. Acknowledgment serves to attune our 
conscience to moral questions and opens space for hope—a correlate of trust. It is both 
creative in nature and ethically-oriented when enacted. When couched within a narrative 
of faith, acknowledgment becomes an alternative to the narrative of individualism 
suggested in social exchange theory. Thus, acknowledgment will be shown in its 
connection to an active understanding of communication, its connection to rhetorical 
competence, its ability to accept a plurality of narratives and as a philosophical 
perspective from which intimate constructs of trust and love can be understood in more 
robust ways. 
Acknowledgment as Active 
 Acknowledgment operates as a postmodern approach to communication in 
contrast to the modern approach of social exchange. As a result, it finds its texture from 
an active understanding of communication where words cannot be separated from the 
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person speaking them. As seen in Chapter 4, action is inseparable from the person and 
situation and is interpretive rather than descriptive. The thrust of this chapter indicates 
how acknowledgment is an active interpretive approach and thus serves well as a 
philosophical foundation for intimacy because it allows for a de-technified approach to 
trust and love. 
  It seems a connection exists between praxis and acknowledgment whereby 
Schrag’s (1986) decentered self in praxis serves as a provider of philosophical space for 
the ethical discourse of Hyde. One way to see this connection is through their depictions 
of “consciousness.” Schrag is maneuvering through the intellectual gauntlet of Derridian 
deconstruction and Foucaultian “death of self” to find space for subjectivity. 
Communicative praxis provides this space. Consciousness is decentered within this 
understanding of communication, “repostured as ‘dialogical consciousness’” (p. 169). 
Consciousness is “reducible neither to the textuality of discourse nor to the tissues of 
human action” (p.171). Rather, there is an “event of praxis, at once discursive and 
actional,” the confluence of which composes the subject. Simply, consciousness is 
viewed in terms of communicative praxis. The subject under this interpretive scheme is a 
saying/doing person—tied to the connections of word and deed—able to build arguments 
and make ethical claims, albeit those claims are temporal, multiple, and embodied. Thus 
consciousness rooted in communicative action is “for and toward” (p. 179) someone, not 
just to someone. In other words, it is not neutral or static, but active and bearing ethical 
consequence.  
 This move opens space to discuss acknowledgment as the way we ought to be 
“for and toward” someone within relational situations. Hyde discusses this as the 
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“attunement of consciousness,” and he brings forward the active nature of 
acknowledgment as an ethical orientation and impetus. Hyde (2006) describes 
consciousness as: 
…not primarily a cognitive and theoretical operation geared to knowing what 
something is. Rather, the intentional structure of consciousness…shows itself first 
and foremost as a pre-cognitive relatedness to a world of existential concerns (for 
example, being able to fix breakfast without giving it much thought). Here 
consciousness works to attune us emotionally to our environment whereby we can 
learn and demonstrate a competence of knowing how to deal with the immediacy 
of our everyday, goal-directed activities. (p. 37)  
This is communicative praxis at work. We are connecting word and deed in such ways 
that we see what competence is in a given situation.  
  The tie to an active orientation towards communication is seen most clearly in the 
distinction between seeing and observing. As Hyde (2006) states, “Consciousness is what 
first attunes us to our surroundings so that they can be both seen and observed with care. 
The attunement of consciousness grows as seeing something evolves into observing what 
this something truly is” (p. 34). Hyde uses the example of Sherlock Holmes. The 
detective’s famed ability to observe the depth of a given situation is contrasted with 
Watson’s rather surface appraisals that see but do not observe. Similarly in an 
interpersonal example, a wife in an argument may see her husband clam up in 
acquiescence in a conversation, which makes her even more frustrated with him; 
however, she does not observe his discomfort with her disdainful attitude toward him that 
caused that reaction. Interpersonal communication is rife with examples of such 
observation challenges. Thus, the “attunement of consciousness” serves as a state of 
readiness, where perceptions are judged and regarded, not merely processed and glossed.  
However, it is important to recognize, this should not be made into a technique. 
There is more to attunement than simply opening up oneself to let in more data so that 
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one can make a proper interpretation. It is awareness, within the perceptual filters that 
make up one’s interpretive frameworks, that allows creative approaches to thinking. It is 
a perpetual “interruption” (Hyde, 2006) that “shakes a world” (p. 43) and thus holds a 
deconstructive ability. “The call of Being demands courage from those who remain open 
to it and, in doing so, stand ready to acknowledge how their ways of thinking and acting 
may not be as authentic and respectful as they could possibly be” (p. 51). Authenticity 
and respect hold important places within this observation. In phenomenological terms, it 
is to see what really is, to the degree that is possible from a standpoint of multiplicity and 
temporality.  
To use an example, look to the classroom. Here, it is important for a professor to 
depict given interpersonal communication phenomena in authentic and respectful ways. 
Interpersonal discussions on listening serve as excellent examples of this differentiation. 
Listening is of utmost importance in acknowledging another person, but all too often it is 
made into process, perhaps not in the text but in the way it is presented in class. For 
example, Julia Wood (2004a) describes attunement in listening as mindfulness whereby 
one “focuses on what is happening in the moment” (p. 114). She then discusses the other 
various stages: hearing, selecting, interpreting, responding, and remembering. Wood 
excels in depicting mindfulness as more than just a step in a process but as the guiding 
force in that process. In this sense it rises to the level of “attunement of consciousness” 
and a state of Being, which in light of her work on Buddhist mindfulness, seems to be a 
goal of her research (Wood, 2004b). Regardless of this intent however, it is easy for a 
student (and a teacher for that matter) to approach these stages like the stages of 
photosynthesis or the Krebs Cycle—just another descriptive process of a phenomenon in 
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life. Listening, however, directly relates to acknowledgment, which means it relates to 
questions concerning the second spiritual question, ethical conduct, and thus relational 
health. This is certainly of consequence beyond mere process! In fact, to view listening as 
a process, a duty, or even an exchangeable commodity is to strip it of its ability to 
acknowledge. This listening-without-love is to listen as a computer might: there may be a 
response that is helpful or even soothing but it does not rise to the level of 
acknowledgment.1 Thus, what must be understood by students is the “attunement of 
conscious” and “call of conscience” (discussed in the next section) that make this 
seemingly technical process “real.” To listen is not merely to follow a number of steps 
but rather a state whereby someone cares—compelled by conscience as guided by a 
narrative—about what the other person is saying or who the other person is. The 
important question becomes: Do you truly care about that person sitting across from you? 
As Hyde (2006) puts it, “The other’s face, in all its nudity, vulnerability, and alterity is a 
most revealing and fitting work of art that speaks of the importance of accountability, 
responsibility, and justice” (p. 141). It is this mentality that must be captured before any 
other steps matter. One must find a way to consider the other before one can truly 
observe and acknowledge. 
In sum, we must strive to make communication phenomena “alive” in that they 
are active. Acknowledgment does this in its attunement to observation rather than seeing. 
But not only this, acknowledgment as an embodied phenomenon is also a function of 
motive and will. The above depiction of listening indicates more about will than it does 
about process. Observation is a matter of having the will to focus one’s attention for a 
                                                 
1 Hyde (2006) nuances this point noting the “two-edged nature” of a computer in human relationships. It 
can advance ethical behavior by opening lines of communication in ways previously impossible, and it can 
distance us as a “faceless self” (p. 225).  
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given moment of time away from other issues of concern and find it in one’s heart and 
mind to care for the other—a topic Augustine analyzes with great depth and insight 
through the lens of charity. This will be discussed in the latter half of the chapter. For 
Hyde, the importance of the will to act is recognized through his analysis of the “call to 
conscience” (Hyde, 2001). This call of conscience consists of the moral ontological 
evocations tied to human being. It is a “challenge-response” logic (p. 40). By this logic 
one is challenged by a given knowledge and then responds for the sake of significance. 
The call of conscience:  
…confronts us with the question of what it means to be. When hearing this call, 
we are concerned with the truth of our temporal existence and with the decisive 
challenge that comes with it—trying to determine how to live out this truth in 
some meaningfully significant way. (Hyde, 2001, p. 25) 
In other words, acknowledgement is a life-giving that strikes at the heart of our existence. 
We need others and they need us in order for significance to be achieved. The 
fundamental question in any given relational moment concerns whether or not we heed 
that call and notice—acknowledge—another person. It is attuning one’s consciousness to 
the call of conscience. This is a function that for Hyde is centered in rhetoric. 
Acknowledgment as Rhetorical 
The basics of acknowledgment are addressed in terms of rhetorical competence. 
While acknowledgment uses appropriateness as the most general criteria for 
consideration, it is predicated on ethical criteria of what is “good” for that person in 
ultimate hopes of providing satisfaction to a given need. Thus the rhetoric of 
acknowledgment has multiple criteria being used. Attribution theory and rhetorical theory 
are both important bases of knowledge for these criteria.  Hyde (2006) emphasizes 
rhetoric:  
 142 
   
The goal of rhetoric is the appropriate production of a dwelling place where sound 
judgment can be fostered in and through collaborative deliberation. Rhetorical 
competence enables human beings to advance nature’s law of the survival of the 
fittest in the sense that it reinforces the value of supporting those who are ethically 
best. (p. 143). 
Without an understanding of appropriateness, Hyde (2006) notes that the loving parent 
becomes a smothering parent and the excellent teacher becomes a kooky entertainer (p. 
143). These are very different situations that no one theory could cover in its specifics. 
This is why through history, rhetoric has been important to the liberal arts and the 
academy, because it enables rich analysis within a variety of situations (see Herrick, 
2005).  
 While rhetorical theory is too vast to be put into the space provided here, there is 
certainly a need to delimit the horizons of theory that apply to acknowledgment and 
interpersonal communication. What would a professor use in a classroom to help guide 
someone in his or her understanding of acknowledgment? These involve conceptions of 
self, accuracy in interpretation, and understanding humility. The first horizon concerns 
how subjectivity, as depicted throughout the history of rhetorical theory, allows 
perspective beyond emotivism. One must gain ground for ethical discussion before one 
can discuss the differences in ethics. Using the theories depicted in the second chapter, 
one might begin to explicate such historical ground. While such depth is not a necessity, 
especially in an introductory course, it is important to recognize that the Ancient Greek 
viewpoint of a person is significantly different than that of a Rousseau, Hobbes, Dawkins, 
or Derrida. Two frameworks can then be presented for analysis of the subject: the one of 
an exchange mentality or one of an acknowledgment mentality. The subject of charitable 
acknowledgment takes form as it is in chapter four: decentered (and thus unpredictable), 
temporal (and thus embedded in a time and place), and multiple (thus with a variety of 
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motives for action). The subject of exchange emerges as centered (and thus predictable), 
discrete (and thus extractable from circumstances such as time and place), and singularly 
devoted to self-interest (thus with one motive).  
A second horizon within which to find appropriate actions of acknowledgment 
would involve appropriate interpretation. Attribution theory greatly aids this process. In 
attribution theory, the works of Heider (1958), Kelley (1967), and Jones & Davis (1965) 
provide a number of important terms for helping to determine why a given action 
occurred. The primary dynamic is “locus” (Heider, 1958) which concerns whether the 
behavior is caused by the self or by the environment/other. An internal attribution means 
you put the locus on the individual and an external attribution puts the locus on the 
situation. Using this primary dynamic, there are several other factors that impact whether 
you attribute internally or externally such as responsibility (Heider, 1958; is the behavior 
controllable?), level of intention (Jones & Davis, 1965; did she mean to do it?), 
distinctiveness (Kelley, 1967; is there a clear situational difference), consistency (Kelley, 
1967; is there a pattern of behavior over time?), and consensus (Kelley, 1967; did others 
have similar patterns occur?). This vocabulary gives people a means for interpretation of 
a given situation. Appropriateness comes with training in one’s attributive biases (see 
Trenholm & Jensen, 2004). The fundamental attributive bias indicates the tendency to 
attribute locus internally for strangers and attribute locus externally for those with whom 
we are familiar. The ultimate attribution bias indicates the tendency to make positive 
attributions based on familiarity and negative ones for strangers. The actor/observer bias 
is when we attribute locus internally for others but when the observer is involved the 
locus is attributed externally. Finally, bias towards groups indicates that people in-groups 
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get external attribution for locus and out-group locus is placed internally. When these 
biases are acknowledged, it helps individuals to recognize the limitations of their 
perceptions and make more appropriate interpretations concerning why a given action 
happened. 
A third horizon, which perhaps is the most difficult to expound upon, is that of 
invention. What is appropriate, and more than that, good to say in a given situation? What 
will provide a life-giving gift to this person across from me? Invention is pivotal to this 
endeavor. To begin, one must have a healthy understanding of self and a thorough 
understanding of competent interpretation. This provides a background that the creative 
process of speaking can draw upon. It is also important that invention in interpersonal 
communication escape the realm of technification in order to communicate charitable 
acknowledgment without seeming trite or disingenuous. For example, when teaching 
invention in framing one’s comments to the bereaved at a funeral, it is helpful to bring 
forward examples of words that may be trite or insensitive and words that may be more 
comforting. However, the education given should never be disconnected from the 
acknowledgment such words confer upon the bereaved. Compassion must not be lost in 
the process of phraseology. Invention should rise above tact, so for the student they 
become imagined reality. This means that one who wishes to educate others in invention 
must become invested in the words, embodying them in the time and place of relevance, 
even to the point of acting out a given role, so that through the displacement, a student’s 
imagination may acknowledge the reality behind the words. Reality of acknowledgment 
is the key, then, to any inventive process in interpersonal communication whereby a 
narrative of charitable acknowledgment is the modus operandi. As Hyde summarizes, 
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“The ever-present issue of appropriateness, [means] discerning what is right and fitting to 
do and to say given the situation, the audience at hand, and one’s desire to reveal what is 
believed to be the truth of something in need of acknowledgment” (p. 74). Invention in 
this capacity is a matter of discernment in revealing believed truth.  
Invention is thus guided by community, guided by an understanding of self, and 
intended to acknowledge the community through word and deed. The diversity of 
communities who might incorporate acknowledgment is the subject of the next section. 
Acknowledgment as Pluralistic 
There is more to humans than the physical or psychological. Humans search for 
answers to three spiritual questions. These questions involve those areas of the human 
“spirit” that provide hope and meaning to life, with the first dealing with issues of where 
we come from, the second dealing with issues of what we should do while we are alive, 
and the third dealing with what happens to us after we die. Interpersonal communication 
is best suited to answering the second question which is the realm within which 
acknowledgment (and thus charitable acknowledgment) dwells.  
Acknowledgment allows people to bring in various narratives of faith to answer 
the first and third spiritual questions (e.g., atheism, Christianity, existentialism) while still 
offering a suggestion for the second question regarding ethical conduct. This placement 
allows for pluralism. Hyde (2006) notes, “’good’ science and ‘good’ deconstruction 
presuppose the presence and vitality of acknowledgment” (p. 10). He also notes how 
institutional religion, particularly in the West, adopts acknowledgment into their stories 
of “creation and hope” (p. 10). Beginnings of existence, whether with an utterance of 
“Let there be light” or a Big Bang, are important to Hyde in the sense that 
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“acknowledgment needs a place to happen” (p. 21), and whether scientific or theistic, the 
explanation gives the literal ground for action. In other words, acknowledgment does not 
necessitate a purely secular approach to relational phenomena.  
 So how does this tie in to charitable acknowledgment? The desire for the good life 
overarches both secular and religious narratives; living faith means embodying belief 
structures that lie at the heart of life’s meaning which entails a search for the good life. 
Regardless of narrative structure, we are conscious that something real, something good, 
something spiritual happens when we are acknowledged. We also believe that in the 
future there will be something real, something good, and something spiritual that happens 
when we approach life in a given way, namely through our defined narrative. Herein lies 
the teachable moment for those devoted to an ethic for interpersonal communication: 
acknowledgment is an attempt to express a phenomenological goodness in human life. 
Charitable acknowledgment serves as an example of a narrative expounding upon this 
goodness, specifically in intimate relationships. How to live vis-à-vis acknowledgment 
has the potential to appeal to both the existentialist and the Christian theologian. A 
narrative of charitable acknowledgment expresses this in active, tangible ways for 
someone who adopts the narrative.  
 This is not to say there is some universal at play here. Acknowledgment is never 
depicted as a universal by Hyde, and should not be understood in this way here; we are 
multiple and embodied, after all, and cannot gain this overarching perspective. Rather, 
acknowledgment speaks to a deep human need for engagement with others that makes 
life meaningful. It echoes Hyde’s (2006) citation of Levinas whereby ethics is first 
philosophy, not ontology (p. 131). One’s narrative of faith outlines the structures within 
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which that acknowledgment is understood, thus keeping it from individualism and 
emotivism. Simultaneously, fidelity to a narrative is established through that narrative’s 
ability to foster acknowledgment in its adherents. There is a dialogue between the 
narrative of faith and its ability to foster acknowledgement.  
One could argue there is a circular argument at work here between the knowing of 
faith and the knowing of deed. If a narrative of faith is defined by good deeds, and good 
deeds are predicated on faith, is not the means of knowing indefinable and nebulous? 
Indeed, there is a difficulty here encountered when using a deductive approach. However, 
at work in the fabric of language is a similar structure that makes problematic any 
meaning when using deduction as the formal structure for truth. Derrida points this out in 
the “infinite play” that forever defers meaning. Deconstruction simply undoes the 
meaning of any foundational structure by showing the différance within a given word. 
Thus, all argument becomes circular on a linguistic level. This is why action is so 
important to the structures of faith, and argument by analogy/metaphor becomes more 
important than deduction. Only in action does a word maintain meaning. The real tree 
makes the symbol “tree” tangible to the other person to whom the word is expressed. 
Shared meaning of the tangible reality makes language effective. Our comparisons 
comprise our realities. Faith expresses that comparison of tangible reality in answer to the 
spiritual questions in our life. When understood through communicative praxis, these 
tangible and thus active understandings hold an aura of instability, as seen in the previous 
chapter. Hyde (2006) adds, “Human being thus shows itself as an opening wherein a 
primordial and on-going ‘struggle’ takes place between order (construction) and disorder 
(deconstruction)” (p. 49). Within these active structures, there is no foundation, per se, 
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whereby we have found that presupposition or tenet of faith that is beyond argument. 
Rather, there is texture—texture that explains reasonably and, to the extent that our 
decentered self allows, accurately those phenomena encountered whereby these 
phenomena are believable and enact-able in healthy ways for society. This is 
acknowledgment’s gift to interpersonal communication. It gives ground for inclusion of 
spiritual questions within plural narratives of faith which provides ground for 
reinterpretations of intimacy. 
Intimacy’s Ground 
  Acknowledgment provides textural background for understanding intimacy 
through an understanding of the face of the other. Hyde notes (2006): 
The other’s face, in all its nudity, vulnerability, and alterity is a most revealing 
and fitting work of art that speaks of the importance of accountability, 
responsibility and justice. The discourse at work here commends a habit of 
thinking and acting that keeps us open to differences of opinion and lifestyles, 
invites collaborative and moral deliberation, and evokes in others a sense of 
wonder and awe for the matter at hand. (p. 141).  
What acknowledgement does in its plural approach is provide an understanding of the 
subject with whom we are intimate and invite further moral deliberation to discover those 
“good habits of thinking and acting.”  
First let us discuss the face of the other. Schrag (1986) pulls subjectivity out of the 
morass of deconstruction through communicative praxis where the decentered self is able 
to find ethical truths. I believe Hyde, relying on Levinas, describes the “face” of this 
decentered self. Rather than understanding face as synonymous with ethos, Levinas 
describes it phenomenologically as “an ‘epiphany’ that reveals the ‘vulnerability’ of the 
human body” (Hyde, 2006, p. 128).  When given our consideration, the face truly is awe-
inspiring. This is an individual person with feelings and intellect, hopes and dreams, 
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ethical triumphs and failures, happiness and sorrow, and a remarkable potentiality. In 
short, the “face” is the place of human alterity where “human being” is captured. 
“Epiphany” captures this understanding. However, what Hyde finds most important in 
Levinas is the idea that the face indicates our fundamental equipment for 
acknowledgment beyond exchange. As Hyde (2006) states: 
The social workings of community are made possible by an altruistic and thus 
moral impulse that lies at the heart of human being. Human existence is structured 
in a way that has the self move toward the other before the self can even raise the 
related issues of reciprocity and moral responsibility. (p. 131).  
Thus, Hyde is able to make a phenomenological case that we are fundamentally capable 
of going beyond self-interest in our ontology. At the core of our being is an impulse 
toward morality that functions to foster relationships.2 That impulse makes possible 
other-centered motives. The vulnerability of the other is our own vulnerability. We are 
interrupted in our own vulnerability by encounters with these others. As Hyde (2006) 
states, “With the presence and saying of the face there comes a call—‘Where art 
thou?”—in need of a response: ‘Here I am!’” (p. 131).  When continued unto the point of 
family, friendship, and romance, this is what we call intimacy.  
Such an approach opens the way for understanding intimacy beyond a social 
exchange mentality. We can have multiple, coinciding motives more complex than self-
interest that contain a “moral impulse” to answer a call of the other. But in what ways 
does one approach the “vulnerability” of the other in an intimate relationship such that it 
produces healthy relationships? This is where moral deliberation is needed. Hyde, 
perhaps because of the plurality with which he engages acknowledgment, does not 
                                                 
2 Augustine makes similar moves; we are moral beings in the sense that God is goodness and we are made 
in the image of God. We cannot know vertical absolutes but transversally (a concept discussed in the next 
section) we can assess goodness through faith and action. 
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develop an argument beyond appropriateness for intimate communication. This is 
appropriate considering Hyde’s (2006) concern with establishing acknowledgment as a 
“more receptive and morally attuned state of consciousness” (p. 284), not with the 
specific applications this might take in intimacy. In implying that we practice “positive” 
acknowledgment (p. 2), he is establishing space for moral discussion. In fact, it leaves 
open texturing for a number of narratives of faith, all looking to the applications of word 
and deed to exemplify their claims. It is here in this space for texture that I believe charity 
can add to our further understanding of intimate interpersonal communication within 
relationships. 
Summary 
Schrag moves us intellectually into a space for subjectivity. Hyde further moves 
us into a space for interpersonal ethics. This is done in both cases in communicative 
praxis—an active, embodied approach to communication. Acknowledgment is not a 
prescriptive system because the ethical impulses upon which it is founded are active and 
decentered: “A moral system’s call of conscience is action-oriented: even when it tells us 
not to do something, it still is telling us not to do something” (Hyde, 2001, p. 40). This 
active ought is thus tempered by our temporality and multiplicity as humans. Through an 
understanding of transversality (described in the next chapter) and narratives of faith as 
embodied, acknowledgment is interpreted rather than prescribed. This embodied 
understanding of life also avoids mere description because life is enacted. There is not 
neutrality to acknowledgment. It is vested. It requires vulnerability and real consideration 
of the other. This leaves room to put forward an ethic without requiring universality. 
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Thus the plurality of acknowledgment lays ground for a deeper understanding of human 
relationships. 
 
Charitable Acknowledgment in Intimate Relationships 
Charitable acknowledgment operates as a narrative for intimate interpersonal 
communication. But what is the distinction between acknowledgment and charitable 
acknowledgment? Think of the comparison as an analogy: Within intimate interpersonal 
communication, social exchange theory is to the narrative of individualism as 
acknowledgment is to the narrative of charitable acknowledgment. It is the philosophical 
entrance into the narrative—the hermeneutic from which one enters. The narrative serves 
as the lived story for action. Elsewhere, we have gone into depth on the different facets of 
the interpretive approaches that texture each theory (See Table 1).  
 
Social Exchange Acknowledgment
Modern Postmodern 
Self-interested Self and Other-interested 
Altruism problematic (or non-existent) Capable of altruism 
Static Active 
Context independent Context dependent 
Primarily descriptive Primarily interpretive 
Criteria of satisfaction Criteria of ethics and appropriateness  
Secular Plural 
 
Table 1. A comparison of social exchange and acknowledgment 
 
We see differences in approach based on modern or postmodern understandings. 
Acknowledgment has the capacity to find motives beyond self-interest, incorporating 
altruism as an important element. It is active, contextual, and primarily dependent upon 
interpretive methods. The criteria used (Spitzberg & Cupach, 2002) through the 
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philosophical approach of acknowledgment is one of ethics and appropriateness rather 
than satisfaction. Finally, whereas social exchange takes a secular approach, 
acknowledgment can incorporate plural narrative structures. 
Narrative structures are important to the lived experience of relationships. As 
Bochner (2002) states, “The narratives we create, discover, and apply help us maintain a 
sense of coherence and continuity over the course of our lives” (p. 74). Arnett and 
Arneson (1999) acknowledge this in a public sphere. The two narratives described here—
certainly there could be others—are specific to intimate romantic relationships. Roughly, 
these translate into a narrative of individualism and a narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment. Narratives are interpretive because they are tied to people symbolically 
and ethically. They are believed and thus enacted. It is argued here that charity, when 
engaged from an experiential (i.e., axiological) hermeneutic provided by 
acknowledgment rather than an ontological hermeneutic (i.e., viz-a-viz Hyde or Plato) 
can provide guidance for the ethical conduction of intimate romantic relationships. 
“Individualism” serves here as a specialized term regarding as the way social exchange is 
lived within romantic relationships.  
As we have seen, a narrative of individualism in romantic relationships fosters an 
ethic of emotivism. Someone adopting this “narrative” looks at the relationship in terms 
of how to achieve emotional fulfillment and satisfaction through interaction with his or 
her partner. As depicted in Chapter 3, the main tenets of interpersonal theory engage 
relationships through this lived lens. Trust is treated as a tool to gain compliance and 
ultimately satisfaction. Reciprocation is important to the functioning of intimacy because, 
as gaming theory (Foa & Foa, 1974) indicates, there are implicit agreements for conduct 
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a couple creates so that everyone achieves a net gain from relational interactions. Goals 
and strategies to achieve those goals serve as the practical ways one can achieve 
happiness within a relationship (e.g., marriage is a contract of fidelity to achieve 
individual happiness). Intimacy then translates as the closeness that comes as a result of a 
couple’s agreement on these strategies, goals, and how they satisfy them together. To 
improve a relationship one must be willing to meet the needs (self-interests) of one’s 
partner while explaining your own needs; communication is the conduit by which this 
takes place (Bagarozzi, 2001). Couples come together to achieve happiness in greater 
ways then they could alone. Because of emotivism, there is a danger that people might 
find other sources for emotional fulfillment but to the extent that a couple is willing to 
reciprocate and is continuing to have a net gain in satisfaction levels, they will stay 
together. There is sufficient verification of this narrative statistically in social exchange, 
goal-orientations, and intimacy skills (see Chapter 3) to make the claim for its existence. 
Narrative of Individualism Narrative of Charitable Acknowledgment
Emotivist Unconditional love 
Self-interested (me vis-à-vis you) Relationally-oriented (us) 
Reciprocation necessary Reciprocation unexpected 
Love-as-emotion Love-as-ethic 
Intimacy as commodity for happiness Intimacy as state of happiness 
Commodification Acknowledgment 
 
Table 2. A comparison of a Narrative of Individualism with a Narrative of 
Charitable Acknowledgment 
 
Here an alternative is offered to this narrative. A narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment, based on the work of Hyde, Schrag, and Augustine, relies on the ethics 
of charity to guide intimate relationships. This provides contrast (see Table 2) with a 
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narrative of individualism. First the ties of charity to acknowledgment will be discussed 
to tether these together on grounds of rhetorical competence, active orientation, and will. 
From this axiological ground, charitable acknowledgment is guided by a 
transversal interpretation of the “good and just.” With the idea of transversality 
established, this goodness and justness in relationships is explored in terms of 
unconditionality, sacrifice, humility, and forgiveness. Finally, love and trust are 
reinterpreted in this narrative away from mere sentiment or tool into an ethical state of 
being required for intimacy. 
Ties to Acknowledgment 
 What binds Augustine and Hyde together intellectually? Augustine is a 4th century 
bishop from Hippo. Hyde is a 21st century rhetoric scholar at Wake Forest University in 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Yet these two have significant areas of intellectual 
overlap, such that when charity is approached from the hermeneutic of acknowledgment 
a narrative emerges that can inform healthy relationships. This overlap can be witnessed 
in their approaches to rhetorical competence, active communication, and will. 
Rhetorical competence. Hyde (2006) uses rhetoric extensively in explanation of 
acknowledgment because it builds a “dwelling place where sound judgment can be 
fostered in and through collaborative deliberation” (p 143). Augustine is arguing for a 
similar “dwelling place” between two extremes of interpretation. First we see Augustine, 
depicting words as symbolic and interpretive, not as fixed objectively used tools. He 
notes, “Conventional signs are those which living creatures show to one another for the 
purpose of conveying, in so far as they able, the motion of their spirits or something 
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which they have sensed or understood” (OCD 2.2.3). These signs can be interpreted in 
various ways:  
Many varied obscurities and ambiguities deceive those who read casually, 
understanding one thing instead of another; indeed, in certain places they do not 
find anything to interpret erroneously, so obscurely are certain sayings covered 
with a most dense mist. I do not doubt that this situation was provided by God to 
conquer pride by work and to combat disdain in our minds, to which those things 
which are easily discovered may seem frequently to become worthless. (OCD 
2.6.7) 
Thus, words are ambiguous, complex, and symbolic. In interpersonal communication, the 
association of worth with complexity is an interesting one since love is one of the most 
complex concepts to understand. Indeed, interpretations of love in intimacy take on a 
mysterious aura, in part because of its complexity (with the remainder coming as a result 
of the different faces of its enactment).   
As a result of this understanding, Augustine develops a two-sided approach to 
competent interpretation of texts (Conf.12.14.17), in his case Biblical scripture, that aids 
in relational interpretations. On one hand there are enemies of the “wondrous depth” of 
the words of scripture. These are revisionists, people who in today’s society might be 
considered “deconstructionists” or “critics,” who allow the flexibility of language to 
undermine the active intent. While rhetoric is indeed symbolic and thus, deconstructable, 
reality and enactment provide solidity whereby ethics can be examined and held in 
community. Thus Augustine considers revisionists faithless because of their lack of 
acknowledgment of the intent of text. On the other hand there is a critique of “praisers” 
of scripture who decry interpretations “different from that which we say” (Conf. 
12.14.17). These, who today would be called fundamentalists, do not recognize their own 
limitations and the limitations of language. As Augustine notes, “For what could God 
have more generously and abundantly provided in the divine writings than that the same 
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words might be understood in various ways which other not less divine witnesses 
approve” (OCD 3.27.39). Thus interpretation is a “double-edged sword” (Conf. 12.14.17) 
which requires one be faithful to a text while being open to multiple faithful 
interpretations (Troup, 1999). One should beware of attributing one case to an action 
where multiple causes may exist; similarly one should avoid drawing conclusions that are 
not faithful to the situation at large based solely one one’s own experiences.  
So what summarizes interpretation so that one might practice charitable 
acknowledgement? I believe the phrase “meet people on their own terms” helps to 
encapsulate the above guidelines. By anticipating what terms the other person intended, 
one is guided beyond personal perceptual filters to encounter the communicative intent of 
the other. It allows an interpreter to interpret accurately. This does not mean that someone 
necessarily agrees with the terms by which a person is approaching a given situation. 
However, it does serve as a starting point for charitable acknowledgment. When 
combined with attribution theory, this double-edged interpretive scheme serves well to 
help those in relationships better understand what really is the case as opposed to what is 
assumed to be the case. Thus one’s ability to acknowledge the other is aided by better 
understanding the perspective from which the other comes. This understanding certainly 
is not the only element towards making good and just decisions, but is a very important 
first step in establishing actions based on truth to the degree truth can be known.  Without 
rhetorical accuracy, there is little hope of reaching beyond self-interest. By finding what 
is accurate in a given situation, one can then proceed to the appropriate action. This is not 
merely a technique. Rather to truly meet someone on their own terms takes what is 
interpreted as appropriateness and unites it with ethical consideration to determine what 
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is truly the best way to acknowledge someone in an intimate relationship. Meeting people 
on their own terms is the beginning of charitable acknowledgment. It shows a willingness 
to really know another person for who they are. This knowledge is determined through an 
understanding of the connection of word and deed.   
 Active in Word and Deed. Augustine is aware of the instabilities of language as 
noted in Chapter 4, which makes it difficult to establish how we ethically can achieve 
healthy relationships. There must be some connection of reality and language to make 
meaning: “I name bodily health, when I am sound in body. The reality itself is present to 
me, but truly unless its image were also in my memory, I could in no wise recollect what 
the sound of this name should signify” (Conf. 10.15.23). We do not have truth beamed 
down to us in a pre-linguistic state; the mind is involved in translating this through 
memory and recollection. This is the process of interpretation which for Augustine is a 
condition of the human experience; even scripture is interpreted (OCD 3.27.39). This 
creates problems when it comes to finding truth upon which to act in intimate 
relationships. Language alone is not sufficient to ground truth for healthy relationships 
because words do not escape human multiplicity and temporality. Words are embodied in 
temporal, multiple subjects. Language also cannot exclusively be grounded in the 
physical reality around us; abstracts such as “happiness” are beyond the realms of mere 
logic or description. So how then can a “happy life” be recognized and understood? 
Augustine has an answer. Augustine notes the happy life is not understood the way one 
“remembers Carthage” for it is not “seen by the eyes since it is not a body” (Conf. 
10.21.31). Also it is not in the way one remembers speech for “even those who are not 
skilled speakers recall the thing itself when they hear the word” (Conf. 10.21.31). Instead 
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it is like the way we remember joy for “I never saw, or heard, or smelled, or tasted, or 
touched joy by a bodily sense. I have experienced it in my mind, when I have rejoiced, 
and knowledge of it has clung to my memory” (Conf. 10.21.31). There is a combination 
of memory of deed connected to memory of word. It is a conception of truth grounded in 
the connection of word to deed. The stability of language in such abstract/ethical 
concepts as happiness or, in the case of intimate communication, love is in the connection 
of word to deed. Love is a symbolic truth meeting a need for acknowledgment. We 
experience it in actions and cling to it in memory. Does this mean then that emotion is the 
foundation for knowing? Such an answer is too simplistic in an active paradigm. In 
communicative praxis, our actions, ethics, will, motives and habits come together to form 
interpretations. For example, Augustine “knows” God, but through a glass, darkly (Conf. 
12.13.16). He experiences Him in actions, interprets Him in a narrative, is guided by Him 
in ethical conduction, and feels joy as a result of His actions. Knowing is not purely 
deductive; it is not purely subjective; it is not purely emotivist. Knowledge is fuzzy, yet 
obtainable in praxis. Yet while emotion may be a component in knowledge, the ethical 
place it should hold in action for intimate relationships is a different subject for 
consideration (see next section). In same way “health” is an abstract concept we 
experience and define simultaneously, so too is love experienced and defined 
simultaneously. In this temporal realm, abstracts are given meaning by connecting word 
with deed in memory.  
 Thus, connecting word and deed must serve as the cornerstone of a narrative of 
charitable acknowledgment. Without this connection, there is little that can be known of 
those elements of the human spirit that are comprised from our narratives of faith. There 
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is a standard then that emerges from this perspective: mistruths must be avoided. “Every 
lie must be called a sin…Words were surely instituted not so that people could deceive 
each other with them, but so that each person could make his thoughts known to another” 
(Ench. 7.22). In a postmodern society, the argument against lying should not be 
approached on a purely prescriptive level; ordering this as a commandment (although it 
can be approached from this perspective) would seem to revert to a premodern mindset 
where absolute truths can be known absolutely. Similarly, this is not just a description of 
the state of affairs of language; there is vested decision to be made concerning the ethical 
consequences of one’s action that cannot be made into a technique. Approaching mistruth 
interpretively requires an embodied understanding of the effects of such actions. But does 
Augustine share this approach? I argue that based on his philosophy/theology on 
memory, the case could be made that Augustine sees lying as a word/deed violation that 
rents asunder the connection of memory to word and memory to deed for the person to 
whom the liar is talking. This hampers the ability to foster any relationship especially 
intimate ones. In this sense, Augustine enters a debate on lying from a position of 
phenomenological linguistic reality. There is no ability to understand reality in a 
relationship when there is a disconnect of word from deed. Words are made to “make 
thoughts known” and charity is the central purpose of these thoughts. Thus fidelity in 
language is of utmost importance in interpersonal relationships. This conception of 
communication overlaps with Hyde’s acknowledgment in this phenomenological 
realization of the importance of enacting truth, not just speaking it. If Augustine is 
viewed as Platonic, this line of reasoning will not make sense. Augustine will be viewed 
as founding words on some abstract, transcendent Word and a prescriptive authoritative 
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stance is adopted. If Augustine is viewed vis-à-vis Hobbes, humans are seen as corrupt 
with truth being so chimerical that we must look to the afterlife for hope. However, by 
understanding Augustine through a different interpretive lens, that of acknowledgment, a 
side more applicable for intimate interpersonal communication emerges. The word is 
founded on the Word (Troup, 1999) understood as an embodied, temporal, and multiple 
engagement of the world as based on a narrative of faith. Hope is found in temporality to 
the extent that charitable acknowledgment is embodied. To further demonstrate this 
embodiment, let us now turn to the importance of will and habit. 
Will & Habit. An enacted ethic drives charitable acknowledgment beyond 
individual emotion. This active ethic directs itself at times internally, fighting with one’s 
will. At times, it is directed externally, for another person’s sake. But it always will be 
seen most clearly in action towards another person. In the narrative of individualism, 
intimacy is driven by satisfaction commonly expressed in emotional “love,” i.e. “passion” 
(Sternberg, 1986). Augustine’s approach to human will draws an alternative explanation 
away from this purely self-interested motive. However, it also avoids the opposite 
extreme demanding pure self-sacrifice. Because actions are embodied in a temporal and 
multiple subject (see Chapter 2), this is impossible. As a result of this person’s fallibilities 
on one hand (we have problems controlling our will) and their physicality on the other 
(we require basic needs, acknowledgment, etc. to survive), people are incapable of pure 
self-sacrifice. Thus, for Augustine there are multiple motives for action; there is no pure 
dichotomy between self and other in this temporal space. We require acknowledgment 
and others require us to acknowledge them; acknowledgment has fuzzy motivational 
boundaries. So what is the nature of motive, will, and our call to action on behalf of 
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others? For Augustine, there is a “nexus of action” that when seen through the lens of 
Hyde’s acknowledgment becomes the horizon within which to define charitable 
acknowledgment. Augustine, presupposing the importance of acknowledging others, 
defines the important questions for how we should act within a nexus of will, habit, and 
charity.  
 Will is the intention to move in a given direction. Yet often people do what they 
willed not to do; this is an issue with which Augustine constantly struggles and this 
struggle defines the horizons of our ability to act: 
Yet I did not do that which I wanted to do with an incomparably greater desire, 
and could have done as soon as I willed to act, for immediately, when I made that 
act of will, I would have willed with efficacy. In such an act the power to act and 
the will itself are the same, and the very act of willing is actually to do the deed. 
Yet it was not done: it was easier for the body to obey the soul’s most feeble 
command, so that its member were moved at pleasure, than for the soul to obey 
itself and to accomplish its own high will wholly with in the will. Whence comes 
this monstrous state? (Conf. 8.8-9.20-21). 
What is being said here is that even if a person wants to perform a given action, he or she 
still may not do it because of the pursuit of self-interested pleasure—often taking the 
form of emotion. For Augustine, pleasure provides only limited encouragement to 
charitably acknowledge someone, because it so often is at odds with the will. 
Consideration of bodily pleasures is an encumbrance to the performance of acts that the 
soul understands to be both “good” and within the realm of possibility.  
Acknowledgment, then, is hampered by over-reliance on emotion, because this 
“feeling of goodness” can often be at odds with the goodness of acknowledging others. 
Someone prioritizing their own personal satisfaction in a narrative of individualism finds 
it difficult to see past this satisfaction in order to act on behalf of others; only those who 
can provide personal gain should be offered the hand of acknowledgment—the life-
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giving gift (Hyde, 2006). Intimate partners are seen as “primary providers” of a need. 
However, charitable acknowledgment does not operate whereby the subject views the 
other as a “provider of love” but rather sees this person simply as a “person to love.” This 
is an ethical orientation to relationships rather than a commodification of that 
relationship. The focus is on an ethic of me doing for you, not on the emotion that you 
can stir in me. Thus, it is of utmost importance, if one values acknowledgment as a 
“good,” that ethics, not passions, take a central place in the narrative. When an action is 
within the realm of possibility (meaning the other is present, and my body is capable) 
then the remaining factor is one of will to act. It is action that provides the true 
recognition of acknowledgment, not the emotion. When one is being observant and has 
the will to acknowledge, emotions must be restrained sometimes—a realization that runs 
counter to an emotivist society, where emotion is often pumped up rather than tamped 
down. 
Let us be clear: charity does not negate self-interests or emotion. That would be to 
substitute the error of pure self-interest for the error of pure other-interest. Charitable 
acknowledgment recognizes that someone “loves his body and wishes to have it safe and 
whole” (OCD 1.25.26). However, Augustine notes that “a man can love more than the 
health and soundness of his body” (OCD 1.25.26). There is the capacity existing to love 
beyond the self. Nonetheless, intimacy does not require complete self-sacrifice (although 
sacrifice is often called for) as such self-depravity is contrary to the natural order: “We 
ought not to blame our sins and defects on the nature of the flesh because this is to 
disparage the Creator. The flesh, in its own kind and order, is good” (COG 14.5). Rather, 
we are multiple in our motives. In temporality, life requires acknowledgment from others 
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for fulfillment (Hyde, 2006). Thus, it is also required that someone has the will to do 
something for someone, an act that may or may not entail receiving anything in return. 
There is a “call of the other” being given and one is asked to respond, regardless of 
whether reciprocation occurs. Sometimes enacting this ethic is easy and rewarding, and 
sometimes it is difficult and depressing. The important question is will a person do it as 
much as why a person does it. 
The will to action is much easier when good habits of acknowledgment are 
formed. Habits for Augustine are previous actions that have formed one’s physical and 
mental pre-cognitive likelihoods for future action. Augustine states, “For the law of sin is 
force of habit, whereby the mind is dragged along and held fast, even against its will, but 
still deservedly so, since it was by its will that it had slipped into the habit” (Conf., 
8.5.12). One’s own actions as a result of will create habits. These habits, good or bad, 
make actions contrary to them more difficult. Thus putting into practice principles of 
charitable acknowledgment will reinforce this action. 
So what are these principles? The specific elements of the ethic of charity are the 
final guides for this nexus of action composed of will, habit and ethic. For Augustine 
charity is not primarily a function of an emotional state, whereby one feels a given action 
would make them happy and so one does it (although emotion is often present). As 
Augustine states, “For the soul wishes to be and it loves to find rest in things that it loves. 
But in [the bodily senses] there is not a place where it may find rest, for they do not 
endure. They flee away, and who can follow them by fleshly sense?” (Conf. 4.10.15). 
Emotions are fleeting and a poor place to place standards of happiness. This is echoed by 
MacIntyre (1984) in his discussion of emotivism.  In an individualistic society, emotions, 
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as a physical manifestation of pleasure or pain, easily may be adopted as a guiding force, 
but they certainly do not “endure.” In contrast with emotivism, charitable 
acknowledgment is understood as the nexus of will, habit, and ethic (i.e., charity), 
through which one acts. The quality of that ethic is determined by horizons of 
appropriateness (already discussed), sacrifice, unconditionality, and forgiveness. But 
before getting to these elements, it is important to discuss how this is understood in terms 
of the subject to avoid substituting Platonism for emotivism. The above terms are not 
Forms or prescriptions for some sort of disembodied ethic. They are embedded in a 
narrative which requires understanding how that narrative is engaged by a subject. 
Consider the following statement by Augustine, which could be considered “ego-
driven” under a narrative of individualism, but here is framed under a narrative of 
charitable acknowledgment:  
When we are merciful to anyone and assist him, we do so for his utility, which is 
our goal; but in a curious way our own utility follows as a consequence when God 
does not leave that compassion which we expend on one who needs it without 
reward (OCD, 1.32.35).  
That reward is happiness or fulfillment, what Augustine calls “enjoyment in God.” This 
pleasure drawn from helping others is the reward typically cited under exchange 
paradigms as the commodity-based motive for acknowledging others. Framing this as a 
reward thus emphasizes the horizontal consequences of acknowledgment. In the above 
quote however, Augustine emphasizes something different. Augustine does not advocate 
pleasure as the standard for action, and thus interprets from a different narrative. There is 
a fulfillment that comes as a result of a narrative of faith—God is involved, seen in the 
joy of mercy. The question is, is this a purely vertical orientation to truth—a sort of 
Platonic ideal of the Good? For those who associate Platonism with Augustine, it is easy 
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to see this as a vertical orientation whereby God dictates good and bad; indeed this is a 
common interpretation of Augustine throughout the Middle Ages and even unto today 
(see Brown, 1972). In this interpretation, there are specific motives that are to be 
“commended or reprimanded” (OCD 3.7.19) as dictated by God; God is the source of all 
good and is provides our moral guidance (Conf. 1.1.1; 7.5.7; 11.1.1); we have a 
transcendent soul that, while differing in nature from Plato’s, it still longs for completion 
in a Formally pure City of God transcendently separate from the City of Man (COG 
10.30-31). These arguments and others are commonly quoted in interpreting Augustine as 
having a vertical orientation to truth.  
However, because of his fidelity to word and deed, his understanding of human 
error, his rhetorical educational background, and his commitment to the enactment of his 
dictates seen in his life, Augustine’s narrative can be interpreted away from the medieval 
vertical and instead be interpreted as a transversal through the lens of charitable 
acknowledgment. Charitable acknowledgment, as an active paradigm, could be 
interpreted on a transversal level—a term used by Schrag. When faith and hope are 
understood transversally, charitable acknowledgment takes on a new degree of 
importance as belief is embodied in action. These issues will occupy the next section. 
Faith, Hope, and Transversals 
So what is a “transversal” in contrast to a horizontal or vertical? Schrag (1997) 
gives an example of this directional orientation using a generic organization:  
Harmony and unity cannot be achieved via a vertically ordered and hegemonic 
decision-making arrangement that simply subordinates the lower to the higher. 
Nor can, of course, decision making be left to the autonomy of horizontally 
serialized groups, which often disagree on matters of both style and policy. What 
is required is a transversal ordering and communication that is achieved through a 
diagonal movement across the groups, acknowledging the otherness and integrity 
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of each, while making the requisite accommodations and adjustments along the 
way. (p. 132)  
Thus as Guattari states, “Transversality is a dimension that tries to overcome both the 
impasse of pure verticality and that of mere horizontality; it tends to be achieved when 
there is a maximum of communication among the different levels and, above all, in 
different meanings” (Schrag, 1997, p. 132). Applying this same concept to social 
relationships, one could say charitable acknowledgment is the interpreted response to the 
lived incorporation of human needs within a time and place. This will not be universal 
because intimacy cannot be applied in the same way for all people; it will however have 
general transversals that unify such actions despite the differences in application—for 
charitable acknowledgment these are comprised of the nexus of action (will, habit, and 
charity) and a nexus of belief (faith, hope, and charity), with charity comprised of 
sacrifice, unconditionality, and forgiveness. Note here charity is the term uniting the 
active belief. The transversal is “an open-textured process of unification moving beyond 
the constraints of the metaphysical oppositions of universality versus particularity and 
identity versus difference” (Schrag, 1997, p. 133). This is a melding together of 
constructs into one enacted narrative. 
 Transversality thus recognizes the interpretive and active nature of 
communication. It is a unification of terms in praxis. So what is it about transversality 
that makes it helpful to interpersonal communication and namely an understanding of 
intimate relationships? In short, a transversal understanding provides a means by which 
spiritual questions can be engaged and defended as “good” within intimate relationships 
without claiming something as “universal.” Vertical categories are resisted largely 
because people are multiple, temporal, and embodied. Thus the other is ever-shifting in 
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his need for acknowledgment, defying vertical absolutes. The acts we do show our faith, 
embody charity, and foster healthy (or unhealthy) relationships. The couple in the 
intimate relationships “moves” simultaneously along all these points on a “diagonal.” We 
interpret this action based on our hermeneutical entrance into the discussion.  
The transversal also allows a professor the opportunity to engage students with 
practical guidance beyond the mere horizontal level. To just give a description of 
techniques within relationships, an approach that exemplifies a horizontal approach, 
denies the spiritual elements of our existence; there is more to be said about human 
relationships to give them relevance. To rise above technique while simultaneously 
avoiding platitudes that may not engage others, charitable acknowledgment is realized as 
an embodied practice and an orientation to regard others. We chose an entrance into the 
discussion somewhere on the diagonal, based on a given hermeneutic, and then texture it. 
When considering relationships on a transversal level, professors choose a hermeneutic 
entrance into the issue of relational quality and then begin to add elements such as 
connecting word and deed, understanding one’s narrative of faith and how that provides 
hope, meeting people on their own terms, forgiveness, the issue of unconditional love, the 
issue of emotivism, and so on. The whole relationship is under consideration here lest the 
parts become technified—this is the heart of a transversal approach. 
I argue that faith and hope, when understood transversally, provide the space for 
understanding charitable acknowledgment. In a transversal approach, faith will impact 
interpretation and interpretation will shape faith. Faith is connected to acknowledgment 
as a lived ontology. Hyde (2006) states that acknowledgment is the “life-giving gift” that 
is “informed by an ontological impulse that points people in the direction of the ‘good 
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and the just’” (p. 7). The interpretation of the “good and just” depends upon how the 
ontological impulse is understood in terms of a narrative of faith. But what is meant here 
by faith? Ontology overlaps with faith on many levels, and for students, faith may be the 
easier term to understand. While students may have encountered “faith” through religious 
or secular encounters, very few, assumedly, have contemplated “ontology” despite the 
fact that both traditionally deal with presuppositions and foundational elements of an 
argument. Typically ontology has dwelt in the realm of philosophy and faith in the realm 
of theology. However, despite faith’s religious roots, there is applicability outside a 
religious context, which comes from understanding faith in terms of action and texture 
rather than logic and foundation. A dictionary definition indicates faith as “confident 
belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of a person, idea, or thing” (American, 2002, 
p. 500). It is also “the body of dogma of a religion.” The former indicates the connotation 
most closely connected with acknowledgment; however, greater depth than this is 
required to encapsulate its perspective as the nexus of word and deed. There is a 
transversal element to faith which is embodied in an understanding of charity through 
acknowledgment. Faith is composed of the embodied beliefs that inform our answers to 
the spiritual questions of where we come from, what we should do while we are here, and 
what happens after we die. Faith is embodied and active in deep, rich ways going beyond 
a vertical level of understanding. 
So what shape does faith take for a narrative of charitable acknowledgment? 
Augustine is coming from a Christian perspective, which defines his understanding of 
faith. For charitable acknowledgment, this does not take form as a theological treatise but 
as a lived belief. As Grenz (1994) notes, “Our response cannot end with an intellectual 
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apologetic for faith. We must also embody our acknowledgment of the reality of God in 
the manner in which we live and in the way that we view ourselves. This embodiment 
entails participation in community…” (p. 67). Theology, often deductive in its method of 
reasoning, here takes on a causal reasoning. Faith in God is exposed in the way such faith 
is lived. This is the faith of charitable acknowledgment—the lived belief, the enactment 
of charity. For Augustine, charity is the outcropping of an appropriately held faith: “For 
one who rightly loves without doubt rightly believes and hopes, and one who does not 
love believes in vain, even if the things he believes are true…” (Ench. 31.117). Belief, 
hope, and love are embodied in the believer, all of which comprise the Christian life. 
Faith cannot be held separate from charity because, as Augustine adds, “Charity is the 
end of every commandment” (Ench. 32.121). As the active portion of the belief system, 
charity indicates the degree and quality of faith. This is what Augustine means when he 
states:  
“the only thing that counts is faith working through love” (Gal. 5:6). But if faith 
works evil rather than good, without doubt as the apostle James says, it “is dead in 
itself” (James 2:17), and he also says, “if a person says he has faith, but does not 
have works, will faith be able to save him?” (James 2:14)” (Ench. 18.67).  
Word is thus connected to deed in a profound way—on the level of faith. Thus, in 
addition to being understood as a body of doctrinal beliefs, faith is defined as a living and 
breathing embodiment of what is conceived as the good life. This embodied 
understanding is what is represented in the “charity” of charitable acknowledgment.  
In addition to faith, Augustine denotes the importance of hope. Whereas “there is 
faith in good things and bad, for both good and bad things are believed, and both in good 
faith, not bad” (Encl. 2.8), “hope is only for good things, only for things that are in the 
future and concern the one who is said to have hope in them.” To be hopeless is to have 
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no capacity for conceiving good things in the future. Thus, by definition, it is not possible 
to hope for something bad for one’s self, because hope believes in improvement, not 
destruction. Those who desire death may say they “hope for death” but here “hope” is 
being conflated with “wish”. The very desire for death is the ultimate statement of 
hopelessness. Thus, while one can have faith in bad things, hope only concerns good 
things in the future. Therefore the premise of charitable acknowledgment is a means of 
giving hope to hopeless lives. By offering an answer to the second spiritual question, the 
act of acknowledgment provides such hope. This hope is embodied in the hope we have 
for mankind and the goodness of others. To the extent a person holds goodwill towards 
others is the extent to which one is hopeful in the future. With this hope, we can enact the 
elements we believe will acknowledge them, often expressed in the “golden rule” as “do 
unto others as you would have them do unto you.” By offering an enacted embodiment of 
charity, acknowledgment as an action provides hope on a level applicable to interpersonal 
relationships. 
I would argue the transversal categories of faith and hope are present in all 
narratives. Bochner (2002) notes “Life both anticipates telling and draws meaning from 
it. Narrative is both about living and part of it” (p. 86). Hope and faith, in providing 
meaning to life are inherent to this narrative structure. For example, the narrative of 
individualism finds faith in the rationality of the subject. There is belief in the inherent 
self-interestedness of humanity, the economic metaphor of relationships, and the capacity 
to find satisfaction in the goals of the individual. Hope is found in the veracity of these 
goals; to the extent they are fulfilled is the extent to which one finds hope.. The 
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commonality that faith and hope provide is neither universal nor horizontal in its 
orientation; it is transversal—believing in different meanings to provide depth.  
One final question emerges in a discussion of transversals, faith, and hope: where 
does the confidence to act come from? If faith is universal, confidence comes from 
above. If a faith is horizontal, confidence has traditionally been found in our rationality. 
Someone from a transversal approach sees the error in our rationality and the inability to 
find universals. Then how is there confidence in interpretation? How can we know what 
is a loving action in an intimate relationship? To answer, it is helpful to consider C. S. 
Lewis’ (1976/1949) exposition on “Transposition.” Lewis explains that we use a poorer 
medium to respond to a richer medium when it comes to our spiritual understanding, a 
transposition where perceptual filters affect interpretation (p. 103). Lewis offers 
examples:  
The brutal man never can by analysis find anything but lust in love; the Flatlander 
never can find anything but flat shapes in a picture; physiology never can find 
anything in thought except twitchings of the grey matter. It is no good 
browbeating the critic who approaches a Transposition from below. On the 
evidence available to him his conclusion is the only one possible. Everything is 
different when you approach the Transposition from above…Spiritual things are 
spiritually discerned. (p. 104-5). 
Out of context, this seems to take a universal top-down approach to interpretation. 
However in context, when Lewis (1976/1949) uses the word “above,” his understanding 
of the temporal, multiple, embodied nature of humanity translates into a diagonal 
orientation. He is not suggesting a universal top-down interpretation but a very humble 
one: “But who dares to be a spiritual man? In the full sense, none of us…With what ever 
sense of unworthiness, with whatever sense of audacity, we must affirm that we know a 
little of the higher system which is being transposed.” (p. 105). This is an important 
element of charitable acknowledgment to grasp: when it comes to our interpretations of 
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human spirituality (i.e., the reasons for our existence and how we should live), we are 
describing a transposition from a rich medium—Being, the image of God, the face of the 
Other—into words and actions which are impaired by the limitations of our perceptual 
filters. Recognition of this limitation often stymies action as people dither in thoughtful 
speculation or are crippled by a sense of unworthiness. However, the counter to 
transposition is not fearful introspection but humble action. As Lewis (1976/1949) states:  
It is not only for humility’s sake (that of course) that we must emphasize the 
dimness of our knowledge. I suspect that, save by God’s direct miracle, spiritual 
experience can never abide introspection…The attempt to discover by 
introspective analysis our own spiritual condition is to me a horrible thing which 
reveals at best...transpositions in intellect, emotion, and imagination, and which at 
worst may be the quickest road to presumption or despair. (p. 107) 
Simply put, there is error present in humanity, and it is pervasive, though not so much 
that we are incapable of making reliable interpretations (see Gertler, 2003). Word 
connected to deed is a powerful mode for action. A person acts based on a sense of ethic, 
sees the result, and re-acts accordingly. For Augustine, what made action difficult was 
becoming “carried away outside myself by the voices of my error, and under the weight 
of my pride I sank down into the depths” (Conf. 4.15.27). Indeed, part of the human 
condition is dealing with errors in interpretation and appropriateness, which lead to 
negative acknowledgment rather than charitable. Perhaps part of Augustine’s despair at 
his prideful errors stems from transposition. At the point Augustine notes these “voices of 
error” in the Confessions, he holds a Manichean approach to humanity which he later 
decides is an impoverished view of God and humanity. He is viewing God from a 
position of disingenuous belief. Later, he finds joy as his belief connects word and deed 
in a profound way: upon being convicted by scripture “all the dark shadows of doubt fled 
away” (Conf. 8.12.28). Confidence is a matter of believing in the “good” and doing it.  
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 To sum up, “seeing” is a result of faith and hope in a narrative. This is not seen as 
an ahistorical, transcendent imperative but a transversal call to act charitably. We “see” 
people in this narrative from the perspective of a nexus of belief—faith, hope, and ethic 
(in this case charity). From this “diagonal” position, we act to fulfill the needs of our 
intimate partners. This of course requires humility as a result of our limitations in 
perspective. Yet this should not be a cause for introspective inactivity. A person acts 
humbly but nonetheless acts. As Augustine states: “This it is then that he [John] enforces 
here. ‘In this we know that we are of the truth, when in deed and in truth’ we love, ‘not 
only in words and in tongue’” (Tract. 1 John, 6.3). What love looks like in charitable 
acknowledgment is the subject of the next section: namely it is the embodiment of a love 
that is unconditional, sacrificial, and forgiving. 
Unconditional, Sacrificial, and Forgiving 
So what do charitable acknowledging actions look like? It is here that we begin to 
see the nuts and bolts of the narrative and how intimate interpersonal communication, in 
particular, benefits from this narrative framework. Sacrifice, forgiveness, and 
unconditional love are the outgrowths of charitable acknowledgment in an intimate 
relationship. To this point the narrative elements such as connecting word and deed and 
meeting people on their own terms could largely be applied to a variety of relationships. 
But the ethical tenets of charity suggested here are difficult to apply to non-intimate 
relationships (when such actions do occur they typically fall into the realm of the heroic; 
see Hyde, 2006, p. 256). The vulnerability and openness required for sacrifice or 
unconditionality necessitates high levels of trust in one’s partner—a trust that comes only 
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with time, commitment and acknowledgment. If given too liberally then spiritual, 
psychological, or even physical hurt may occur.  
To begin, it is important to understand that intimacy is a condition of further and 
further closeness between two individuals (Sternberg, 1986), expressed in friendships, 
family and romantic relationships. Communication is certainly one element that fosters 
intimacy (e.g., Altman & Taylor, 1973) but there is much more to intimacy than that. 
Interpersonal relational partners are building, in the metaphorical terms of Hyde, (2006) a 
“dwelling place,” namely a “home.” As Hyde (2006) states, “A house that is authentically 
a home is an abode or dwelling place whose inhabitants ought to know that, no matter 
how bad things become, here still exists a haven of shelter and forgiveness” (p. 98). The 
condition that fundamentally defines a home is safety, not just on a physical level but on 
psychological and spiritual levels as well. Ideally, home is the dwelling place where a 
person finds the potential to be exactly who he or she is in the presence of others. It 
should be a “place” where the couple acts together, acknowledge one another, and accept 
one another for who they are. To achieve this level of acceptance requires the ability to 
unconditionally accept the individual qua individual, often at the expense of one’s own 
personal being.  
 Unconditionality. Unconditional love is what makes “home” possible, because by 
loving unconditionally, one provides a space for safe expression of one’s personality. 
Love-as-charity epitomizes this need for unconditionality. Charity for Augustine is “the 
motion of the soul toward the enjoyment of God for His own sake, and the enjoyment of 
self and of one’s neighbor for the sake of God” (OCD 3.10.16). Charity, then, is 
unconditional because God’s love is unconditional. As Augustine states, God is:  
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Most high, most good, most mighty, most almighty; most merciful and most just; 
most hidden and most present; most beautiful and most strong; stable and 
incomprehensible; unchangeable, yet changing all things; never new, and never 
old, yet renewing all things…supporting, fulfilling, and protecting things; 
creating, nourishing, and perfecting them; searching them out, although nothing is 
lacking you. You love, but are not inflamed with passion; you are jealous, yet free 
from care; you repent, but do not sorrow; you grow angry, but remain tranquil. 
You change your works, but do not change your plan… (Conf. 1.4.4). 
In this, God’s love is unchanging. A person shows God’s love to the extent that he/she 
loves the other as the other is. But is this not a universal, the very thing we are trying to 
intellectually avoid?  Remember that for Augustine words dwell in memory and are 
functions of human interpretation. We are limited in temporality. For moral action to be 
tenable at all requires something profound indeed. This is the function of the Incarnation, 
God’s direct entrance into the temporal from the eternal. “Love others as I loved you” 
(John 15:12) is the most succinct expression of this. The Incarnation serves as the 
entrance of love into this world—a transversal through which we know by example. As a 
result of this example, there is a nexus of action within which we find the will to enact 
charity and thus build habits. When Augustine cites charity as a movement of the soul 
toward God, one might say his hermeneutic entrance is at the level of faith. As the 
example of goodness did, so I will do. 
 Yet as Troup (1999) notes, “Few today will submit themselves to the moral rigor 
associated with the Incarnation, let alone that rigor in combination with the 
comprehensive intellectual knowledge and performative skills that Augustine calls 
wisdom” (p. 178). I argue by entering this discussion from a hermeneutic of 
acknowledgment one can make this “moral rigor” more inviting if only because it starts 
from the charitable acknowledgment of others and works to show faith through love. The 
interpreter starts with love as the nexus of action is explored. What does this mean? Let 
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us start at the level of experience assuming unconditionality. In showing one’s intimate 
partner unconditional love, there is a real and tangible ability to be who one truly is. I 
love you for you, and because I trust you, I am who I am when you love me. This may be 
mimetic to God’s love; but we cannot absolutely know this. We can only choose to 
believe (or not) and enact it (or not). But when enacted, the safety is so appealing that it 
may seem to participate in something bigger—Hyde would go as far as calling this 
something bigger “primordial” and Levinas would go further calling it “the infinite in the 
other” which is “closer to God than I” (Hyde, 2006, p. 141). In the shelter of charitable 
acknowledgment, this temporal world becomes more tolerable—even good. It 
demonstrates a spiritual element of humanity and points to something beyond. Thus, 
letting down one’s guard and being allowed to be who one truly is a true life-giving gift. 
Charitable acknowledgment engages the question of relationship on the enacted level of 
love and through enactment, the transposition of spirituality may become less 
pronounced. 
The action of unconditionality has several different elements. First, expectations 
for behavior should be avoided within unconditional love. Baer (2002) is an author who 
states this well: “Marriage is not an opportunity to dump our expectations for happiness 
on our partner—it’s a commitment we make to stay with our partner while we learn to 
love him or her unconditionally” (p. 196). Charitable acknowledgment reverts into an 
exchange paradigm when someone uses their spouse to achieve personal happiness. Thus, 
one must accept the other person without qualification to open a space for a “home”. This 
is a difficult conception to accept in an emotivist society. Love qua charity is not a 
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commodity but an organic state freely emerging from a desire to acknowledge. This 
requires that it be unconditional, which can be difficult and often disturbingly vulnerable: 
While it’s true that I may promise to love you, the moment you expect me to keep 
that promise, you destroy the possibility of feeling unconditionally accepted 
because unconditional love can only be freely given and freely received. When 
we expect love, anything we receive can only feel like an order that was filled, or 
something we paid for. (Baer, 2002, p.53)  
Thus, to demand someone change is unacceptable for someone holding to an ethic of 
charitable acknowledgment. Charity establishes a home and that home requires the 
freedom to love or not love. As Baer (2002) states, “Trying to change another person is 
manipulative, controlling, and arrogant, and it proves that we’re primarily concerned with 
our own happiness, not our partner’s” (p. 51). Thus, an important understanding here is: 
Who is the person that you have partnered with? In theory it is the person whose “face” 
you most want to attend to and who in turn most wants to attend to your face. The whole 
idea of marriage is a “becoming one” whereby individuals are both contributing towards 
one relationship. Expectations for change indicate a lack of acceptance and thus a lack of 
acknowledgment. This does not mean a spouse will never change, but such a change 
should occur because of charity, motivated out of the love for the other individual, not 
because one is manipulated or demanded to do so by the other person.  
Because of the demands it requires, the expression of charitable acknowledgment 
is normally healthiest in the most intimate of relationships, namely marriage, immediate 
family, and the closest friendships. The reason for this is that unconditionality moves 
relationships from the physical realm of economic trade and enters the spiritual world of 
charity, a move that exposes one to hurt and pain. This is a shift from wielding power 
with and/or above others for the sake of personal comfort to understanding others for the 
sake for acknowledgment. A person relinquishes control over a situation by trusting 
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someone else with his or her own intimate levels of well-being—a level of trust that 
acquaintances can legitimately claim is not their responsibility (see research on self-
disclosure and self-monitoring). The person operating under a narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment is one who emphasizes truth and trust—both of which leave a person 
very vulnerable. It is this vulnerability that requires careful application.  
Nonetheless, unconditional love when put into practice provides stability by 
letting a person be who they really are and still be acknowledged. The relationship is the 
most genuine connection of word and deed as your best features as well as your flaws are 
understood and accepted. This is a relationship built on truth and thus trust is fostered. 
But what happens when conflict occurs? How do two people resolve disagreements that 
occur when, despite the acceptance of the other, the issue is fundamentally dissonant 
(e.g., difference in religious beliefs; difference in family upbringing)? This brings about 
an obligation to sacrifice. 
Sacrifice. As Hyde (2006) notes, “Acknowledgment requires sacrifice” (p. 53). 
Augustine shows well how this sacrifice should be applied. Augustine notes “another 
man is to be loved more than our own bodies; for all of these things are to be loved for 
the sake of God” (OCD, 1.27.28). Sacrifice, simply put, is the state of affairs for 
Augustine because it is a giving of oneself—a love beyond our own bodies. We are called 
to give; this is also at the heart of acknowledgment. Yet for Augustine, “All other men 
are to be loved equally; but since you cannot be of assistance to everyone, those 
especially are to be cared for who are most closely bound to you by place, time, or 
opportunity” (OCD 1.28.29). As a result of his request to “love equally,” Augustine 
might be interpreted as drawing no distinction between intimates and non-intimates, a 
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point that contrasts with above statements concerning who should receive the deepest 
charitable acknowledgment. However Augustine, ever aware of his limitations recognizes 
the difference between what we ought to do and what we can. Intimacy is where such 
sacrifices are most demanded because this is the person with whom we share the closest 
proximity. Someone who is just also discerns when and what to love based on their value; 
“He lives in justice and sanctity who is an unprejudiced assessor of the intrinsic value of 
things. He is a man who has an ordinate love; he neither loves what should not be loved 
nor fails to love what should be loved.” (OCD 1.27.28). An argument could be made that 
on a practical level, justice, proximity, and our inability to see “clearly” (Conf. 12.13.16) 
compose a statement of the healthy applications of sacrifice. Those who would abuse us 
might justly be refused our sacrifice. However, while differences of interpretation of 
these criteria may emerge, the requirement for sacrifice is definitely applicable for those 
closest to us.  
How should such sacrifice be conducted? Who gives to whom and when? There is 
no pat answer to this. It must take place within the relational situation and be worked out 
through unconditional love. While fearing this will be taken as a glib answer, the 
complexity of sacrifice requires such openness of application. The nature of sacrifice is 
one of personal choice to enact the ethical standard and can only be offered by the person 
who is doing giving. Some things are held more sacredly then others. Certain couples 
break apart, and rightly so, because individual differences in narratives of faith, or some 
other area of the relationship are too pronounced. To ignore this issue can work for a 
time, but ultimately the issue will have to be broached. Sacrifice may be necessary by 
someone. Indeed, sacrifice is the way of fostering charity and charity leads to joy. I give 
 180 
   
to you because I want you to be happy and acknowledged; this is love. When 
reciprocated freely it is, as Baer (2002) describes it, a “beautiful duet” (p. 170).  
 Forgiveness. We all err. The response to this error in marriage is widely 
divergent, from implicit acceptance, to feigned ignorance, to divorce (see Waldron & 
Kelley, 2007). Forgiveness is the temporal response necessary to navigate beyond error 
so that unconditional love can be enacted. For Augustine forgiveness is a condition of 
charity:  
A new commandment give I unto you, that ye love one another." Whoso doeth 
contrary to charity and contrary to brotherly love, let him not dare to glory and 
say that he is born of God: but whoso is in brotherly love, there are certain sins 
which he cannot commit, and this above all, that he should hate his brother. And 
how fares it with him concerning his other sins, of which it is said, "If we say that 
we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us?" Let him hear 
that which shall set his mind at rest from another place of Scripture; "Charity 
covereth a multitude of sins.’ (Tract. 1 John 5.3) 
Charity exists in temporality as forgiveness. We “cover a multitude of sins” for our 
partner as we “move beyond” error. There are several necessary quid pro quos: Of 
course, it is better never to make such an error in the first place. Of course, this is more 
complex than simply “moving on,” requiring time and much contemplation. Of course, 
trust may be broken and require a great deal of work to repair. There may even be times 
when destruction of intimacy is too great to repair. But charity forgives because there is a 
relationship at stake, a person who needs acknowledged, and error to reconcile. 
Relationships that operate from charitable acknowledgment, accept the other for who 
they are. Part of this is enduring when major and minor offenses are committed. It is not 
easy; but neither is allowing the relationship to be destroyed. Erring people should 
understand this position in which they put their beloved. Leaving and staying are both 
painful. Forgiveness is the process of recovering from error; it is letting go of the pain. As 
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Mark Twain stated, “Forgiveness is the fragrance a violet sheds on the heel that has 
crushed it.” When forgiveness is offered, for Augustine this is the mimesis of receiving 
mercy from God. “If, therefore, God gave to thee grace, because He gave freely, love 
freely. Do not for the sake of reward love God; let Him be the reward” (Tract. John 3.21). 
Those with whom we are intimate are to be forgiven as we are forgiven. Certainly 
forgiveness can be abused. Augustine points again to the Creator of mercy: 
But, someone will say: “How, then, is I that this divine mercy was bestowed on 
impious and ungrateful man?” Surely, the answer is that mercy was shown by the 
One who, day by day, “maketh His sun to rise upon the good and bad, and raineth 
upon the just and unjust” (COG 1.8). 
This is why forgiveness and justice must work in tandem. This is a difficulty dynamic to 
navigate. Organizationally, justice seems to be the preference (yet even here Augustine 
note in response to the Donatists that justice must be meted with mercy). Interpersonally, 
perhaps a better realization is that “Justice is the Lord’s” (COG 20.30). Charity requires 
forgiveness in order to practice acknowledgment. Justice postponed provides love a space 
to operate, infiltrate, and heal the wounds of error. 
The Ethic of Love  
Thus we are brought to one of the final major elements within a narrative of 
charitable acknowledgment—the issue of love. Through this narrative, love is reframed 
from a static to an active phenomenon and from emotion-driven to ethic-driven. Love 
becomes central within this understanding of interpersonal communication, yet can still 
work well with research currently conducted (e.g., Lee, 1978; Sternberg, 1986). With this 
new understanding of love, a narrative of charitable acknowledgment provides an 
alternative to a narrative of individualism. The construct of love shifts from narrow 
application to broad application within interpersonal communication—a view more 
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reflective of vernacular usage. Finally, intimacy can reflect more thoroughly a view most 
commonly called “agape” which has largely perplexed the field to this point because it is 
not easily quantified. 
 Love occupies a place on the periphery of interpersonal communication. Through 
the late seventies and early eighties several influential works by were conducted that 
shaped the way love was researched. Rubin (1973) formed a distinction between liking 
and loving where liking consists of affection and respect and love includes attachment, 
caring, and intimacy. Lee (1978) depicted love in terms of its different “colors” (i.e., eros, 
pragma, storge, mania, ludus, agape). Sternberg (1986) created a triangle of love 
composed of passion, intimacy, and commitment. Future studies propagated other 
theories (Hecht, Marston, & Larkey, 1994; Hendrick & Hendrick, 1986; Davis & Todd, 
1982). Each of the above largely is an attempt to categorize love to make it easier to 
study. While several other studies have been published in the Journal of Social and 
Personal Relationships that have had varying degrees of influence, (Beall & Sternberg, 
1995; Fehr & Russell, 1991; Kovecses, Z, 1991; Maxwell, 1996; Shaver & Hazan, 1988) 
there has been little attention paid to the construct of love outside this small subsection of 
interpersonal communication and psychology. Textbooks are further evidence of this 
neglect. In general, there is a lack of usage of “love” in interpersonal communication 
textbooks (Williams, 2003). There are several speculations on why this is the case. 
Perhaps it is as Buscaglia (1972) states because “[to the academic community] love is 
prejudicial, superstitious, unscientific bosh” (p. 8). Indeed because love is so prevalent in 
the common vernacular, the word may seem overused and elementary. More likely, 
however, is that love is difficult to analyze scientifically. Fehr and Russell (1991) 
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demonstrate how wide the usage of love really is from paternal to sensual to containing 
the meaning of life. Breaking this wide berth into variables is nearly impossible due to 
the sheer depth involved in the term.  Nonetheless, love is incredibly relevant to the real 
life enactment of interpersonal communication. Terbovich (1966) states that love is “the 
very soul of music, poetry, and romance” (p. 12). Emily Dickinson (1924/1993) affirms 
this in her poetry, stating, “Love is anterior to life, / Posterior to death, / Initial of 
creation, and / The Exponent of breath” (XXXVII).  Buscaglia (1972) even entitles a 
book Love: What Life is All About. Simply, every person who tells another person “I love 
you” is acknowledging love’s place in interpersonal communication. The peripheral 
treatment of love then is concerning for something so central. So how can love be framed 
to make it more meaningful? 
 I argue that in intimate relationships there are at least two frameworks for love 
operating under a narrative of individualism or charitable acknowledgment; each of these 
provides meaningful expression of love, but with greatly different effect. Under a 
narrative of individualism, love is an emotion-based commodity and thus is static. 
Because a person views life in an exchange mentality, love is commodified, essentially 
becoming an emotional good to be traded with one’s partner to garner satisfaction. 
Giddens (1992), who could be considered one of the clearest authors articulating love 
under a narrative of individualism, recognizes the commodification of intimacy in his 
discussion of “pure relationships:” 
A pure relationship has nothing to do with sexual purity, and is a limiting concept 
rather than only a descriptive one. It refers to a situation where a social relation is 
entered into for its own sake, for what can be derived by each person from a 
sustained association with one another; and which is continued only in so far as it 
is thought by both parties to deliver enough satisfactions for each individual to 
stay within it (p. 58). 
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Thus, attaining the emotional good of passionate love can be a goal to achieve from a 
relationship; marriage can serve as a benchmark of such achievement. From a research 
perspective, one measures “arousal” and “passion” in self-reports in order to assess the 
“love” of the couple. Of course this is not all a relationship is founded upon. One must 
have actions that show such passion. There must be support of the needs of the other 
person, while simultaneously respecting the other’s individuality, i.e., respect should be 
given for the other person’s alternative goals outside of that relationship. Good 
relationships are able to keep emotions alive in the romance while balancing life around 
them. As Giddens (1992) notes, “Intimacy is above all a matter of emotional 
communication, with others and with the self, in a context of interpersonal equality” (p. 
130). Satisfaction of the individual thus reaches its culmination in this way—by 
providing space for the actualization of the self. The emotion shapes the actions 
associated with passionate love that are prioritized within the relationship. Ethics are 
driven by these emotions. While marriage may be claimed as a covenant for life, 
emotional lack of fulfillment would dictate whether marriage under this narrative should 
continue. There may be competing narratives that cause struggle in making this decision; 
someone with strong religious ties may find it difficult to navigate two opposing ethical 
standards. Nonetheless, a narrative of individualism, emotivist in nature, will make it 
hard to find validity in communal narratives. What I think/feel is what is most real and in 
fact what is most right. The emotion love must be felt to continue this feeling of 
rightness. 
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A narrative of charitable acknowledgment takes a different view of love as an 
embodied ethic and thus active in nature. This approach lends itself to philosophical 
study as an unconditional expression of acknowledgment. Love is first and foremost an 
ethic in this narrative. It is an orientation towards the other that demands appropriate 
enactment of sacrifice, forgiveness, unconditional love, humility, meeting people on their 
own terms, and rhetorical competence. Through these embodied actions, a person is 
oriented towards the other in such a way that trust organically emerges. Giddens (1992) 
in explaining pure relationships points towards this narrative:  
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There is a structural contradiction in the pure relationship, centering upon 
commitment, which many of Hite’s respondents acknowledge. To generate 
commitment and develop a shared history, an individual must give of herself to 
the other. That is, she must provide, in word and deed, some kind of guarantees to 
the other that the relationship can be sustained for an indefinite period. (p. 137). 
The pure relationship is fundamentally unable to foster long-term commitment. I argue 
however this goes beyond commitment but to ethical duty all-together. Embodiment in 
word and deed is necessary for trust which predicates commitment to the other. Thus, 
commitment is not just a matter of choice but a matter of intertwined ethical duty, 
compulsion to answer the call of the other, and passion (also compassion) for that person 
with whom you are intimate. The nexus of action—the will to behave in a certain way 
based on charity and thus establishing habits—indicates that commitment is the emergent 
result of someone enacting charitable acknowledgment. Trust is built because one is 
being loved for who they really are, not just to gain some sort of benefit. Someone who 
has the will to acknowledge is organically building trust, as opposed to the artificial 
technique required of someone in a “pure relationship.” Trust, then, is not a technique for 
garnering a given need but a real, embodied ethical commitment to the other. This 
difference between technification and embodiment makes all the difference when it 
comes to long-term relationships. Augustine’s teaching on habit and will recognizes that 
only with a proper orientation, in this case an embodiment of the ethic of love, do we 
have a chance to enact a given behavior with any sort of regularity. Éven then, “I do what 
I do not want to do.” This ethic then with appropriate will leads to actions which fosters 
emotion. Emotion is not absent in a charitable acknowledgment narrative, a point which 
is often lost when looking at Augustine from the standpoint of the pessimistic 18th 
century hermeneutic. We are not stoics who should abandon body to focus on spirit; this 
is a Platonic view. Emotion emanates from the actions. When viewed through the lens of 
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charitable acknowledgment, romance as typically depicted in society (e.g., date nights, 
flowers) “works” to foster emotion because it shows concern for the other. It is not a 
technique but a real expression (incidentally, the more a society makes such actions 
clichéd, the more difficult to escape the realm of technique). 
Thus, love is central to the field when using a charitable acknowledgement 
narrative. The simplest way to demonstrate this is by answering the following question: If 
this is a narrative, who is telling this story and why? The answer for someone studying 
intimate communication from a narrative of charitable acknowledgment is that this is a 
story of love told by those who are loving others in order to determine who they should 
be loving and how. Love no longer is confined to the realm of emotion, one note in the 
chord of emotions one can feel. Indeed, love does have an emotional element but it is not 
its most important feature. Love as charity is an ethic that guides behavior. This is close 
to what authors like Lee (1973) describe as “agape.” In Lee’s (1973) “colors” of love, 
agape is described as unselfish, patient, and without need for reciprocity. In other words, 
the other is an end in herself rather than a means to an end. An appropriate narration then 
would be to describe the elements of agape as it pertains to charitable acknowledgment.  
This reality in expression is different for each couple. It is transversal, not 
universal; one will participate in charitable acknowledgment but its expression will be 
temporal, multiple, and embodied. Love, then, is unique to the relational partners who are 
doing the narrating. The unique status comes with the uniqueness of the partners. When 
two unique “faces” come together to create a “home,” a unique expression of love is 
created. The difficulty in predicting what love will look like in various relationships 
stems from this unique home that is created by each couple. Some couples fight 
 188 
   
productively, some quietly disagree. Some partners are outwardly emotional in their 
affection for one another; others rarely show emotion. Some marriages are religious and 
succeed; others are secular and succeed. The underlying narrative to a successful 
partnership, as theorized here, is the ability to acknowledge one another and abide by an 
ethic of charity, i.e., unconditionality, sacrifice, and forgiveness. The core of the narrative 
is the ability to acknowledge one another with more than just emotion.  
The narrative of a couple is a powerful interpretive metaphor. Scholars have said 
as much (e.g., Bochner, 2002). Charitable acknowledgment provides a guiding force to 
this interpretive power by providing the lens through which one could see relationships 
growing and surviving. It is theorized that long-term relationships in particular would 
benefit from this approach. How a couple should love one another may differ in the 
embodied actions, but at their core it is theorized they would take similar shape. Future 
research could analyze the extent to which sacrifice, unconditional love, observation, 
hope in the other, faith in acknowledgment, and willingness to acknowledge appear as 
constructs within interviews.  
 
Summary 
 Charitable acknowledgment is an alternative approach to intimate interpersonal 
relationships that further textures our interpretive capabilities in the field. The narrative 
operates from a position of embodied faith whereby a person believes in a given action’s 
goodness and embodies it. It is a living faith from a transversal rather than vertical 
understanding of the word. There is hopefulness about mankind and our ability to better 
its condition through acknowledgment. There is a transversal nature to faith and hope 
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within this narrative that engages a level beyond senses—a spiritual level. To enact 
charitable acknowledgment requires not just seeing but observing. It is looking into the 
face of the other and acknowledging what is needed. This takes a great deal of 
appropriate orientation that comes with an attunement of conscious. That attunement 
requires a proper understanding of the ethic-driven as opposed to emotion-driven nature 
of the narrative and the will to act. From this good habits are formed that will make 
attunement of conscious easier. Appropriateness allows for situational factors to be taken 
into consideration. To navigate situations well requires a good understanding of self, a 
good understanding of interpretation, and a good understanding of invention. Within a 
narrative of charitable acknowledgment the self is multiple, temporal, and embodied. To 
guide a person in making accurate interpretations, attribution theory and the metaphor of 
the two-edged sword of Augustine can help orient someone in the proper balance 
between deconstruction and absolutism. Invention is the most complex feature, 
attempting to avoid technification while still guiding people to appropriate statements. 
Lewis’ transposition and Wood’s mindfulness are helpful in looking at issues of 
invention and technique. Humility intersects throughout all the above; humanity’s error-
prone nature makes it imperative to take an approach that meets people on their own 
terms and admits that a given interpretation could be wrong. Finally, sacrifice and 
unconditional love are the most intense applications of a narrative of charitable 
acknowledgment. Primarily geared towards those with whom a person is most intimate, 
sacrifice indicates the frequent need for a person in intimate relationships to consider 
another person’s  needs before their own for the sake of acknowledgment. The charity 
shown is unconditional, requiring that a person avoid the commodification of love that is 
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frequent in an emotivist society. To do this means expectations should be avoided to 
provide a “safe place”—a home”—where a person can be who he or she truly is. When 
reciprocated, this love can build healthy, long-lasting relationships.  
 Charitable acknowledgment attempts to express a spiritual side of humanity while 
avoiding emotivism, hopefully providing an alternative viewpoint to the narrative of 
individualism so prevalent within interpersonal communication. Healthy relationships 
find new interpretive horizons within the fuzzy boundaries of rhetorical competence, 
forgiveness, unconditionality, and sacrifice. In the nexus of belief and the nexus of 
action, we find charity providing enacted intimate texture to our relationships. The ethical 
guidance this provides can guide interpersonal communication in the intimate private 
sphere. 
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Chapter 6 
Implications and Conclusions 
 In this final chapter, a narrative of charitable acknowledgment will be analyzed 
for its implications and potential research opportunities within the field of interpersonal 
communication, including limitations and applications. These hopefully will provide an 
opening for further discussion of ethics within intimate relationships. Concluding 
summary remarks concerning charitable acknowledgment will provide closure to the 
project.  
 
The Impact of Charitable Acknowledgment 
A narrative of charitable acknowledgment takes the current research on intimate 
interpersonal communication and reinterprets it to provide an alternative explanation of 
intimacy and the human condition of relating. Roughly, such impact could translate into a 
different approach to the organization of a class in interpersonal communication. 
Previous textbooks have used metaphors of competence (Trenholm & Jensen, 2004), 
relationships (Knapp & Vangelisti, 1999), and goal-orientation (Canary, Cody, & 
Manasov, 2000) to guide their introduction to interpersonal communication. In the 
approach stemming from charitable acknowledgment, ethics take a central role, providing 
guidance on how to build healthy relationships. How to live is the primary question of 
importance. Thus, the impact of charitable acknowledgment on interpersonal 
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communication can be divided into areas regarding the ethics of self and other, the ethics 
of interpretation, the ethics of conflict, and the ethics of intimate relationships. 
Ethics of Self and Other 
Charitable acknowledgment recognizes the self as temporal, multiple, and 
embodied (Schrag, 1997). How does this understanding impact the way we approach our 
selves and others? First of all, all people need acknowledgment. Rather than looking at 
this state of the human condition as a lack that must be met by others through an 
individual’s relationships, this is understood within the nexus of action—will, habit, and 
ethic. Acknowledgment is not a function of individual want but of communal will to act. 
People together make acknowledgement happen for everyone else; acknowledgment 
must emerge from someone for someone. This holistic approach to communication 
recognizes people as vastly complex networks of which the smallest unit for study is the 
relationship. The idea of an individual self is meaningless without relational context. 
Thus, acknowledgment recognizes communication as interpersonal more than 
interpersonal (i.e., intrapersonal). Rather than emphasizing self-actualization (an 
impossibility from a charitable acknowledgement perspective), the will to act on behalf 
of the other is the actualization of focus. We are acknowledged by acknowledging others. 
In fact, the instant someone seeks methods to gain acknowledgment for one’s self, they 
often unintentionally corrupt that acknowledgment; it is not authentic but rather 
manipulated, coerced, or exchanged. 
Charitable acknowledgment sees individuals as entrenched in relationships and 
inseparable from those relationships, thus making it unnecessary to parse out sharp 
delineations of self and other. This should be a relief to those struggling with issues of 
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motive as it pertains to altruism and egoism. Ultimately, the important question in 
charitable acknowledgment is not on some linear direction of motivation but the 
embodied relational ethic with which one approaches the relationship. This active 
interpretive approach is not an “I think therefore I am” Cartesian duality but rather a will 
to acknowledge others ethically. Ethics come first. If an individual hopes for 
“actualization” of a spiritual nature, it must come as a result of providing 
acknowledgment into the network in which they are embedded. Indeed, the study of 
interpersonal communication cannot separate selves out of relationships with word and 
deed intact. Words must be connected to actions/deeds in this active approach.  
The impact of separation is significant. When word is isolated from this dyad and 
emphasized, a relationship is composed of individuals peering hypothetically at theories 
of health from what seems like a privileged position. The only way an “ideal” self can 
emerge is by separating the self from its context. It is a theoretical self when separated 
from the active, physical realm of “deed.” This was the mistake of humanism. In the 
more common approach in interpersonal communication where deed is emphasized 
alone, an individual enacts a technique in which an emotivist outcome is of primary 
importance. What is felt and experienced comprises the primary basis of decision-making 
rather than some overarching “word” or communal principle.  
By connecting word and deed, charitable acknowledgment takes an embodied 
approach.  Thus, to understand the self and others while connecting word and deed, it is 
pivotally important to understand charitable acknowledgment as an enacted ethic. 
Through enactment, recalcitrant reality tempers symbolic searches for the good. It is 
physical reality that is the buttress against abstract philosophizing, while our symbolic 
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nature is the buttress against mechanistic reductionism to the physical and material alone. 
This connection is a median of interpretive ground from which experience and 
symbolism unite to make meaning—including meaning in our intimate relationships.  
But what of the dynamic of the reality/symbol dyad where the symbol influences 
our perceptions of reality? What of power’s role in the dyad? Through power one can use 
symbols to shape reality as well—even defy it. Manipulation, propaganda, and spin all 
represent distortions of word that when implemented by a more powerful partner can lead 
to unhealthy relational situations (e.g., physical abuse, psychological abuse). People fall 
under the control of someone else to the detriment of their own self. Because of this 
danger, it is of utmost importance that someone fully embodies an understanding of 
human nature in a charitable acknowledgment narrative. Our multiplicity and temporality 
defy our power-laden ability to override reality with rhetorical “cookery.” We are 
imperfect because we are bound to a time and place and are multiple in our will-to-act. 
Only in word alone are we able to “stand” outside of time, thus indicating Schrag (1986) 
and Augustine’s (Confessions) interest in temporality. Only in word alone are we able to 
conceive of pure acts of “freedom,” “terror,” “justice,” and “love.” Those who 
manipulate these words to their success find power in their ability to succeed at this 
disconnection (e.g., when an abusive husband continually shames a wife into staying by 
committing to change and demeaning her when she does not believe him). When word is 
connected to deed though (when our symbols are connected to our actions), this exposes 
the fragility and imperfection of the human condition. Healthy relationships are 
composed of two partners in recognition of this condition. As a result, they will be open 
to alternative interpretation within the confines of reality. For example: In what ways can 
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“freedom” in America, be seen similarly as “freedom” in Iraq? When is “terrorist” a 
stereotype and not a reality? To what extent is “justice” functioning in capital 
punishment? And most importantly for this dissertation, when does “love” function as a 
product of charitable acknowledgment? Because our limitations temper absolutism, an 
ethical relational partner ought to maintain openness to improvements in both word and 
deed, guided by charitable acknowledgment. Thus power, ever-present, should be 
directed towards guiding one’s will towards acknowledgment.  
The relevance then of this approach to communication is in its ability to analyze 
ethical decisions. The focus on ethics here is pivotal. There are “good” elements and 
“bad” elements that are present in relational contexts to restrain relativism and 
emotivism. The restraints of neutrality and objectivity have been removed from the 
vocabulary of self, but the restraint of connecting word to deed has been added. The task 
becomes exploring the nature of this good. There is an active relational good striving for 
a micro-community (i.e., an intimate relationship), not just a good for self or other. In 
striving to enact charitable acknowledgment, we are suggesting a path upon which 
someone might plausibly struggle towards a “transversal good” commonly called love. 
As word is connected to deed, epistemological questions of knowing this love are 
answered as new questions simultaneously emerge. To achieve greater accuracy in these 
endeavors, one must look to the ethics of interpretation, a conversation engaged in 
throughout history (see Herrick, 2005). 
In sum, an ethics-driven approach to interpersonal communication begins by 
explaining that relationships require acknowledgment. We need each other. But to 
achieve this is not a condition of me individually going out to get it. Acknowledgment is 
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a product of our will to act on behalf of others. Together we make acknowledgment work 
in relationships. This is a condition of a decentered self—a person who is not the center 
when it comes to interpersonal communication—acknowledging someone in relationship. 
Relationship is central; the smallest unit for study should be the dyad when it comes to 
communication in order to reflect better the nature of the human condition. In this 
condition, we are not objective, neutral, or without community. The decentered self is a 
person who is multiple, temporal, and embodied. We have many motives, cannot escape 
the time or place in which we entered, and are embodied in a physicality. As a result of 
this condition we must maintain openness to others, because we simply are not neutral. 
But this openness is not a call for emotivism, the idea that any individual preference is 
good or ethical. The individual establishes communal ethics by connecting word and 
deed within a relationship—an interpretive endeavor. This makes the ethics of 
interpretation very important. 
Ethics of Interpretation 
 Because we are biased, symbolic beings, an important question is: how can we 
make accurate and ethical interpretations? Charitable acknowledgment provides valuable 
insight into this question. Perhaps the most valuable lesson here is that to be human is to 
live with mystery. We will never have absolute interpretive certainty; nonetheless we act. 
We experience love, we see other’s happiness, we understand pain, and we recognize 
rational consequences. This all occurs within a decentered realm of self—embodied, 
multiple, and temporal. We speak as we relate to our environment. As a result of our 
connections with word and deed, we act and do so with ethical effects. In other words, 
our words and deed make good things (and bad things) happen. These actions provide a 
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modicum of stability for the mystery of symbolic humanity, where our words are so 
ethereal. The extent to which life is valuable, fulfilling, fascinating, enriching, and 
remarkable depends upon the extent to which our actions affirm ethical commitments, 
even if unsuccessful. Charitable acknowledgment provides guidance on how this might 
be done with some sort of adequacy and healthfulness when it comes to intimate 
relationships. How it does this is through encouraging accurate connections of word and 
deed, the embodiment of humility, and the practice of listening. 
To begin, accuracy in interpretation must be attempted. In terms of charitable 
acknowledgment, this means word and deed must be understood in ways that are 
reflective of the reality of the situation. If manipulation, deceit, and coercion are actively 
pursued this fundamentally destroys the capacity for accurate interpretation on the part of 
one’s intimate partner. The capacity to love unconditionally is hindered because the 
person to whom lies are told does not truly know who their partner is. The relationship is 
founded on misconception. Who then can realize the joys of intimacy when the persona 
being offered to the other is, in whatever capacity, a sham? There is a vital responsibility 
to pursue a connection of word and deed. The most basic of lies can undermine this 
pursuit for unconditionality, and without this standard, there is no foundation for 
intimacy. Thus one of the most important implications of the ethic of charitable 
acknowledgment is the powerful need for connecting word and deed. It is perhaps the 
most foundational call for human relational communication. 
In addition to connecting word and deed, interpretation requires proper 
assessments of what really happened in a given situation, acknowledging one’s biases to 
establish a more accurate understanding. Attribution theory plays an important role in this 
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interpretive assessment (e.g., Kelley, 1967; Jones & Davis, 1965; Jones & Harris, 1967). 
After discussing different dynamics of the theory (e.g., locus, responsibility), attributive 
bias can be analyzed within a person’s interpretations. Everyone has different perceptual 
filters through which they analyze situations. These include gender, race, class, age, 
upbringing, and many others. In order to achieve an accurate interpretation of what the 
other person really intends, it is important to meet that person on his/her own terms rather 
than letting unacknowledged biases filter information incorrectly. This can be understood 
as coming to the situation as the other person is coming to it. Of course, there is no 
negating a bias; a “white Jewish male” cannot negate the circumstances into which he 
was born. However, one can attempt to navigate through it through a focus on the other. 
By an individual attempting to meet others on their terms, one can orient himself or 
herself more appropriately to navigate such biases and thus “see” where the other is 
coming from. 
Within the field of interpersonal communication, however, accuracy is not the 
area where charitable acknowledgment has the greatest impact. Rather what charitable 
acknowledgement adds to the conversation is the extent to which ethics define how 
accurate interpretation is applied. Accuracy established within the bounds of a narrative 
of charitable acknowledgment has several important implications. Initially, one must 
recognize that taking the time to “meet someone on their own terms” is difficult and 
demanding and thus requires a great deal of willingness to acknowledge the other. In fact, 
it is rather irrelevant to teach a person the interpretational biases one holds without also 
including the mindset with which one must approach the other to avoid the negative 
consequences and energize the positive contributions of those biases. If someone does not 
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care what their spouse has to say, why bother with accuracy? When contempt is listed by 
Gottman (1994) is a precursor to divorce, a charitable acknowledgment approach 
interprets this as the unwillingness to see the other’s worthiness for acknowledgment. 
Their very being has become devalued. In such a scenario, accuracy will not only suffer 
but it will become insignificant. To say communication is important to marriage (as is 
common in self-help books) is only true then to the extent one still finds value in their 
spouse. Thus, foundational to interpretation is a willingness to acknowledge charitably. 
Charitable acknowledgment provides a couple of important lessons to facilitate this 
willingness.  
First is the need for humility. Humility has a two-fold meaning. On the one hand 
lies an acknowledgment of error and on the other is an acknowledgment of others. A 
consideration of our own error should come as a result of recognizing our multiple, 
temporal, embodied nature. One should never stray far from the realization that his or her 
interpretation could be wrong. This should be in the background of conversation and 
often should come to the forefront in order to show others our own interpretive charity on 
a given issue. To see someone else is to see a person who has a given set of 
circumstances that I in my difference will never completely understand. The person is a 
mystery (Levinas, 1961). This does not, however, mean that intimacy is a chimera and 
the best we can do is meet our own personal needs or worse not act at all. Rather, 
intimacy as charitable acknowledgment is the ethical texturing that provides us with the 
willingness to meet the other where they stand. Indeed, without this texturing a person 
might be inclined not to act, because they are stymied by feelings of personal inadequacy, 
doubt, or even relativism. Charitable acknowledgment tempers this through an additional 
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understanding of humility as phenomenological focus on the other. As Chesterton (1908) 
states, humility should be interpreted as “a spur that prevents a man from stopping; not a 
nail in his boot that prevents him from going on.” To prevent this “spur” from becoming 
a “nail” one must temper humility in interpretation with humility in our focus on others. 
If I have another person figured out, there is no need to listen. I assume I already know. 
However, by keeping humility at the ready, one is more willing to be open to information 
and by implication open to the other. I am not so high in my self-regard that I negate the 
regard of people outside my personal scope. I am, in other words, humble and thus see 
others as valuable.  
To use a metaphor, much like a sponge, humility reveals the inherent holes in our 
own capacities, so that we absorb the information from others more readily. These holes 
represent both an openness to see the value of others and a capacity for error. Without 
this porous quality, we remain inflexible and often unwilling to accept others for who 
they are. As Hyde (2004) would note, it is an “objective uncertainty” that is forever at 
work” that call us to ethical responsibility. Thus, ironically, my own inadequacies and 
absorptive qualities make the other more understandable ethically approachable. The 
notion of perfection in interpretation is flipped upside down as accuracy suddenly takes 
on a whole new meaning. Rather than being an absolute “right,” it is an enacted 
connection of word and deed where I show acknowledgment in my willingness to see 
another person as they really are. As I “absorb” what the other communicates, I gain 
understanding, trust, and the capacity for closeness. This, in short, is the epistemological 
understanding of love. To interpret is to open one’s self, such as it is, to the mystery of 
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the other. Humility as the embodiment of this openness is thus a necessity for healthy 
interpretation in intimate relationships. 
Another important facet to facilitate the willingness to interpret charitably is 
centralizing listening. Listening is not just a technique with requisite head nods, eye 
contact, and feedback on the order of “so what I hear you saying is…” Rather, mindful 
listening (Wood, 2004a) in intimate relationships is a function of love thus making it an 
ethical communicative action. Remember love is not merely an emotion here, but an 
ethic. To the extent that someone is unconditionally oriented towards accepting the other, 
one must be willing to listen. In this sense, listening is a gift we give to our intimate 
partner. More than flowers or chocolates, listening provides the context for intimacy. 
When it comes to a classroom, these sort of statements can sound overly sentimental and 
ring a trite tone. Perhaps a better way of stating this is that by not listening you 
fundamentally undermine your relationship. Interpretation is a one-sided affair without 
this willingness. The only way one can find intimacy is to listen—and care about what 
he/she is hearing. Charitable acknowledgment puts listening in a proper place of 
importance by emphasizing the centrality of the relationship above the individual. It is an 
ethical calling, an attunement of conciousness (Hyde, 2006), providing the impetus and 
the guidance on what “caring” comprises. It is an openness to acknowledge the other.  
In sum, this approach provides the texture necessary to establish meaning outside 
the realms of emotivism and relativism. The self is not the sole source of meaning; nor is 
meaning indeterminable. Meaning stems from my charitable acknowledging actions that 
guide me and my partner as we try to understand one another. Interpretation will never be 
perfect but when charity founds one’s relationship, there is an understanding that 
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misinterpretation is not to facilitate manipulation or deceit on behalf of one’s own self 
interests; I listen because I care what you have to say. But what about when a person 
really does not feel like caring? What of those times when listening fails and conflict 
emerges? Such scenarios impact our interpretations as well and require a more lengthy 
account. 
Ethics of Conflict 
We make mistakes. We have differences of opinion and beliefs. Our multiple, 
temporal, embodied nature necessitates such failures and differences. For Augustine our 
soul is “rent asunder by grievous hurt as long as it prefers” to continue in bad habits 
rather than enact change (Conf. 8.10.24). When there is a clash as a result of people’s 
mistakes and differences, conflict emerges. Thus, one of the most important issues for 
intimate communication involves dealing with conflict. What is conflict resolution for 
charitable acknowledgment? I believe this is one of the areas where charitable 
acknowledgement can have the greatest impact on interpersonal communication namely 
through an understanding of respect and the importance of choice as a dynamic in the 
nexus of will, habit, and ethic. 
First one must establish respect as an important correlate of healthy intimate 
relationships. Even if we could know a person is in his or her totality, we would still 
disagree with him or her. The die-hard Democratic father whose knows exactly his die-
hard Republican son’s beliefs will not find it any easier to reconcile their differences; in 
fact such knowledge could exacerbate conflicts. So how can differences on this 
fundamental level be handled as to avoid dysfunctional relationships, vindictiveness, or 
even violence? To begin, respect must be a precursor to basic acknowledgment. I define 
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respect as acknowledging the value of a person’s actions, opinions, or at the very least his 
or her being. Even if you cannot respect a person for their actions, the least that is owed 
to them is respect for being human. When respect on all levels (action, opinion, and 
being) is lost, there is no ground from which to continue a relationship outside of 
manipulation. Respect thus comprises a baseline for all relationships. Conflict managed 
from positions of respect establishes ground from which two people can agree (possibly 
to disagree). 
However, in intimate relationships where charitable acknowledgment is practiced, 
respect-of-being is a fall back position—e.g., when all else fails, this person is still my 
wife and I should respect her for who she is. It is a beginning rather than an end. Yes 
respect-of-being provides a ground for agreeing but ultimately this is only on the level of 
toleration—an endurance through a given set of actions. Tolerance might be acceptable 
with acquaintances and low level friendships. Ultimately however, toleration is not 
sufficient for intimacy to flourish. Trust requires something deeper than this. A man 
might disagree with, but respectfully tolerate in his co-workers, behavior (e.g., constant 
self-centered conversation) that he justifiably would not be able to tolerate indefinitely in 
an intimate relationship. Intimacy is building a life together—creating a home (Hyde, 
2006). This cannot happen if the space created together is merely endured. Rather, home 
is a product of the ethic that unites the couple. Thus in a conflict among intimates, the 
true “fall back” for agreement should be the ethic of charitable acknowledgment. 
Remember charitable acknowledgment notes the need to accept a person for who they 
are. Therefore, it is more than just a respect for being a human. It is a transversal unity 
shared as a couple that is respected. It is much closer and more heavily vested in the 
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outcome of the conflict. A couple is united in the desire to love unconditionally, forgive 
wrongs, and acknowledge one another regardless of benefits to self. The beauty and 
vulnerability of an intimate relationship under this paradigm is that someone 
simultaneously is free to express their opinions and act on them, while being constrained 
by responsibility for the other. In conflict, I am free to express my displeasure and am 
bound by charity (i.e., love) for my spouse.  
Within this paradigm, the ground for conducting conflict is thus “softened” 
somewhat; I am restrained, not by commitment, not by an emotion, not by long-term 
gains, but by an ethic where I am compelled to acknowledge. According to an ethic of 
charitable acknowledgment, a person’s will is oriented to act on the other’s behalf. 
Someone willing to acknowledge the other will enter a conflict armed with the respect-
elevated-to-charity necessary to navigate that conflict in healthy and responsible ways. 
Armed thusly, it is much harder for contempt to gain hold, especially in regard to the 
mundanities of life.  
Thus, the challenge in any conflict is encouraging the will to act within a set of 
fuzzy ethical boundaries. These boundaries are defined by charity, i.e., forgiveness, 
sacrifice, and unconditionality. Habits then are established in a relationship that fosters 
healthy patterns of acknowledgment. But what of those people who do not hold to similar 
ethical ideas of love? It is important to recognize here that both parties must understand 
love within these common ethical bounds upon entering into a long-term committed 
relationship, particularly a marriage. When someone understands love in a different 
paradigm [e.g., exchange; Lee’s (1973) eros or mania], the focus is not the ethic but the 
individual. While marriage indicates to society the similar legal and social ties of a 
 205 
   
couple, it is not always entered under similar ethical ties. Conflict it is theorized stems 
from this dissimilarity of ethical narratives leading to a greater likelihood for disillusion 
and dissolution.    
Inevitably another question emerges concerning justifiable instances where 
conflict should result in the dissolution of a relationship. In response, the importance of 
choice should not be overlooked in a charitable acknowledgment ethic. Unconditionality 
is rightly understood as a choice we make with every conflict that emerges. The will to 
act in this way is a constant battle, whether on issues as minor as who should wash the 
dishes and as major as lying about an affair. By and large, forgiveness can act as the 
remedy to the poison of conflict. It redeems both the minor offense and the unredeemable 
under a cleansing pardon from the mistake, especially when the person at fault is penitent 
and wills to change (see Etzioni & Carney, 1997). But are there instances where 
unconditionality crumbles and forgiveness is beyond one’s capacities? Within the context 
of a multiple, temporal, and embodied humanity, it is to be expected. There are certainly 
reasons for the dissolution of a relationship. Large among them is a reneged repentance 
where a person asks for forgiveness for a major betrayal (e.g., an affair), enacts the 
promised change, but drastically violates the other’s trust again. However, to draw a strict 
line here would be ridiculous; an active communication paradigm dependent on context 
requires a thorough specificity to the embodied and embedded circumstances (i.e., 
texture) to determine appropriate action. Thus, forgiveness and its corollary in repentance 
are intensely embedded in the specific intimate relationship. 
Theoretically, the threshold for dissolution should be higher for couples practicing 
charitable acknowledgment. Under this ethic, splitting up is not conditioned upon an 
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individual’s choice to pursue happiness. Rather the condition for leaving is a result of the 
utter negation of trust through the separation of word and deed and thus the negation of 
the ethic. Habits of acknowledgment, the will to act on behalf of the other, the 
establishment of a home are not easily abandoned. Additionally, forgiveness has the 
powerful ability to reinstate trust and should be liberally applied, particularly when 
coupled with the repentance of a partner. Nonetheless word and deed can be rent asunder 
irreparably. The resulting pain of this separation, both physical and mental, is real, 
causing words of charity to utterly lose meaning. In these cases dissolution would be 
expected.  
In sum, conflict is addressed not by suggesting a set of techniques but by 
suggesting one base conflict within the bounds of charitable acknowledgment.  In conflict 
resolution within non-intimate interpersonal relationships, respect-for-being is an 
important starting point, but when it comes to intimate relationships, more is expected.  
The ethic of charitable acknowledgment provides this “something more” by offering the 
dialectic of freedom of expression and responsibility to acknowledge. Unconditionality 
requires we attend to the other, and our appreciation for the home built together provides 
an impetus for a will to action. A person falls back to the ethic when conflict emerges. 
Nonetheless, charitable acknowledgment is a choice, and when circumstances arise where 
a given action separates word and deed to an irreparable level, it may require dissolution. 
However, the threshold is very high as a result of the capacity for forgiveness and the 
home built between the two individuals. Conflict is only one dynamic of intimate 
relationships, but a very important one. Charitable acknowledgment helps augment our 
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understanding of how to resolve conflicts when possible and does so without resorting to 
techniques or emotivism.  
Ethics of Intimate Relationships 
In addition to conflict, other dynamics within intimate relationships are impacted 
through charitable acknowledgment. Love, trust, & reciprocation are three of the most 
important, though there are certainly others. Love has already been discussed in some 
length in the previous chapter but it is worth revisiting here in terms of its impact on 
interpersonal communication. The shift of love from emotion-driven to ethic-driven 
significantly impacts the meaning of the words “I love you.” The colors of Lee (1973) 
have already recognized the different ways we understand love in terms of philosophical 
approach. Is love a game (ludus)? A passionate emotion (eros)? A friendly partnership 
(storge)? An addiction (mania)? A practical commitment (pragma)? Or is love an 
unconditional ethic (agape)?  Lee’s terminology recognizes that when someone says “I 
love you,” they might mean something completely different than one might interpret. 
Hendrick & Hendrick (1986) however, could not find a measurement for agape, implying 
its lack of existence. This has been persistent (e.g., Knapp & Vangelisti, 2000). However, 
rather than being non-existent, under a narrative of charitable acknowledgment “agape” is 
an active communication phenomenon requiring embodiment; it must be approached 
holistically within the ethical narrative in which it is embedded. What charitable 
acknowledgment adds to the literature is a robust context for recognizing agape and 
opens new ground from which to answer how a healthy relationship can be conducted. 
Intimate relationships are textured in action through unconditionality, sacrifice, and 
forgiveness as tied to an understanding of acknowledgment. This opens doors for moral 
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discussion—a more rhetorical than measurable phenomenon. What are the difficulties of 
forgiveness? What are the bounds within which sacrifice is “good” in a relationship? 
How is one able to unconditionally love a partner without becoming a door mat? Love 
can thus be discussed in terms of its moral implications beyond emotivism and self-
interest with the complexity of intimate relationships reflecting the relational coordinates 
of agape as well as eros. Helping people recognize the different meanings of love, helps 
them better navigate conflict with those whose with whom their narrative of love differs, 
and potentially avoid future difficulties in their long-term relationship.  
 Trust is another dynamic of utmost importance in relationships from a charitable 
acknowledgment perspective. Essentially trust is the result of connecting word and deed 
in ethical ways. As habits of these connections are established, a home is built where 
communication is fostered. As someone feels comfort with their intimate partner, they 
feel open to discuss more and deeper issues—a fact long acknowledged in the field (i.e., 
Altman & Taylor, 1973). What is added through charitable acknowledgment is an 
emphasis on trust as the ethical “level” to help balance power differences. As a person 
recognizes his or her own limitations in self, they lean on their partner and vice versa. 
Trust is a plunge that requires letting go of control for the sake of intimacy. Emotion and 
power both are factors in this “letting go.” Emotion is not central to a charitable 
acknowledgment, but they are present—powerfully so. The trust one feels in the other as 
a result of the connection of word and deed in turn connects the ethical “word” of charity 
to the emotional “deed” of charity. In other words, as I trust you, I cannot help but feel 
“loved.” Emotion is the outgrowth of trust.  
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Additionally, power is a function of trust. I need not use my power in the 
relationship to gain what I need because I trust you. You will not manipulate me and I do 
not need to manipulate you. Power then is shifted to personal enactment for the other 
rather than gaining compliance from the other. To the extent that a couple perceives one 
another’s needs on equitable levels, one person’s needs will not hold superiority over the 
other’s. In other words, sacrifice is balanced equitably as people trust one another to take 
care of him or her (equality is only possible in ideology not reality). Trust is understood 
not as a tool but as an organic part of a healthy intimate relationship. To trust one another 
allows both emotion and power to function in helpful, healthy ways in a relationship. By 
connecting word and deed and relinquishing control, relationships grow in intimacy. 
The place of reciprocation is the last dynamic explored here. Reciprocation is a 
requirement for healthy relationships. This has typically been interpreted within an 
exchange paradigm—i.e., as an agreed upon term of the relationship sought after for the 
purpose of meeting self-interest (e.g., McCabe, 2003). While charitable acknowledgment 
recognizes reciprocation as a necessity, for its occurrence to foster unconditonality it 
must be indirect and tangential rather than a goal to achieve. Reciprocity is a function of 
the will to act on behalf of the other and thus is on the periphery of charitable 
acknowledgment as a side effect of properly oriented action. It is not a goal but a 
symptom of healthy habits. Together in dyads of intimate relationships, individuals live 
an ethic. Needs are met through answering the call of the other (Levinas, 1961). What 
this means in a narrative of charitable acknowledgment is that people enact love (charity) 
with a focus on the love itself rather than a focus on the need. In other words, when a 
person calls out “I am in need,” the charitable acknowledgment response is: “Then act 
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with charity on behalf of your partner.” Under this ethic, lines of self and other are 
blurred. There is no need to explicitly delineate my needs from your needs. I act 
charitably on your behalf. You act charitably on mine. Each event is separately focused 
on the end of enacting an ethical good. That reciprocation occurs is incidental, despite its 
importance. Reciprocation is thus the paradox of charitable acknowledgment. To gain 
one must give. Together, our charity is our connection to one another and our call to 
reciprocity.  
Enactment of charitable acknowledgment involves quality communication and the 
interpretive ability to negotiate what is the best response (which sometimes may include 
not meeting what the other person perceives as a need). In regards to communication, the 
needs, feelings, and difficulties that arise in one’s relationship and life in general should 
be communicated as bounded by the ethical guides of appropriateness, intimacy, and 
sacrifice. Appropriateness addresses factors such as time and place that dictate how, 
where, and when something is said. Research on self-monitoring certainly guides this 
process (Snyder, 1974). But self-monitoring among intimates should be less necessary 
than it normally is in more distanced relationships. In a healthy intimate relationship, a 
person wants to hear the struggles and desires of his or her partner. Because you are 
unified with me in a relationship of great importance, it is of great value to know what 
you are thinking. Communicating one’s feelings and thoughts should become an episode 
of frequency. One should not feel they have to sacrifice the expression of all needs, fears, 
etc.; sacrifice does play a role in what to communicate but not to the level of self-
negation. As described above, trust in the other person as an equitable partner should 
foster communication. However, some thoughts and feelings can justifiably be purged to 
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the degree they fall outside the bounds of charity—a fuzzy boundary bound to specific 
situations. There are many things a person might want that they responsibly should 
refrain from pursuing. When these are pursued, it may even be good for a partner to 
address the negative consequences of the request as based on its respective health for the 
relationship. Such interactions are negotiated within the active embodied, and embedded 
situation; conflict resolution may be necessary in these episodes. Communication thus 
takes place within the bounds of sacrifice, intimacy, and appropriateness.  
In summary, love, trust, and reciprocation are all important dynamics within 
romantic intimate interpersonal relationships. Charitable acknowledgment interprets these 
in ways that help foster ethical debate on healthy relationships. This provides an 
alternative to the emotivist ethical implications of exchange-based approaches to the field 
where love is considered as an emotion, trust is a technique, and reciprocation is a 
function of exchange. Here love is an ethical approach, trust is an outgrowth of this ethic, 
and reciprocation is a function of will to action. To be in an intimate relationship is an 
orientation to the other where one’s emotional attachment and will to power are products 
of his or her will to act in charitable acknowledging ways (i.e., love). Such ways will 
foster trust and the reciprocation we long for. Letting go is a big part of charitable 
acknowledgment. Despite a will that makes this “letting go” difficult, there is credence 
within an active communication paradigm in navigating issues concerning the 
development of healthy relationships. 
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Future Research  
When considering the potentiality for further research using a narrative of 
charitable acknowledgment, it seems there is much (exciting) work to be done. The 
interpretive study given here has tried to find philosophical ground from which to explore 
ethical consequences of intimate relationships. Future interviews of partners in an 
intimate relationship would explore how these interpretive frameworks impact a variety 
of phenomena from the longevity of relationships to issues of conflict management. 
Intimate interpersonal communication is thus opened in a number of new ways with a 
variety of compelling studies.  
The most compelling (to me) regards the different frameworks of love 
surrounding a narrative of charitable acknowledgment and a narrative of individualism. 
What impact does an interpretation of love-as-emotion have on the longevity of 
relationships versus the longevity of relationships with an interpretation of love-as-ethic? 
It is theorized these two frameworks of love, lead to very different relationships. One 
operates from personal emotional satisfaction and leads to emotivist ethics. Love is 
conditional on feeling a given passionate emotion; this emotion leads to actions of 
charity, which in turn leads to emotivism (e.g., I have faith and hope in our relationship, 
because I feel emotion when they are around). When someone is not feeling love, this 
begins to fall apart. Eros, mania, and ludus (Lee, 1978) all provide different applications 
of this similar framework of love, with eros being the purest expression. The ethic-
centered love operates as a need to acknowledge one’s romantic partner and recognizes 
love as an orientation towards the other prior to any sort of emotional attachment. Action 
stems from an acknowledgment of the other person for who they are, not primarily for an 
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emotion they can provide. Emotion is a consequence of this ethic, not a condition for its 
existence (e.g., I feel emotion when they are around, because I have faith and hope in our 
relationship). Agape, storge, and pragma (Lee, 1978) each take this approach in different 
ways, with agape being the purest expression. With this interpretive background guiding 
the study, long-term relationships could be analyzed in order to determine the extent to 
which their success was a product of their ethical approach.  It would be interesting to see 
whether longevity is positively connected to a narrative of charitable acknowledgment. 
Additionally, one could examine the extent to which couples embody 
appropriateness, unconditionality, sacrifice, and forgiveness. Much could be learned by 
talking to people whose marriages have lasted for 25 years or more in regard to how these 
have played a role in their marriages. By asking couples how these three dynamics have 
affected their relationship, one could see charity’s impact on communication within a 
marriage. What are the rhetorical methods by which couples frame arguments? How have 
sacrifice and forgiveness played a role in making the marriage work? To what degree 
does their spouse love them for who they are? What things would the spouse want to 
change in the other spouse? A documentary, ethnography, or other long-term study of 
several long-term married couples targeting these elements would give further heuristic 
power to this dissertation. Additionally, co-habitation could be examined to see the extent 
to which these dynamics are applied and maintained. 
With charitable acknowledgment as the theoretical background, conflict 
resolution could be reexamined beyond its mere implementation. In other words, this is 
not a technique-driven analysis but a search for embodied practices reflective of ethical 
narratives that frame how people interact. By discovering ethical frameworks emerging 
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from narratives such as charitable acknowledgment, one can begin to connect the conflict 
resolution strategy with the narrative choice that produced it. By doing a framework 
analysis to identify the prevalence of a given set of ethical circumstances, one can 
determine the extent to which love is viewed in emotivist versus charitable narrative 
structures. Then an analysis of conflict resolution could be conducted to analyze the 
impact these structures have in fostering such negatives for relationships as 
“stonewalling” or “contempt” (Gottman, 1992). This approach comes at conflict from a 
different direction which hopefully can add to a debate on the ethical consequences of 
relational practices  
Another interpretive paradigm that emerges from this study involves the 
interpretation of charity from a universal position versus those who view it as a 
transversal. It would be interesting to see how love as a transcendent or love as a 
horizontal plays into one’s interpretations of relationships. Several questions emerge 
here: Because charity-as-a-universal is impossible to achieve, does one’s focus shift to 
the afterlife when love is a transcendent? When love is seen from a horizontal 
understanding, does this impact one’s cynicism about intimate relationships? When love 
is transversally understood, does this lead to more volunteerism? More long-lasting 
relationships? Or even a greater degree of hope? In ascertaining a transversal versus 
universal orientation to charity, perhaps literary or other artistic forums could be used to 
demonstrate these differences. Characters such as Heathcliff in Wuthering Heights or the 
difference between Javier and Jean-Valjean in Les Miserables might help make this 
distinction. I believe couples could also provide this distinction as well, provided the 
interview is sufficiently robust and conducted over several sessions; transversality seems 
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too broad to encapsulate with a couple questions in a single interview or survey. 
Nonetheless, I believe it can be delineated with sufficient forethought and time. By 
drawing this fuzzy boundary, perhaps this “directional” orientation towards love may 
provide further insight into one’s intimate relationships allowing people further analytical 
means of critiquing the health of their interactions.  
But what about the non-ideal applications of charitable acknowledgment? As an 
ethic, charitable acknowledgment provides an ethical orientation which indicates a 
direction for action. Certainly future research would be able to ascertain other directions 
in which relationships are orientated and the impact this has on their health. A couple 
might find themselves at odds due to different approaches to love. How do mixed ethical 
orientations in an intimate relationship (e.g., one charitable acknowledgment and one 
exchange) navigate that difference and overcome it? Another question might concern 
those who are committed to the relationship but find little emotional support from it. It is 
conceivable they may be overlooking the other for the sake of an overarching principle. 
This overemphasis on the theoretical ethic is missing the active embodied need for 
engaging the other. An important research agenda could discuss the re-orientation of 
one’s phenomenological focus “downward” wherein the enacted ethic focuses on the 
“good for the other” not just the “good.” One final question concerns those overcoming 
violations of trust, where charitable acknowledgment may be a chimera. Research could 
explore the “rhetoric of healing” associated with navigating through this process. In short, 
this is an area ripe with potentialities for future research. 
 Within charitable acknowledgment, one can find several interesting questions for 
consideration. Issues of love, trust, conflict, and ethics are reinterpreted in such a way to  
 216 
   
maneuver beyond emotivism and thus explore ramifications with newfound relevance 
and possibility. It is through interpretive study that one can bring new light to bear on old 
questions in order to provide new and better explanations. Hopefully, interpersonal 
communication has been opened in new ways that can create new horizons for research 
into intimate relationships.  
 
Conclusion 
Charitable acknowledgment is one way of organizing intimate romantic 
relationships. It encourages embodiment of ethical beliefs among which are 
unconditional love, observation, appropriateness, humility, and sacrifice. One must have 
the will to live on behalf of the other. When someone else has the same will, there is 
something beautiful being acknowledged. People do need others. Our being cries out for 
relationship. Love is one of the best ways of describing the fulfillment of this need but 
sadly it is very hard to understand due to its ubiquitous and often multiple usages. The 
attempt here is to provide a framework for a healthy expression of this love so it easier to 
enter into a conversation about it in classrooms and in research. It is hoped that we have 
gone beyond mere description to give ethical guidance for action.  
In the end it is hoped that the question of “how we should reinvigorate the 
philosophical ground for other-focused action in today’s historical moment in regard to 
the study of interpersonal intimate romantic relationships?” has been given an answer. 
The active perspective of charitable acknowledgment points in this direction providing a 
means of discussing ethics. It opens the door for future moral debate in interpersonal 
communication—a much needed component to achieve relevance. Further research, may 
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indeed indicate new dynamics for interpretation of relationships. Nevertheless, while the 
mystery of intimacy might always be confined to the relationships themselves, 
acknowledgment is certainly a portion of this mystery. This life-giving gift is central to 
our existence and it is hoped relationships can be bettered through the interpersonal 
communication field spending more time discussing and learning about this valuable part 
of our spiritual existence. 
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